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By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession ofone Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse inwords)Mentall Discourse. When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever,His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Notevery Thought to every Thought succeeds indierently. . .The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, intoVerbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts into a Trayne of Words. . .Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan (1651)It is tempting to speculate that these coherence relations are instantiationsin discourse comprehension of more general principles of coherence thatwe apply in attempting to make sense of the world we nd ourselves in,principles that rest ultimately on some notion of cognitive economy.Jerry Hobbs: On the Coherence and Structure of Discourse (1985)
AbstractThe notion that a text is coherent in virtue of the `relations' that hold between its com-ponent spans currently forms the basis for an active research programme in discourselinguistics. Coherence relations feature prominently in many theories of discoursestructure, and have recently been used with considerable success in text generationsystems. However, while the concept of coherence relations is now common currencyfor discourse theorists, there remains much confusion about them, and no standard setof relations has yet emerged.The aim of this thesis is to contribute towards the development of a standard setof relations. We begin from an explicitly empirical conception of relations: they aretaken to model a collection of psychological mechanisms operative during the tasksof reading and writing. This conception is eshed out with reference to psychologi-cal theories of skilled task performance, and to Rosch's notion of the basic level ofcategorisation.A methodology for investigating these mechanisms is then presented, which takes as itsstarting point a study of cue phrases|the sentence/clause connectives by which theyare signalled. Although it is conventional to investigate psychological mechanisms bystudying human behaviour, it is argued here that evidence for the constructs modelledby relations can be sought in an analysis of the linguistic resources available for markingthem explicitly in text.The methodology is based on two simple linguistic tests: the test for cue phrasesand the test for substitutability. Both tests are functional in inspiration: the formertest identies a heterogenous class of phrases used for linking one portion of text toanother; and the latter test is used to discover when a writer is willing to substituteone of these phrases for another. The tests are designed to capture the judgementsof ordinary readers and writers, rather than the theoretical intuitions of specialiseddiscourse analysts.The test for cue phrases is used to analyse around 200 pages of naturally occurringtext, from which a corpus of over 200 cue phrases is assembled. The substitutabilitytest is then used to organise this corpus into a hierarchical taxonomy, representingthe substitutability relationship between every pair of phrases.The taxonomy of cue phrases lends itself neatly to a model of relations as feature-based constructs. Many cue phrases can be interpreted as signalling just somefeatures of relations, rather than whole relations. Small extracts from the taxonomy canbe used systematically to determine the alternative values of single features; complexrelation denitions can then be formed by combining the values of many features.The thesis delivers results on two levels. Firstly, it sets out a methodology for mo-tivating a set of relation denitions, which rests on a systematic analysis of concretelinguistic data, and demands a minimum of theoretical assumptions. Also provided arethe relation denitions which result from applying the methodology. The new deni-tions give an interesting picture of the variation that exists amongst cue phrases, andoer a number of innovative insights into text coherence.ii
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Chapter 1Introduction1.1 Discourse Coherence: The Phenomenon Under Inves-tigationTheories of discourse coherence aim to investigate the rules which govern how clausesand sentences can be strung together into a text. While syntactic theories concentrateon the internal structure of sentences, theories of discourse look beyond single sen-tences to the organisation of larger units of language, such as conversations, books ornewspaper articles.The starting point for any such theory is that what we normally think of as `connecteddiscourse' is more than just a concatenation of random sentences. This fact is uncon-tentious, and a few examples will suce to illustrate it. Consider, for instance, howa reader opening a newspaper might react to the two paragraphs given in Figure 1.1.The rst is taken from the editorial of an issue of The Economist. The second containsexactly the same clauses as the rst, but arranged in a dierent order. Whereas theformer paragraph can easily be understood, the latter is at best odd, and at worst com-pletely unintelligible. We can say, pending more precise denitions, that the formertext is coherent, whilst the latter is incoherent.1.1.1 Two Types of IncoherenceAt least two separate problems can be identied in the second paragraph in Figure 1.1.One has to do with deciding about the referents of anaphoric expressions in the text.For instance, the phrase these middle-aged rich people cannot be interpreted|it occursbefore any such group of people has been introduced. It is simply impossible for thereader to understand or evaluate any propositions in which such unresolved anaphoraappear.A second class of problems in the incoherent text relate to the reader's inability tounderstand why two portions of text are placed next to one another in the rst place.In these cases, there are no problems with nding interpretations for the two portionsof text; it is merely surprising that they have been juxtaposed. For instance, consider1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2The World in 19931993 will start with the world in a pes-simistic frame of mind. That gloomshould soon dispel itself. A clear economicrecovery is under way. Though it will behesitant at rst, it will last the longerfor being so. If you are sitting in oneof the world's blackspots, this predictionwill seem hopelessly optimistic. But nextyear's wealth won't return to yesteryear'swinners; these middle-aged rich peopleneed to look over their shoulders to theyounger world that is closing in on them.
The World in 19931993 will start with the world in a pes-simistic frame of mind. A clear economicrecovery is under way. That gloom shouldsoon dispel itself. These middle-aged richpeople need to look over their shouldersto the younger world that is closing in onthem. But next year's wealth won't re-turn to yesteryear's winners; it will lastthe longer for being so if you are sittingin one of the world's blackspots. Thoughit will be hesitant at rst, this predictionwill seem hopelessly optimistic.Figure 1.1: Coherent and Incoherent Textsthe rst two sentences of the incoherent text:(1.1) 1993 will start with the world in a pessimistic frame of mind. A clear economicrecovery is under way.Why should the world be pessimistic if an economic recovery is under way? The twostatements appear to be contradictory, and we do not expect the writer to countenanceboth of them.The two examples above appear incoherent in quite dierent ways. In fact, it is acommon assumption amongst discourse linguists that coherence is not a unitary phe-nomenon at all, but rather the product of a number of dierent mechanisms. If thisis the case, then it should be possible to undertake an explanation of some aspects ofdiscourse coherence without providing a complete account of it. In the present study,this will be the objective.1.1.2 The Role of Context in Decisions about CoherenceIt should be noted immediately that when we rule the second paragraph in Figure 1.1as incoherent, we are not making a judgement about an isolated piece of text; we arealso making certain assumptions about its reader, its writer, and the situation in whichit was produced. For instance, if the text was accompanied by a photograph of a groupof well-heeled businessmen, then a plausible referent for the phrase these middle-agedrich people would be available. Again, if we imagine the text to be aimed at readerswho believe that the world is full of anarchists who dread an economic recovery, thenthe sentences in Example 1.1 become intelligible.Judgements about coherence, therefore, are not made about strings of sentences,but about complexes comprising several additional components, including a reader,a writer, the stock of world knowledge which they share, and what we might call a`communicative situation' in which they nd themselves. This point has often been
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3made in the past: Halliday and Hasan (1976) were inuential in distinguishing betweena text and the context in which it appears, envisaging a strong role for the latterconcept in an explanation of the former. While a text is relatively concrete, taking theform either of marks on a page or of a series of spoken sounds, its context is a muchmore intangible notion, and much harder to capture. Indeed, most of the dicultieswhich arise in simulating the tasks of text production and interpretation have to dowith the adequate representation and use of the reader and writer's world knowledge,and of the situation in which a text is produced.The importance of context in the study of discourse makes the presentation of exampletexts somewhat of a problem. It is impossible to specify the context for a text underdiscussion in all its detail; in what follows, the reader will often have to imagineplausible contexts for the texts being discussed. An eort will be made to keep thistask as easy as possible.It is interesting to discover that inventing texts which are incoherent in any contextis actually quite dicult. This is particularly true as regards the kind of incoherencewhich results from juxtaposing apparently unrelated portions of text|if we allow our-selves to imagine unusual contexts, we can often give very bizarre discourses coherentinterpretations. For instance, consider Text 1.2:(1.2) Sally decided to take the history course. The ducks on the lake were noteating the bread.1This text, although odd at rst sight, can be perfectly well understood if we imagineSally to have unusual superstitions about the ducks on the lake.It seems as though readers often go out of their way to nd a coherent interpretationof a text, even when this involves making some odd assumptions about it. In a way,this is to be expected: it cannot be easy for a reader to abandon the assumption thatthe text conforms at some level to Gricean Maxims (Grice (1975)); but this is oftenwhat is required in order to appreciate that a text is incoherent. In addition, readersare not often exposed to incoherent texts, and so it is natural for them to operate onthe assumption of coherence.1.1.3 Degrees of Coherence and IncoherenceA nal observation about coherence is that it can be present in texts in varying degrees.Texts should not be thought of as either coherent or incoherent, rather as more or lesscoherent; the dividing line between coherent and incoherent texts is a hazy one.Part of this haziness can be traced to the problem mentioned in the previous section, ofthe role of context in decisions about coherence, and of the tendency of readers to lookfor plausible contexts even for the most implausible texts. However, even if contextsare fully specied in advance, texts still admit of degrees of coherence.1 Linguistic examples are hand-crafted unless otherwise noted. One of the reasons for this is so thatexamples of incoherent texts can be provided as easily as examples of coherent ones.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4There are two reasons for this. The rst is that coherence is a global measure of text.Thus it is possible that a text is coherent in some places, but incoherent in others. Itwould of course be preferable to use a more local measure of coherence to avoid thisproblem. However, we are still working with a pre-theoretical concept at present, andwithout a theory of coherence, it seems premature to try tracking down problems tospecic features of a text.A second reason for the haziness of the concept of coherence is simply that we canunderstand some texts more easily than others. If a text is well written, the intendedreader should understand it without much diculty; however, even if it is badly written,a reader may still be able to piece together its meaning. Consider the following example,from `The Brief English Handbook' (Dornan and Dawe (1984)):(1.3) Alice Adams is a successful writer, and she lives in San Fransisco, and shehas received grants from the Guggenheim foundation and the National Foun-dation for the Arts.This text is stylistically awkward, but it still manages to get its message across. Ideally,however, we would like a way of distinguishing between such texts and `well-written'ones.1.1.4 A Denition of CoherenceFor the purposes of this thesis, an operational denition of coherence is required; prefer-ably, one which does not pre-empt too many theoretical questions. In what follows,therefore, we will think of an incoherent text as one whose `structure' a high schoolteacher would be inclined to question or correct if it appeared as part of a student'sessay. We will not be concerned with any corrections a teacher might make arisingfrom bad grammar or spelling mistakes, or from errors of fact: an incoherent text isone which avoids such errors, but is nonetheless hard or impossible to understand.Admittedly, this is a very informal denition to start o with. But an initial descriptionof `what a theory is about' precisely should be informal, so as not to begin doing thework intended for the theory itself. Subsequent more precise conceptions of coherenceshould ultimately be judged according to how well they reect an informal conceptionsuch as this one.1.2 First and Second Order Tasks for Text AnalystsTheories of coherence call for texts to be analysed|that is, broken up into parts whichare given descriptions in theoretical terms. The theoretical description of an individualtext should contribute to an account of why it is or is not coherent.Two quite separate questions confront a discourse analyst. Firstly, what are the appro-priate theoretical terms to be used for describing texts, and how are they to be used?Secondly, what is the right analysis for any particular text|for instance the text on theleft in Figure 1.1? The rst question calls for a decision amongst competing theories
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5of coherence. The second calls for a decision about how to represent a particular textin terms of one theory or another. We can refer to this latter task as the rst-ordertask, and to the task of deciding between theories as the second-order task. Bothtasks have their problems. Theorists can (and do) disagree about the primitives tobe used by a theory of coherence; and also, once a theory has been agreed on, overindividual analyses.This thesis is directed primarily at the second-order task|that of deciding on theaspects of a text which an analysis should identify, rather than of determining howthese aspects are to be identied for any given text, either by a human or by a machine.The second-order task seems logically primary; after all, it is not possible to analyse atext until a particular representation formalism has been chosen. The rst-order taskwill also be addressed to some extent, however, as is detailed in Section 1.3.2.1.3 Requirements for a Theory of Discourse CoherenceWhile the previous sections described what is to be investigated in this thesis, thepresent section examines how it is to be investigated. Two requirements for a theoryof coherence are set out, one concerning the goals that the theory should have, andone concerning the kinds of intuitions which should be admissible as evidence.1.3.1 Descriptive versus Explanatory AdequacyTo assess a theory of discourse coherence, we can make use of some Chomskyan termi-nology. One of the tasks of the theory is clearly to provide a means for distinguishingbetween coherent and incoherent texts. It should be possible to use the theory todecide whether any given text is coherent or incoherent; if the theory is good, thenthese decisions will correspond to our own judgements of coherence. A theory whichsatises this requirement can be termed descriptively adequate.A second, more stringent requirement for a theory of coherence is that of explanatoryadequacy. Chomsky's (1964) original formulation of this notion is with reference tosyntactic theories. An explanatorily adequate theory is one which is able not onlyto distinguish between well-formed and ill-formed texts, but also to explain why it isthat well-formed texts are well-formed; in other words, to explain why it is that wehave the grammars that we do. The notion can apply just as easily to theories ofcoherence|in this case, it would demand that a theory is able not only to distinguishbetween coherent and incoherent texts, but also to explain why it is that readers andwriters have these standards for coherence.It is ambitious even to aim for descriptive adequacy in a theory of discourse. However,this is no reason to completely ignore the criterion of explanatory adequacy. In thisthesis, particularly in Chapter 3, the notion of explanatory adequacy will gure quiteprominently.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 61.3.2 Pre-Theoretical and Post-Theoretical IntuitionsThe raw data for a theory of discourse are `intuitions of coherence'. As Section 1.1.4species, we are examining the kind of intuitions that a high school teacher might haveabout a range of dierent texts|if corrections of a certain kind are felt to be needed,a text is classed as incoherent, otherwise, it is classed as coherent.This type of judgement about a text is what a theory of coherence must explain; it canbe termed pre-theoretical. It should be contrasted with another type of judgementabout text, which we can call post-theoretical|such judgements are about `the waya text should be described'. A post-theoretical judgement might be, for instance, that`a discourse segment boundary falls between sentences s1 and s2', or that `the focusedentity in span S5 is E3'. The rst-order task of text analysis is normally thought of asinvolving such judgements.As readers and writers of text, we might well have our own ideas about what makes atext hang together well, and these might even involve notions of text segments, focusand so on. If asked what the topic of a given sentence is, or how a given discourseshould be segmented, we would probably be able to make some suggestions. However,these intuitions should be dierentiated sharply from our intuitions of coherence. Theycannot be relied upon in the same way: while intuitions of coherence have the statusof irrefutable facts to be explained, post-theoretical intuitions are intended as part ofan explanation of those facts, and are subject to the same standards of assessment asany other explanation.In fact, our intuitions about text analysis do not seem to be especially reliable. Asalready noted, disagreements between analysts are very common. And although somemeasure of consensus among analysts is often claimed for a particular theory, dierencesbetween analysts from dierent theoretical backgrounds are often quite signicant. Theproblem is that it is hard to see how such dierences can be resolved. Why should onetheorist's intuitions be any more reliable than another's? The theorists are competingfor an explanation of the same text; if we are looking for a single theory of text, thenthere is no question of both theorists' intuitions being equally good.A second, more fundamental problem with a reliance on post-theoretical intuitions canalso be noted. There is evidence in the psychological literature that people's intuitionsabout how they perform complex and highly learned tasks dier considerably from theway they are actually performed. For instance, Berry and Broadbent (1984) have foundthat subjects' verbalisations about how they perform a task do not change markedlyas their skill increases, although qualitative changes in performance can be observed.The tasks of text generation and interpretation are highly skilled, and thus it could bethat our intuitions about them (however much we agree or disagree) are inaccurate.How then are we to go about analysing texts? In this thesis, a method will be suggestedthat relies less heavily on post-theoretical intuitions.2 It is proposed that some of theconstructs in a theory of discourse coherence can be linked a priori to a second class ofpre-theoretical data, independent from straightforward judgments of coherence. The2 Of course, the development of the theory still requires post-theoretical intuitions. The problem ofusing only pre-theoretical intuitions is highlighted by Scott and Paris (1995).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7new class of data concerns the judgements of ordinary writers about when two phrasesof a certain type can be substituted for one another in a text, and will be describedin detail in the following chapters. The important thing to note now is that thejudgements are ones which a normal writer is frequently called upon to make; theydo not require the analyst to think explicitly about theoretical concepts like `focus' ortext segments and so diverge from tasks present in the normal writing process. If thetheory of coherence is successful, then, it will identify a correlation between the twoclasses of pre-theoretical intuitions.This approach to theorising about discourse is much closer to the traditional pattern ofempirical theories; it consists in making predictions about the relationship between twoindependent sets of data to be explained. For another example of this approach, wecan again refer to theories of syntax. In a syntactic theory, the original pre-theoreticalintuitions to be accounted for are judgements of well-formedness. These are explainedin terms of a theory whose central construct is that of a `constituent'. This constructis in turn grounded in other pre-theoretical intuitions, enshrined in the so-called `testsfor constituency'. For instance, it is specied that constituents can typically be movedfrom one part of a sentence to another, or replaced by an anaphoric expression, withoutaecting well-formedness. The crucial point is that our intuitions about these manipu-lations are dierent from our intuitions of well-formedness themselves. And moreover,they cannot be questioned; they are just another phenomenon to be explained. Essen-tially, what we have is a theory which makes predictions about a relationship betweentwo independent classes of data. If these predictions are borne out, we have an empir-ical result.Of course, the development of the theory itself still requires post-theoretical intuitions.Denitions for theoretical constructs must be proposed, and we must justify the deci-sion to link these constructs to pre-theoretical judgements.1.4 An Outline of the ThesisWe began this chapter by introducing and expanding on the notion of discourse coher-ence. We then distinguished the task of creating a theory of discourse coherence fromthe task of analysing particular texts in terms of such a theory|only the former taskwill be attempted in this thesis. Finally, we set out the requirements for a theory ofcoherence; namely that it seeks for an explanatory account of the phenomenon, andthat it draws only on the pre-theoretical intuitions of ordinary readers and writers.A summary of the rest of the thesis will now be given.Chapter 2: Coherence RelationsThe thesis targets a particular class of discourse theories; those which attribute thecoherence of a text (at least in part) to the relations which hold, at dierent levels ofhierarchy, between its various sub-parts. Many such theories can be found in the liter-ature; in the last few years, the notion of coherence relations has become increasinglypopular as they have been successfully adapted for use in computational applications
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8such as text generation systems.This chapter reviews the many dierent theories of coherence relations, emphasisingthe dierences between them, and their lack of agreement on a standard set of relations.The proliferation of alternative sets of relations is the central problem to be addressedin the thesis. What is needed is a clear conception of the role of relations, and basedon this, a method for justifying one particular set of relations over the others.Chapter 3: Motivating a Set of RelationsIn this chapter two existing approaches for justifying relations are described and com-pared. One approach associates relations with linguistic conjunctions or cue phrases.This permits a subtle classication of relations, but seems to lack explanatory ade-quacy; it is not clear why relations thus dened should provide a particularly revealingaccount of text. A second approach is to think of relations as modelling a set of psycho-logical constructs used by readers and writers when they process text. This promises amore explanatory account; but there are problems with the experimental methodolo-gies designed to investigate these constructs, because we have no reliable experimentalwindow on `the relations people use'.The main proposal in the thesis is that these two methods can be combined, in sucha way as to maximise the advantages of both, while avoiding their main problems. Itis argued that cue phrases can be taken as evidence for relations precisely if they arethought of as modelling psychological constructs.Chapter 4: A Data-Driven Methodology for Determining a Set ofRelationsOn the basis of the argument in Chapter 3, a step-by-step methodology is proposed formotivating a set of relations, making use of the pre-theoretical intuitions of readers andwriters. The rst step is to gather a corpus of cue phrases. A pre-theoretical test forcue phrases is described, which is used to gather a corpus of some 200 phrases fromseveral hundred pages of naturally occurring text. These phrases are then organisedinto a taxonomy, using a second pre-theoretical test for substitutability, which tapswriter's intuitions about whether one phrase can replace another in a given context.The corpus of cue phrases is given in Appendix A, and the taxonomy of cue phrasesin Appendix B.Chapter 5: Preliminaries for Dening a Set of RelationsThis chapter outlines how the taxonomy of cue phrases can be used systematically tomotivate a set of relation denitions. It is argued that the taxonomy lends itself verynaturally to a conception of relations as feature-based constructs. Some generalcriteria for the individual features to be motivated are then discussed.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9Chapter 6: Using the Taxonomy to Create Relation DenitionsIn this chapter, a preliminary set of relation denitions is put forward. To begin with,the taxonomy of cue phrases is used systematically to motivate a number of orthogonalfeatures: each feature is justied individually on the basis of appropriate extracts fromthe taxonomy. After this, the issue of how these features can be assembled to createcomplex relation denitions is discussed. The complete set of feature denitions is givenin Appendix C, and a preliminary set of relation denitions is given in Appendix D.The task of motivating features from the taxonomy is an arduous one, and thereis plenty of room for improvement and addition to the sets of features and relationdenitions reached in this chapter. However, a number of interesting new ideas doemerge as the theoretical interpretation of the taxonomy is developed. The fact thatsubstitution methodology yields these fruitful results is an additional argument in itsfavour.Chapter 7: An Evaluation of the Substitution MethodologyIn this chapter, a number of problems with the substitution methodology are takenup. These have to do partly with the operation of the substitutability test itself,and partly with the set of relations which it eventually sanctions. None of theseproblems appears fatal to the proposed methodology, although they all point to furtherinteresting avenues of research.Chapter 8: ConclusionsThe objectives of the thesis are quite straightforward. It attempts to remedy a currentproblem for theories of discourse, namely the confusing proliferation of coherence re-lations. It does so by giving rstly a concrete proposal about what relations should bethought of as modelling; secondly a clear methodology for investigating these entities;and thirdly, as a result of applying this methodology, an embryonic set of relationdenitions.The contribution of the thesis is twofold. The most tangible contribution is the set ofrelation denitions itself|these have several features not found in other sets of rela-tions, and promise to be useful both in text analysis and in computational applications.However, it really requires more justication than this for bringing yet another set ofrelations into the world. The primary aim of the thesis is to establish and argue for asystematic methodology for determining a set of relations, based on a battery of fairlyreplicable linguistic tests. While it is unrealistic to suppose that every researcher whouses it will emerge with the same set of relations, it would at least be preferable ifthe dierences between them could be traced to disagreements over the interpretationof concrete linguistic data, rather than being expressed in terms of intangible rstprinciples.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 101.5 The Scope of the Project, and Some TerminologyBefore moving on, a word is in order about the type of texts which are within the scopeof this study. I will only be looking at monologue in this thesis; and I shall concentrate(but not exclusively) on written monologue. Texts which incorporate devices fromdialogue such as direct speech or question-and-answer patterns (`How do we knowthis? By looking at the evidence') will not be considered. I will also concentrate onEnglish texts|although some cross-linguistic comparisons will be made in Chapters 3and 7.Finally, some terminology. I will use the words text and discourse interchangeably.Unlike Halliday and Hasan, for whom `a text' is by denition coherent, I shall think ofa text or discourse as any sequence of sentences produced by one writer in a particularcontext|texts can thus be ruled as coherent or incoherent.I will refer throughout to the readers and writers of a text; these terms are intendedcover hearers and speakers too, where applicable. To circumvent the biases of English,writers will be referred to generically as `she', and readers as `he'.
Chapter 2Coherence Relations: A Surveyof Research2.1 IntroductionThis chapter reviews the existing literature on coherence relations, placing it withinthe wider context of research into discourse coherence. A roughly historical perspectivewill be taken in presenting the dierent theories, beginning from the early work in textlinguistics and nishing with the latest computational research.Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide some preliminaries to the review. In Section 2.2, a workingdenition of coherence relations is given, broad enough to encompass all the theoriesto be discussed here. Section 2.3 considers how (if at all) a purely relational theorymust be supplemented in order to achieve a complete account of discourse coherence.In Section 2.4, the many relational theories in the literature are presented. Recently,some of these theories have found useful application in computational domains, par-ticularly in natural language generation: Section 2.5 describes how coherence relationshave been adapted to this task, and surveys the dierent systems which have resulted.Section 2.6 outlines the central problem to be addressed in this thesis: the proliferationof sets of relations, both in theories of coherence and in generation systems. The lackof a well-established, standard set of relations is already recognised in the literature:each theorist|and each generation system|uses a dierently-dened set of relations.This makes it hard to draw comparisons between the various theories and systems;and worse, threatens to undermine the empirical content of the relation construct ingeneral.2.2 A Working Denition of Coherence RelationsAs was noted at the very beginning, the point of departure for a discourse theorist isthat a coherent text is more than just a concatenation of sentences. The propertiesof any given sentence in a text place certain constraints on those of its neighbouring11
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 12sentences|in other words, there are constraints on the relations between the sentencesin a coherent text.However, to say at this point that `a text is coherent because of the relations betweenits sentences' is not to make any particular theoretical claim; we are simply re-iteratingthe phenomenon to be explained. There are as many `relations between sentences' asthere are pairs of possible sentences|clearly what matters for a coherent text is thatthe relations be of the right kind.A proper theory of coherence relations thus needs to propose a particular set of rela-tions, and claim that texts are only coherent if they are composed of relations fromwithin this set. At this point, the term `relation' acquires a new, technical meaning,referring to a class of well-dened theoretical constructs.Dierent theories have taken dierent approaches to the denition of relations. How-ever, there are some concepts which we will take as central to all relational theories:these are outlined below.2.2.1 A View to Explaining the Notion of CoherenceRelations have been used for a variety of purposes in the literature: for planning thestructure of text, for working out the temporal relations between clauses or sentences,for identifying or generating the referents of anaphora, and so on (see Sections 2.4and 2.5 for details of some of these). However, in this thesis it will be taken ascentral to a theory of relations that it is concerned at least in part with providingan explanatory account of text coherence. In practice, this conception of relationsoften underlies accounts developed for specic purposes. (For instance, if a theory ofrelations is useful in predicting the pattern of anaphora in a text, it is reasonable toassume that this is because it captures something about the ways a coherent text canbe structured.) This concern will be a unifying thread behind all the accounts to beconsidered here.2.2.2 Text SpansA theory of relations must specify the units between which relations are required tohold in a text. In all the theories to be considered here, we can begin by thinking ofrelations as holding between text spans|units of text the size of a clause or bigger.In fact, theories often propose that relations hold between more abstract entities, suchas propositions or intentions, which are expressed in text spans; however, the linkbetween these entities and the spans which express them is sucient at least to beginto make comparisons. In particular, a common graphical representation is possible forall coherence relations, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.1 In this diagram, the horizontallines represent text spans, and the curved line represents the relation between them.The line is labelled with the name of the relation (in this case, evidence,2 a relationtaken from Rhetorical Structure Theory|see Section 2.4.3 below).1 This representation is adapted from that used in Mann and Thompson (1988).2 The names of relations will appear in small capitals throughout the thesis.
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Bill can’t be feeling very well. He hasn’t touched his food.
evidenceFigure 2.1: Graphical Representation of a Coherence RelationText spans can be of dierent sizes. In some theories, spans are always associated withindividual clauses or sentences. In others, they can vary in size from single clauses towhole paragraphs and even larger sections of text. Still other theories allow relationsto hold between elements within a single clause. In this thesis, we shall be mainlyconcerned with spans ranging in size from clauses to paragraphs. It is taken to be adening feature of coherence relations that they can apply between text spans of anysize within this range.Insensitivity to span size is a useful feature of coherence relations. It permits a hierar-chical, recursive account of text, in which small spans are joined together by relationsto form larger spans, which are themselves be joined together by other relations. Anexample is given in Figure 2.2.




he didn’t even try
some soup.
evidence
elaborationFigure 2.2: A Hierarchical Structure of Relations2.2.3 Span StructureAs well as a providing a conception of text spans, a relational theory must specify theplaces where relations are needed in a coherent discourse. Whereabouts in a text mustrelations be present in order to ensure its coherence? Are they needed between everypair of clauses? Between every pair of paragraphs? How are the various spans in atext supposed to be connected up?To answer these questions, we need what can be termed a theory of span struc-ture, telling us, for any given text, where the coherence relations are expected to befound. Again, there is scope for considerable variation amongst such theories. In some,relations are not expected between every pair of clauses. In others, more than one rela-tion can apply simultaneously between two spans; in others, several consecutive spanscan be linked together by a chain of relations; other theories allow relations betweendiscontinuous spans.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 142.3 Relations and Focus: Alternative Metaphors for Dis-course CoherenceAmong other things, the theory of span structure determines how much of the coherenceof a discourse is to be attributed to relations. Few, if any, researchers would claimthat relations tell us everything we need to know about discourse coherence|they aretypically held to account just for some aspects of it. To help delineate the territory tobe explained by relations, it is useful to consider some of the other constructs used intheories of coherence; and in particular the concept of focus.Many theories of discourse (eg Sidner (1983), Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein (1983), Bren-nan et al (1987), McCoy and Cheng (1991)) analyse a text in terms of the way its `focus'moves from one entity to another. At any particular moment while a text is being read,certain objects in its domain of reference are `in focus': the reader is attending to theseelements in particular. The concept of focus has proved extremely useful in modellinganaphora resolution|focused entities are those which can be referred to anaphorically.But it is also used to talk about coherence: the idea is that a writer must obey certainconstraints when changing the focus from one entity to another. Consider the followingtwo texts:(2.1) Dow Associates today launched a surprise bid for the beleagured Harris group.Harris reacted speedily, holding an upbeat press conference.(2.2) *Dow Associates today launched a surprise bid for the beleagured Harris group.Beans, which contain lots of protein, are good for you.The notion of focus can be used to explain why Text 2.1 is coherent and Text 2.2 isnot. At any point in the text, the entities to which the focus can shift are grouped in alist, which Sidner calls the `potential focus list' and Grosz et al call the `forward centerlist'. The potential focus list associated with the rst sentence in each case contains,among other things, Harris, but it does not contain beans; Text 2.1 shifts its focus toHarris and is thus coherent, but Text 2.2 makes an illegal shift to beans, and is thusincoherent.Clearly, there is a signicant possibility for overlap between the metaphors of `relations'and `focus'. The coherence of Text 2.1, for instance, might equally be attributed to theexistence of a relation (perhaps called something like result or reaction) betweenits two sentences.At the same time, the overlap between the two metaphors is not complete. For in-stance, the binary nature of relations makes them better suited to an analysis of localconstraints on coherence, such as those which might apply between two neighbouringspans regardless of their context. Constraints operative over more than two spans (forexample, prohibitions on `straying from the original topic', or on `returning to a topicpreviously closed') might be better dealt with using the focus metaphor. For anotherthing, relations (as we are thinking of them) do not hold between entities referred toin a text; rather, they link sections of the text itself (or at least the propositions orintentions which underlie it). `Being in focus', on the other hand, is something moreeasily attributed to entities being discussed in a text than to portions of the text itself.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 15Of course, the aspects of coherence targetted by relations and by focus can vary con-siderably from theory to theory|there is a large degree of exibility as to how thework should be divided up. The important thing is to make sure that between thetwo accounts, all aspects of text coherence are covered, and (equally importantly) thatthere is no redundancy between them. For this reason, when developing a theory ofrelations it is important to specify exactly which aspects of coherence it is intendedto cover. Ideally, what is needed is a clear way of distinguishing the contributions tocoherence made by focus and by relations, in such a way as to make best use of bothmetaphors.This thesis is primarily concerned with developing a theory of coherence relations;the issue of focus will take a back seat in most of what follows. However, it will re-appear with an important role in Chapter 6, when the new theory of relations is to beevaluated, and for this reason it is mentioned here.2.4 Current Theories of Coherence RelationsTo sum up so far: the requirements for a relational theory of coherence are (1) a setof relation denitions; (2) a conception of text spans; (3) a theory of span structure;and (4) some kind of delineation of the phenomena to be accounted for using therelational metaphor. The present section discusses the important relational theories inthe literature in the light of these requirements, and examines the dierences betweenthem.I will not go into the details of individual relation denitions in this review, althoughin many cases a rough idea of the nature of an individual relation is given by its name.My main purpose is to point out the diversity that exists between the many sets ofrelations that have been put forward.2.4.1 Some Early Relational AccountsAttempts to delineate the set of relations that can hold between sections of a discoursedate back at least to the 1970s; perhaps the rst of note is that of Ballard, Conradand Longacre (1971). The aim in this study is to catalogue the `deep' relations whichunderlie the `surface' syntactic relations between clauses in complex sentences. Ballardet al note that there is no straightforward one-to-one mapping between surface con-junctions and the semantic relationships between the clauses they link|for instance,the conjunction because can be used to signal a relation of efficient cause (He didit because she wanted him to) or of generic-specific (They don't taste good becausethey are bitter). Conversely, a single semantic relationship can be encoded in dierentways: for instance, the sentences I left before Mary came back and I left at about thesame time as Mary came back can be used to describe exactly the same situation,emphasising dierent aspects of it. The precise roles of deep and surface relationsare not completely clear in this account; however, a distinction between the underly-ing relations in a text and the way they are signalled is retained in many subsequenttheories.













Figure 2.3: The Top Levels of Longacre's Taxonomy of RelationsGrimes' model of relations (Grimes (1975)) gives them a dual role: they provide in-formation, just as clauses do, and they also organise groups of clauses into coherentdiscourses. Like Longacre, his basic units are clauses (embodying `lexical predicates')and the relations between them (embodying `rhetorical predicates'). However, thisanalysis admits of exceptions. Rhetorical relationships can be found within clauses;for instance, the relation of alternative, typically expressed between two or moreclauses, is also found in the single clause Let's have no more of your neither-here-nor-there observations.4 Moreover, the arguments of a lexical predicate can be spreadout over several clauses; for instance, the arguments of the predicate `drop' might bepresented as follows: The stone fell. It hit the ground. Zog made it happen.).3 Small capitals will also be used to refer to groups of relations identied by a particular theory.Hence, there will be no typographical way of distinguishing between an individual relation and aclass of relations.4 Though in Grimes' example, it is not very clear what elements in the clause the relation appliesbetween.
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constituencyFigure 2.4: Grimes' Taxonomy of RelationsAlthough their taxonomies are quite dierent, the theories of Grimes and Longacrehave much in common. For one thing, relations are dened independently of surfacelinguistic phenomena, in terms of the underlying semantics of the clauses which expressthem|they seem essentially to hold between propositions.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 18A second point of similarity between the two theories is the ability of relations tohold within clauses, as well as between them. Both theories, perhaps because theylook beneath the surface structures in text, forfeit a solid conception of the `textunits' between which relations are construed to hold. For instance, Longacre sees anefficient cause relation in the single clause Stephen made Kathleen do it; Grimes seesan adversative relation in the clause I'd rather have coee than tea. It is not clearhow, if at all, the semantic units being related in these examples map onto distinct,neighbouring sections of text. It is not even clear that the units being related are wholepropositions. In such a situation, a theory of relations starts to encroach on a theoryof the semantics of clauses; it becomes hard to see how the work is to be divided upbetweeen the two types of theory.Finally, while both accounts envisage relations applying between large sections of textsuch as groups of sentences, paragraphs and so on, neither of them has much to sayabout these higher levels|they both focus on the mechanisms of clause combinationwithin complex sentences. For a fuller account of coherence, relations between sentencecomplexes and paragraphs must also be investigated.2.4.2 Cohesive RelationsAn alternative conception of relations downplays the importance of the `deep structure'of text, concentrating on an analysis of the resources available in a language to signalrelations explicitly in the surface structure. This approach is adopted by Halliday andHasan (1976), and also (to some extent) by Martin (1992).Halliday and Hasan's Conjunctive RelationsHalliday and Hasan (1976) set out to describe the cohesive resources in a language;that is, the resources available for linking sentences together in text. Cohesive relationsare semantic in nature, and apply both within sentences and between them. However,when found inside sentences, they interact with a theory of sentence structure whichis outside the scope of Halliday and Hasan's investigation; they are only studied intheir `pure' form, between whole sentences.There are several types of cohesive relation: reference, substitution, ellipsis, lexi-cal cohesion, and conjunction. The rst four of these can be thought of as depen-dency structures, where one portion of a text can only be interpreted by reference tosomething else, either in the preceding or following portions of text or in the environ-ment in which the text is found. Conjunctive relations, on the other hand, are notinstructions about how to interpret a portion of text, but a specication of the way inwhich two already interpretable portions of text are to be linked together. These arethe correlates of coherence relations.Halliday and Hasan's study is primarily of conjunctive elements in a language;i.e. its resources for signalling conjunctive relations. Essentially, what is provided isa classication of sentence conjunctions. Several commentators have criticised theirreliance on surface features in text for an account of coherence, arguing that texts can
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 19be coherent without any explicit signals. However, while a surface analysis certainlydominates in Halliday and Hasan, relations are not tied irrevocably to surface structure:it is the underlying semantic relation. . . that actually has the cohesive power.This explains how it is that we are often prepared to recognise the presenceof a relation. . . even when it is not expressed overtly at all. We are preparedto supply it for ourselves, and thus to assume that there is cohesion eventhough it has not been explicitly demonstrated.Halliday and Hasan (1976), p229Having said that, the idea of implicit relations is not discussed at length by Hallidayand Hasan, and the mapping between conjunctive elements and `underlying relations'remains unclear.The actual classication of conjunctive phrases involves a fourfold distinction betweenadditive, adversative, causal and temporal relations. The adversative rela-tions cover part of the ground covered by Longacre's frustrated relations; but herethey are not factored out as an orthogonal dimension. An alternative orthogonal dis-tinction is proposed instead, between internal and external relations. Externalrelations hold between things referred to in a text, while internal relations hold be-tween elements which are constitutive of the text itself|things such as speech acts.To give a canonical example, consider Texts 2.3 and 2.4:(2.3) First he switched on the light. Next he inserted the key into the lock.(2.4) First he was unable to stand upright. Next he was incapable of inserting thekey into the lock.Both texts contain temporal relations. But in 2.3 the relation is between two eventsin the world (and hence external); while in 2.4 it is between two speech acts, `I assertthat he was unable to stand upright' and `I assert that he was incapable of insertingthe key into the lock'5 (and is hence internal). The distinction between internaland external relations is another one which is echoed in many subsequent relationaltheories.The top levels of Halliday and Hasan's taxonomy are given (in slightly simplied form)in Figure 2.5.By concentrating on an analysis of surface features in text, Halliday and Hasan'stheory avoids some of the problems associated with Grimes' and Longacre's accounts.Conjunctive elements are concrete linguistic entities, and it is at least clear whereaboutsin a text they are present (even if it is not so easy to decide exactly which units theyare linking). But Halliday and Hasan admit that a complete account of text must makereference to unmarked relations. And it is not enough just to recognise the existenceof such relations|they must be properly described and individuated.5 The interpretation in this case is presumably that the writer is enumerating two points in anargument.



















externalFigure 2.5: The Top Levels of Halliday and Hasan's Taxonomy of RelationsOn a separate note, the decision not to consider the relations within complex sentencesseems overly cautious. Admittedly, it avoids any possible confusion between a theory ofclause semantics and a theory of discourse structure; however, there are so many simi-larities between clause-combining and sentence-combining phrases that generalisationswill surely be lost if only the latter group is studied. Consider the phrases althoughand however|the former links clauses, the latter links sentences; but they have verysimilar functions. Why should they not be accounted for in the same theory?It should be clear by now that the demands for structural simplicity in a theory andfor a complete account of the underlying relations in a text pull in opposite directions.A compromise is needed between `deep structure' accounts (which tend to fudge thedividing line between theories of clause semantics and discourse structure) and surfaceaccounts (which often leave important features of a text unexplained). It remains tobe seen whether a theory can be developed which avoids both of these problems.Martin's RelationsMartin's (1992) theory of relations follows Halliday and Hasan in its emphasis onexplicit linguistic conjunctions|in essence, it provides an alternative taxonomy ofconnectives. However, it expands on their theory in two respects. Firstly, it givesa better account of the relationship between `deep' and `surface' relations: basically,an implicit relation exists at a given point in a text if a conjunctive phrase can beinserted at that point.As a test for the presence of an implicit connection it can be required thatthe connection could have been explicit. . . Martin (1992), p184



















externalFigure 2.6: The Top Levels of Martin's Taxonomy of Relationsonomy is designed as a systemic network, framed in terms of the choices availableto the writer. The writer begins by making high-level decisions about the nature ofthe relation, and these generate progressively lower-level choices until a decision abouta particular conjunction can be made. The central division into additive, com-parative, temporal and consequential relations is supplemented by orthogonaldistinctions between internal and external (taken from Halliday and Hasan) andbetween paratactic and hypotactic (reminiscent of Grimes's taxonomy). At lowerlevels, an extremely subtle classication is eected, which distinguishes around 100dierent types of conjunction.2.4.3 Computational Theories of RelationsIn the 1980s, computational linguists became interested in coherence relations as poten-tially useful constructs in discourse processing applications. A number of distinctively`computational' theories of relations appeared, characterised by the use of A.I. conceptssuch as knowledge representation, planning and recursion. Three of these theories will
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 22be outlined in this section.Hobbs' TheoryHobbs' theory (1985) emphasises the amount of world knowledge that is required tointerpret discourse. He considers the following text by way of illustration:(2.5) John took a book from the shelf. He turned to the index.It is clear to the reader that the index referred to in the second clause is that of thebook which John has just taken; but to make this inference automatically requires agreat deal of knowledge about what people do with books, what indices are, and so on.The relations Hobbs proposes are dened in terms of the dierent kinds of inferenceswhich the reader needs to draw in order to make sense of a text.Hobbs identies four types of inference, and accordingly, four categories of coherencerelations. He notes rstly that a discourse can be coherent because it talks aboutcoherent events in the world; events such that if one is known, the other one can beinferred given appropriate background knowledge. Two portions of text describing twosuch events are said to be linked by an occasion relation. This relation subdividesinto relations like cause and enablement.Secondly, discourse coherence can be due to the fact that the speaker has some rationalstructure of goals for producing a discourse. Sometimes these goals are referred to fairlyexplicitly in the text:(2.6) Did you bring your car today? Mine is at the garage.Hobbs accounts for such references with the class of evaluation relations, whichassociate some portion of discourse with a piece of `metatalk' about why that portionis in the discourse.Thirdly, a discourse will only be coherent if what the speaker says can be linked towhat the hearer already knows. This idea provides the basis for the background andexplanation relations, which perform this function.Fourthly, the hearer of a discourse has only limited processing resources: thereforea coherent discourse makes explicit certain inferences which, given greater resources,he could be expected to make for himself. Expansion, the fourth class of coherencerelation, links such inferences: two clear examples are parallel and contrast.The set of relations in Hobbs' theory is given in Figure 2.7.Hobbs' appreciation of the need for a knowledge-intensive approach to discourse in-terpretation is characteristic of a computational theory. Also characteristic is a well-articulated account of the compositional nature of relations:When two segments of discourse are discovered to be linked by some co-herence relation, we can consider the two together as a single segment of












negative contrastFigure 2.7: The Relations in Hobbs' Theorydiscourse. By recognising coherence relations between segments, we canthus build up recursively a structure for the discourse as a whole.Hobbs (1985), p22The conception of relations as recursive mechanisms for building up large sections oftext has two useful consequences. Firstly, it helps to give substance to the structuraltheory of text called for in Section 2.2.3. This theory, it will be recalled, is required tospecify for any text whereabouts relations are expected to be found; Hobbs' suggestionis basically that a tree structure of relations must exist in a text for it to be coherent.Secondly, the recursive conception of relations suggests for them a procedural role inconstructing large sections of text. Recursively dened constructs are well suited,for instance, to hierarchical planning formalisms. And thinking about relations inthe context of a planning paradigm also suggests how they could be grounded in apsychological theory of text processing|at one point Hobbs likens relations to `text-building strategies', used by the writer to facilitate the task of the reader. This ideawhich will be taken up in much more detail in the next chapter.Grosz and Sidner's RelationsGrosz and Sidner's (1986) theory also features recursively dened relations. In thisaccount, discourse segments (dss) are the principal units of structure, and relationshold between these to form larger dss. However, the primitives used to dene relationsare dierent from those of Hobbs: they make reference solely to the intentions awriter has in creating a text. Relations actually apply between discourse segmentpurposes (dsps); an assumption is made that a single overriding intention can bespecied for each segment, and it is these intentions which are connected by relations.The fundamental metaphor is of a text embodying the execution of a plan pursued bythe writer.66 Note that although Grosz and Sidner frequently use examples from task-oriented dialogues, theytake care in such cases to distinguish the plan required to carry out the task from the plan requiredto create the text. (See Litman and Allen (1990) for further discussion of discourse plans anddomain-level plans.)
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 24Using intentions in relation denitions follows quite naturally from thinking of themin the context of a recursive planning paradigm. Plans are produced to achieve usergoals (or in the present case, writer goals); and do so by decomposing a principal goalinto a hierarchy of subgoals. What is more, it is easy to see how the same intention can`underlie' text spans of very dierent sizes. For instance, the same goal to convincethe reader of some fact might require an extended argument for one reader, but asimple sentence for another reader who is already disposed to believe it. Note that it ismuch harder to claim that two dierently-sized texts contain the same `propositionalcontent'. Intentions therefore seem to provide an ideal way of dening relations whichmust hold between spans of very dierent sizes.There are only two relations in Grosz and Sidner's theory: dominance and satisfaction-precedence (see Figure 2.8). Since these are the rst intentionally dened relations
dominance
satisfaction-precedenceFigure 2.8: The Relations in Grosz and Sidner's Theorywe have come across, it is worth spelling them out in detail: dsp2 dominates dsp1 (and dsp1 contributes to dsp2) if the satisfaction ofdsp1 is intended to provide part of the satisfaction of dsp2. dsp1 satisfaction-precedes dsp2 if both purposes are dominated by some otherpurpose dsp3, but in order to satisfy dsp3, dsp1 has to be satised before dsp2.For example, Text 2.7 contains a dominance relation:(2.7) Television is bad for children. They grow up on a steady diet of violence andadvertising.while Text 2.8 (second sentence) contains one of satisfaction-precedence:(2.8) Try out the gun by ring o a few rounds. First, release the safety catch;then squeeze the trigger gently.As well as dening their relations dierently, Grosz and Sidner also adopt a slightlydierent conception of compositionality to that proposed by Hobbs. While Hobbssees a relation between two adjacent spans as forming a new composite span, Groszand Sidner's composite discourse segments include the segments which they dominate.Thus in Text 2.7, the subordinate span is the second sentence, and the dominant spanis the rst and second sentences together.A nal attractive feature of Grosz and Sidner's theory is its account of the interactionbetween relations and focus. Associated with every discourse segment is a focus space,
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 25and at every point in a text a focus stack is given which models the reader's focus ofattention as the discourse proceeds (elements at the top of the stack being `more salient'to the reader than elements lower down). The metaphor of a stack is another importfrom computational theories. Its pushes and pops are determined by the dominancerelations in the text: if the segment S2 dominates a sub-segment S1, then moving intoS1 causes the focus space associated with S1 to be pushed onto the stack, and leavingS1 causes it to be popped o the stack.Grosz and Sidner's theory is the rst to look in detail at relations between larger sizedunits of text; indeed most of their examples are of high-level relations. In fact, thetheory does not provide a very complete account of lower level relations such as thosebetween single clauses or sentences. Even `atomic' discourse segments are often largerthan a single sentence. The rationale for these units is based on studies of how `naive'subjects segment discourses (1975) and of how speech rate correlates with segmentboundaries (1975). However, whether or not these studies are convincing, there seemsno reason in principle why the analysis of text units should not descend at least to thelevel of individual sentences.Rhetorical Structure TheoryWe turn now to the third computational theory to be discussed|rhetorical structuretheory (rst). This theory, developed mainly by William Mann and Sandra Thompson,is presented in a number of papers; in this thesis I shall for the most part be drawingon the account in Mann and Thompson (1988), which is the most comprehensive.The central constructs in rst are rhetorical relations. Text coherence is attributedprincipally to the presence of these relations; unlike Grosz and Sidner, Mann andThompson do not envisage an important role for other constructs such as focus. Theclaim is that the relations in rst suce to analyse `the vast majority' of English texts;exceptions are only made for very unusual texts like poems and legal documents.Rhetorical relations are dened functionally, in terms of the eect the writer intendsto achieve by presenting two text spans side by side. In this respect, they resembleGrosz and Sidner's relations. However, there are also several dierences between thetwo types of relation.Firstly, rst relations do in fact make some reference to the propositional content ofspans, as well as to the intentions of the writer in putting them forward. For instance,the motivation relation species that one of the spans `presents' an action to beperformed by the reader; the sequence relation species that a succession relationshipmust exist between the related spans. rst relations are in fact dened using veelds|only one of these explicitly represents the eect of the relation; the othersrepresent the various dierent constraints that must be satised in order to achievethis eect, and these are specied using a mixture of propositional and intentionallanguage.Secondly, Mann and Thompson go out of their way to rule out a connection betweenthe set of relations and the linguistic devices used to signal them. This goes beyondthe claim that the relations in a text need not be signalled|they further suggest that
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 26some types of rhetorical relations have no corresponding conjunctive signals.Mann and Thompson (1988), p45 (my italics)In this, their theory diers from Grosz and Sidner's (and many others besides), inwhich at least an informal link is made between underlying relations and the linguisticdevices for marking them.A third novel feature of rst is its concept of nuclearity. As well as representingthe relationship between two text spans, rhetorical relations also convey informationabout which span is more central to the writer's purposes. The nucleus is the morecentral span, and the satellite is the less central one.7 Mann and Thompson con-tend that the majority of text is structured using nucleus-satellite relations; althoughsome relations|termedmultinuclear|do not exhibit it. (There are two multinuclearrelations: sequence and contrast.)The nucleus-satellite distinction is in some ways comparable to the paratactic-hypotactic distinction of Grimes and others. But while these are expressed in se-mantic or even syntactic terms, rst's denition is functional, based on the idea that awriter has more important and less important goals when she sets out to create a text.Nucleus-satellite relations are in fact more reminiscent of Grosz and Sidner's class ofdominance relations. But even here there is a dierence: in Grosz and Sidner's modelit is hard to talk about the purpose of the dominant span being `more central' to thewriter than that of the subordinate span, because the former purpose actually includesthe latter.rst provides a set of around 23 rhetorical relations. The numbers vary slightly frompaper to paper, but the central core of relations as presented in Mann and Thompson(1988) are given in Figure 2.9. The top-level distinction in this taxonomy is betweensubject-matter and presentational relations. Subject-matter relations haveas their eect that the reader recognize the relation in question; while presentationalrelations have as their eect to increase some inclination in the reader. Thus sequenceis a subject-matter relation (its eect is that the reader recognize that the two re-lated spans present events occurring in sequence) and motivation is presentational(its eect is to increase the reader's motivation to perform the action presented in thenucleus span). To some extent, this distinction mirrors Halliday and Hasan's distinc-tion between internal and external relations. But again, the similarity is far fromcomplete.Like the other computational theories of relations, rst has a strong structural ac-count of text. It begins with an independent denition of `text span'|for Mann andThompson, the size of the atomic units of text analysis is arbitrary, but they shouldhave independent functional integrity. The clause is selected as the minimal unit oforganisation; thus text spans are clauses, or larger units composed of clauses. UnlikeGrosz and Sidner, relations must hold between non-overlapping text spans. (An ex-7 A test for nuclearity is to delete the satellite span of a given relation and see if the resulting textstill makes sense. The prediction is that without the nucleus, the signicance of the material in thesatellite will not be apparent, while the nucleus should be able to stand by itself. This test is ratherblunt, and not completely reliable, but it is useful at least in giving some substance to Mann andThompson's notion of nuclearity.

































(d) (e)Figure 2.10: The Types of Schema in rstIn this diagram, horizontal lines depict text spans, the labelled lines depict relationsbetween spans, nuclei are picked out by the vertical lines (they are diagonal for mult-inuclear relations), and all other spans are satellites. From these structures, schemaapplications are formed, by rearranging the spans in any order and by duplicatingspans any number of times. (For the schemas with satellites, only the satellite spanscan be duplicated.) Relations are then tted to the schema applications thus formed|relations which take a nucleus and a satellite are tted to the single or dual relation
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 28schema applications, and the specialised contrast and sequence relations are ttedto the individual schemas (b) and (e) respectively. The `joint' schema is for linkingpieces of text which are not linked by any RST relations, and is essentially used forrepresenting lists.A rhetorical structure tree is a hierarchical system of schema applications. Aschema application links a number of consecutive spans, and creates a complex spanwhich can in turn be linked by a higher level schema application. This enables treestructures to be built|it is a central claim of RST that the structure of every coherentdiscourse can be described by a single rhetorical structure tree, whose top schemaapplication creates a span encompassing the whole discourse.An interesting aspect of rst's structural account is its use of the multisatellite schema(illustrated in Figure 2.10 (d)). Note that in this case, there is no relation linking thesecond and third spans; although they are adjacent, they are only linked indirectly,by virtue of both being related to the rst span. (They might, for instance, be twoseparate justifications for a claim expressed in the rst span.) Other theorists havechosen to model such structures with a new type of relation; for instance, Hallidayand Hasan's internal sequence accomplishes exactly this function. The respectivemerits of the two approaches will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis, inSection 6.2.4.rst has proved a very inuential theory amongst computational linguists, as the nextsection will attest. Its popularity is perhaps best attributed to a combination of fea-tures: the emphasis on a functional conception of relations; the carefully presentedset of relation denitions; the simply stated structural theory. It is doubtful whetheranyone believes the claims made in rst|but at least it is clearly enough expressed forpeople to be able to frame their objections to it.2.5 The Uses of Relations in Automatic Text GenerationIn the last few years, coherence relations have begun to feature prominently in studiesof natural language generation (nlg). Successive generation workshops (Dale et al(1990), McKeown et al (1990), Dale et al (1992), Zock et al (1994), McDonald et al(1994)) contain accounts of relations being implemented in generation systems. Andtwo recent workshops, in Maratea (Scott and Hovy (1993)) and Columbus (Rambow(1993)) have been largely given over to a discussion of relations.The two most popular theories for implementation have been Mann and Thompson'srst and Martin's systemic model. However, as in the theoretical eld, no standard setof relations has emerged|the relations in both of these theories have been considerablyand variously adapted for their new procedural role. In the following review, I will againbe emphasising the dierences between the various conceptions of relations which haveemerged in the literature.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 292.5.1 Hovy's Implementation: Relations as Planning OperatorsThe original relation-based text structurer was Hovy's (1988) implementation of rst.This system develops the idea of relations as planning operators, dening them in termsof preconditions and postconditions. Both preconditions and postconditions areexpressed in terms of communicative goals|the idea is that a communicative goal canbe satised in simple cases by producing a single clause, and in other cases by `applying'an rst relation, whose nucleus and satellite are each characterised in terms of simplercommunicative goals. For example, the denition of the operator for the sequencerelation species a complex goal as its `result' (or postcondition), and simpler goals asits `requirements' (or preconditions):___SEQUENCE___Results:((BMB SPEAKER HEARER (SEQUENCE-OF ?PART ?NEXT)))Nucleus requirements/subgoals:((BMB SPEAKER HEARER (TOPIC ?PART)))Satellite requirements/subgoals:((BMB SPEAKER HEARER (TOPIC ?NEXT)))(`BMB SPEAKER HEARER X' can be read `achieve the state in which the speaker and thehearer mutually believe that X'. `TOPIC X' is satised by associating the clause whichtranslates X with the nucleus or satellite of the relation.)Of course, an operator can only be applied if the appropriate semantic relation holdsbetween its nucleus and satellite. So another part of the precondition for sequence isas follows:Nucleus+satellite requirements/subgoals:((NEXT-ACTION ?PART ?NEXT))(`NEXT-ACTION' is a semantic predicate which can be checked by inspection of a database.)Hovy's structurer takes as input one or more communicative goals, and a set of clause-sized `input entities' which contain the material to be generated. On the basis of these,a simple rhetorical structure tree is formed, consisting of one relation, one nucleus andone satellite. The tree is then progressively expanded by a process of adjunction: oneof its leaf nodes is selected, and replaced by a new relation whose nucleus is the originalleaf node and whose satellite is one of the other input entities to be incorporated. Theprocess continues until all the input entities have been used up.To produce a piece of text, the nished tree is traversed left-to-right, and the leaves arefed to the sentence generator penman (Mann and Matthiessen (1983)). The sentencesthus produced are linked using prototypical keywords; for instance, keywords for thesequence relation include then and next. The resulting text should in theory satisfythe original communicative goal, include all the material in the input entities, and inaddition, be coherent.Hovy's system is the rst to exploit a powerful new technique. Although it is rudi-mentary, it demonstrates how the power of a hierarchical planning system can be of
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 30real use in text structuring problems|the ability of a planner to deal with complexconstraints and to consider all possible solutions to a given problem make it well suitedto such tasks. And using relations as operators seems to provide just the right amountof exibility for the planner: if relations do indeed underlie the phenomenon of coher-ence, then the space of texts to be searched will include all and only those texts whichare coherent. However, Hovy's system is only a start; a number of problems can beidentied in its operation.For one thing, in constraining the set of texts produced from a single input, the plannermakes use of the notion of possible growth points|a notion not apparent in any ofthe rst literature. The idea is that the nucleus and satellite of a given relation can onlybe expanded in certain ways; for instance, the nucleus of sequence can expand intocircumstance, elaboration-attribute or purpose and its `satellite' can expandinto elaboration-attribute, elaboration-details or another sequence. Thereseems no justication for these constraints|texts which violate them can easily bethought up.In other respects, the generation process appears underconstrained. Constraints to dowith the focus of the text being built are not addressed, and the texts produced oftenseem to violate these, switching in an unprincipled way from subject to subject. Asystem implementing both relational and focus-based constraints is presented by Hovyand McCoy (1989), which resolves some of these problems.Perhaps the most serious problem with Hovy's system is the way it characterises thetext structuring problem in the rst place, in terms of a communicative goal and aset of clause-sized input entities. Beginning from these elements begs the question|how are they themselves determined? It is not realistic to think of text structuringhappening after the elements of content to be expressed are decided; for instance, wemight rst decide we need to justify a claim, and only then search for the material touse in the justication.2.5.2 Moore and Paris: Relations for Guiding Content Selection inDialogueThe planner developed by Moore and Paris (1989) (see also Moore (1989), Moore andParis (1993)) addresses the problem of choosing the material to be generated as wellas that of deciding how the material should be structured.We believe that the tasks of choosing what to say and selecting a strategyfor saying it cannot be divided. Moore (1989), p67Their planner forms part of the interface for an expert system which gives advice invarious dierent domains, and reacts to users' followup questions. It is thus able todraw on the domain-specic information needed to decide on what advice to give.The technique for interleaving content selection and text structuring tasks centresaround the representation of the intentions of the text to be produced. For Moore
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 31and Paris, it is important that the intention behind every part of the text be representedin the text plan, so that if the plan fails in some respect and the reader has to askfor clarication, it can be determined what went wrong and how to put it right. InHovy's structurer, the intention underlying the whole text is represented|it is given inthe communicative goal specied at input|but the motivation for including additionalinput entities is not. If some part of the text is unsuccessful and the reader queries it(for instance, by saying `I don't understand that last point'), what is required is a newattempt to achieve the intended eect of that portion of text. However, if its intendedeect is not explicitly represented, this will not be possible: knowing the relation whichlinks the text segment to the rest of the discourse is not sucient, because frequentlywhat is called for is a new explanatory strategy involving other relations. For instance,if the reader does not understand a concept by use of an analogy, a contrast mightbe given, although the intention (to explain the concept) is the same in both cases.Thus it is claimed that there is no simple one-to-one mapping between the relations ina text and the intentions that underlie them. In one sense this is confusing: both Hovyand Moore and Paris work with rst relations, which are dened precisely in terms ofthe eects they are intended to achieve. The point becomes clearer when it is realisedthat the intentions behind a span of text can be described at many dierent levels.Consider Text 2.9:(2.9) The window's open.Underlying this text are any (or all) of the following: The intention to say \The window is open". The intention to convey to the hearer that the window is open. The intention to convey to the hearer that the room is cold. The intention to make the hearer close the window. The intention that the room warm up.Moore and Paris' point is that the intentions used to dene rst relations are often notabstract enough to allow eective backtracking in the case of a local failure.In a later paper (Moore and Paris (1993)) this point is rened. They claim that for thepresentational relations in rst, the eects specied in the denitions are deemedadequate for generating alternative strategies. (The eects of all these relations, it willbe recalled, are to `increase some inclination in the reader'.) For the subject-matterrelations, whose eects are simply that the reader recognise the relation in question, aspecication of deeper level intentions is demanded to avoid the backtracking problemsoutlined above.Clearly, the intentions used in dening some rst relations are insucient for somepurposes. However, the level of abstraction at which intentions must be speciedmight be to some extent genre-dependent|in an explanatory dialogue, we can expectpresentational relations to predominate. But in other genres, such as narratives, it
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 32is dicult to specify a more abstract goal than the simple representation of content.To give an example: the cause relation can be used as part of an argument, as inText 2.10, or in a story, as in Text 2.11:(2.10) Bill must have been absent, because he was sick.(2.11) Bill was absent from school that day, because he was sick.The argument in 2.10 hinges on the fact that being sick typically causes absence.But expressing the causal relation is not the writer's primary objective; if the readeris unconvinced, an alternative strategy (perhaps to report that no-one saw him atschool) could be attempted. However, if the causal relation is presented as part of astory being told to the reader, as in 2.11, it is hard to identify a goal beyond that ofsimply relating the cause of Bill's absence. To take another example|the goal behinda sequence relation in a story is likely to be just to tell the reader what happenednext.2.5.3 Systems using Multiple Levels of Analysis for RelationsA further extension of the notion of intentions is suggested in Moore and Pollack(1992). Here, it is proposed that every discourse should be analysed on two levels,rstly in terms of its intentional (presentational) relations and secondly in terms of itsinformational (subject-matter) relations. The arguments given are similar to those inthe previous section. While the case of purely narrative texts seems to argue againstidentifying an intentional and an informational relation in every case, there certainlyseems some merit in factoring out the two components.A similar decomposition of relations is proposed by Maier and Hovy (1991) and Maier(1993), and implemented in Hovy et al (1992). In these studies, three types of rela-tion are identied, mirroring Halliday and Hasan's (1976) classication of the threefunctions of language. Ideational and interpersonal relations correspond roughlyto rst's subject-matter and presentational relations respectively. Textual re-lations serve to `structure text'|the archetypal examples seem to be the signallersof Halliday and Hasan's internal sequence (rstly, secondly, moreover and so on).Maier and Hovy allow that more than one type of relation can hold between two spansin a text; however, there is no need for every type of relation to be present at everypoint. Thus they allow that descriptive texts are relatively poor in interpersonalrelations.However, some aspects of this classication make for confusion. For one thing, theclass of textual relations seems rather dierent from the other two. It contains notonly `linearising' relations such as those marked by rstly etc, but also relations suchas `relnamecomparative', `relnameconcessive' and `relnametemporal', which seem toperform much more than a purely ordering function. It is plausible to claim that spanslinked by moreover are not related by any ideational or interpersonal relations,but merely by the fact that they appear as consecutive items in a text; but these otherrelations seem quite clearly to convey either propositional or intentional content. Therethus seems to be considerable redundancy within the system of relations as a whole.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 33A second objection to the classication comes from Moore and Pollack (1992): theyobject to the large number of possible combinations of relations that results fromthe assumption of three independent relation types. However, this objection seemsless telling; Moore and Pollack's use of two independent levels of analysis gives riseto a similar combinatorial problem. Clearly what both theories need to provide is aspecication of any contingent constraints between the independent components of theanalysis. In fact, both theories do provide some initial specications of such constraints(see Moore and Paris (1993) p670, Maier (1991) pp42{43); but neither of them is yetcomplete.2.5.4 Relations in Text RealisationAttention has also been focused on rst relations as guides to the linguistic marking oftext structure.Although Mann and Thompson strenuously avoid any reference to surface syntacticphenomena in their relation denitions, many correspondences can in fact be found.Several techniques for signalling rst relations are presented by Scott and de Souza(1990), who outline a number of heuristics for guiding the textual realisation pro-cess, informed by a combination of stylistics and psycholinguistics. The heuristics,motivated individually, include using embedded relative clauses to signal elabora-tion, and using paratactic and hypotactic coordinators to signal multinuclear andnucleus-satellite relations respectively. The utility of such heuristics has givenmany researchers cause to question Mann and Thompson's policy of downplaying thelink between relations and surface linguistic structures. It should certainly not beassumed that any one-to-one mapping between relations and linguistic forms will befound; as Scott and Paris (1995) point out, it is often impossible to predict the structureof a text on the basis of its surface characteristics alone. However, the developmentand renement of sophisticated heuristics for marking relations continues to proveuseful|see in particular the system proposed by Moser and Moore (1995).On another front, Rosner and Stede (1992, 1992) and Knott (1991) have suggestedways of making the realisation of a relation sensitive to its hierarchical position ina rhetorical structure tree. Dierent strategies are appropriate for dierent levels;of particular interest are high-level marking techniques which involve whole clauses,such as there are two reasons for this or this happened as follows. At the other endof the spectrum, researchers (notably Vander Linden et al (1992)) have investigatedways of signalling rst relations within single clauses. Available techniques includenominalisation and the use of adverbial phrases; for instance the purpose relation canbe marked as follows:(2.12) Follow the steps in the illustration below for desk installation.A nal issue of importance is the decision about when to mark a relation and whennot to. If relations are always signalled using the most specic available conjunction,the texts which result are often stylistically awkward, making explicit informationwhich is easily inferrable by the reader. Oberlander and Lascarides (1991; see alsoLascarides and Oberlander, 1992) introduce the notion of laconic text to represent
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 34text in which the only relations to be marked are those not inferrable from context andworld knowledge. They propose an algorithm for generating such texts using a systemof defeasible rules to represent the dierent types of knowledge that are needed.2.5.5 Relations in Multilingual Generation SystemsA nal use of coherence relations in generation systems is as a language-independentintermediate representation of text structure. Such a representation is particularlyuseful in multilingual generation systems|relations model the intentions underlyinga text, and it seems plausible that these are invariant during translation. A modularapproach to multilingual generation is then aorded, whereby it is only in the textualrealisation of rhetorical structure trees that dierent strategies are required for dierentlanguages.Several multilingual systems currently make use of relations in this way; among themRosner and Stede (1992), Bateman et al (1993). However, there are also studies whichcall into question the invariance of relations across translations|see for example Delinet al (1994). The debate here seems to hinge on the level of abstraction at whichrelations are intended to represent the information conveyed by a text.2.6 The Proliferation of Relations, and its ProblemsWe turn now to the central point to be made in this chapter|that the diversity amongstthe many alternative sets of relations, as well as being confusing in its own right, issymptomatic of a deeper confusion about what it is about a text that relations areactually modelling.I will begin in Section 2.6.1 by looking at the diversity of relations in computationalapplications. In Section 2.6.2 I will turn to the more serious dierences that exist be-tween relational theories, and make some suggestions about what might be responsiblefor them.2.6.1 Dierences between Generation SystemsAll the systems reviewed in Section 2.5 draw principally on rst's set of relations. Butdespite this, there is a surprising amount of variability between researchers in the setsof relations they use. No two systems use exactly the same set of relations; and nosystem uses exactly the set of relations proposed in rst.Departures from rst's original set are of many dierent types. rstrelations have beensubdivided|for instance, Rosner and Stede's step-sequence is a specialisation of therst relation sequence. They have also been amalgamated to form new relations|for instance, Scott and de Souza combine the relations volitional-cause, non-volitional-cause, volitional-result, non-volitional-result and evidence,for the purposes of textual realisation. In other cases, relations seem to be denedorthogonally to those in rst: for instance, Hovy et al's (1992) analogy covers some
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 35of the ground covered by the rst relations restatement, evaluation and elab-oration; but needless to say, these latter relations are not always analysable usinganalogy. Finally, some new relations have appeared which have no obvious con-nection with rst relations at all|for example, Rosner and Stede dene a relationcalled until, which is customised for instructional texts where a given action must beperformed until a certain condition is met. In short, there are currently hundreds ofrelations in use|clearly, a signicant departure from rst's original set of 23.This proliferation is partly to be expected: its origin can be traced to a number offeatures of rst. For one thing, Mann and Thompson are themselves quite exibleabout the set of relations in their theory; they are more concerned with establishingthe rhetorical relation in general as a useful tool for text analysts.Relation denitions have the status of applications of the theory ratherthan elements of the theory. One might want to change or replace the de-nitions. . . such changes are to be expected and do not cross the denitionalboundaries of rst. Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson (1989), p 48The exibility of rst is in fact held by some to be an advantage of the theory:Generally a new domain has dictated modications to the inventory ofrelations, but this very adaptability is one of its most useful features.Vander Linden et al (1992), p 184At the same time, giving theorists such a free hand to choose relations creates someserious problems. For one thing, it makes it hard to compare generation systemsamongst each other. But more importantly, it tends to undermine the empirical contentof the relation construct in general. The hypothesis that `virtually any text can beanalysed by representing its coherence relations' becomes much less strong if relationscan be created whenever they are needed: it is hard to think what evidence could befound which could disprove it. Coherence relations at this point hardly seem to besaying any more than speech act theory; that we must take intentions into accountwhen representing text. The extra claim in rst|that text is coherent by virtue ofthe relations between its intentions|is virtually unfalsiable without a method forspecifying what is to count as a relation in the rst place.Even incoherent texts can be analysed according to the relations between the intentionsin their spans. For instance, the text in (2.13) seems incoherent at rst sight:(2.13) John broke his leg. I like plums.Yet we could still dene a relation which holds between the intentions underlyingthe spans in this text: perhaps we could call the relation inform-accident-and-mention-fruit. The relation might be multinuclear, with one nucleus intended toconvey information about an accident, and the other intended to convey informationabout fruit. Clearly, we do not want to include these sorts of relations in any principledset of coherence relations.
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 36To place the relational claim on a sounder empirical footing, we need to tighten theconstraints on relationhood|for instance, by giving a xed set of relations, or by givingrules for picking out a set of relations from some larger set of `potential relations'.2.6.2 Dierences between Relational TheoriesA diversity of relations exists not only amongst the various implementations of rst butbetween rst and the other relational theories. This should be clear from Section 2.4.The number of relations posited in a theory ranges from two to over a hundred; theprimitives used for their denition are themselves very diverse; so too are the principlesby which relations are organised into taxonomies. Naturally, some of the dierencesbetween theories are due to the fact that dierent theories have dierent aims|forinstance, Grosz and Sidner's theory is geared principally towards modelling the patternof anaphora in a text, rather than to providing a full set of resources for a text planner.And yet all these theories have, broadly speaking, a common objective|to model thecoherence and structure of discourse. They are all apparently trying to explain the samephenomenon; thus it is odd that no consensus about a set of relations is emerging.One reason for the many dierent sets of relations is perhaps that none of them seemsquite right for expressing all the data. Many theorists acknowledge this themselves:for instance, Grimes (1975) admits that he is `not completely satised with the basis ofclassication' for his hypotactic predicates; Martin (1992), in comparing his relationswith those of Halliday and Hasan, mentions several areas where `neither categorisationis completely satisfactory'. The diculties in nding a suitable classication schemesuggest perhaps that the data to be accounted for is not well captured by a hierarchicaltaxonomy at all, and that some dierent formalism might be more appropriate. Thisidea will be developed in Chapter 5 and beyond.However, the proliferation of relations also highlights a more fundamental problem, notjust to do with the accuracy of relational theories, but again to do with their empiricalstatus. It seems strange, from a theoretical point of view, that we should have achoice about which set of relations to use. Theoretical constructs are typically treatedas corresponding to real phenomena underlying the data they describe, rather thanas being purely synthetic: otherwise there seems little point in using the constructsat all. But relational theories tend to downplay this `realist' conception of relations;consequently, little attention is paid to the question of what it is underlying a textthat relations actually model. And yet it is a serious question. `Coherence' is notjust a label applied to an arbitrary group of texts by text analysts|coherent texts areactually produced, and appear in books, newspapers and so on, while incoherent texts(by and large) do not. There must be some reason for this, and if we are looking torelations for an account of coherence, we should expect them to make some referenceto it.In fact, the real situation is not quite as arbitrary as the preceding discussion wouldimply. There is still some degree of consensus between researchers about which relationsto use. (For instance, nearly all of them identify concepts like causality and sequence asimportant.) But this very fact suggests that intuitions are at work which are not beingacknowledged: while researchers rarely attempt justication for their choices beyond
CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH 37an adherence to the needs of descriptive adequacy, their choices are not as diverse asthey might be given only this criterion.2.7 SummaryThis chapter has reviewed a large number of alternative theories of coherence relations,highlighting the diversity of the dierent sets of relations that have been proposed.The diversity of relations has of course been noted before|for instance, Hovy (1990)discusses it at length|and it is clear that agreement on a standard set of relationswould be a considerable step forward for discourse theorists. Apart from anything else,there is a danger that unless a standard set begins to emerge, the research programmebased on coherence relations might grind to a halt. If what one researcher calls aresult the next calls a reaction, and the next an elaboration, we will be boundto ask whether there is any point in using such constructs at all.Clearly what is needed is a standard set of relations. But perhaps more importantly,we need a way of justifying a standard set of relations, so that we can begin to arguethat one set is more appropriate than another. It is to this latter question that weturn in the next chapter.
Chapter 3Strategies for Motivating a Set ofRelationsLacking a clear way to continue our description of the underlying conceptualsystem, we turned to analyses of the parts of it frozen by social conventioninto the English lexicon.Miller & Johnson-Laird, Language and Perception, p6973.1 IntroductionIn the previous chapter, a great many sets of coherence relations of dierent kinds weredescribed, and the need was emphasised for a means of justifying one such set over theothers. The justication should ideally perform several functions. It should provide anindependent denition of relations, which makes clear why it is that relations underliediscourse coherence. It should also impose some kind of limit on the size of the set ofrelations, so that a theory explaining coherence in terms of relations is not unfalsiable.It should also make clear how a given set of relations is more appropriate than any otherset for the theoretical task it is to perform.This chapter is given over to examining various strategies that have been proposedin the literature for justifying a set of relations. The rst of these is to pick a setof relations that allows an adequate description of all the discourses that the theorypurports to explain. The second strategy suggests that connective cue phrases suchas because and however can be used to motivate a set of relations. A nal strategy isbased on the contention that relations model psychological constructs used in humantext processing. Each of these strategies has advantages and shortcomings, which willbe discussed. In the second half of the chapter, a new strategy for justifying a setof relations is proposed, which (it will be argued) combines the advantages of theabove methods, and minimises their shortcomings. According to this strategy, cuephrases can be used as evidence for relations precisely if relations are considered aspsychologically real entities. This is the central claim of the thesis: the rest of thechapter will be devoted to clarifying it, arguing for it, and defending it against various38
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 39objections.3.2 Choosing a `Descriptively Adequate' Set of RelationsThe most fundamental rationale for a set of coherence relations is that they enable ananalysis of all the texts which the theory using them purports to account for. Some setsof relations are tailored specically to particular registers of discourse (for instance,those in Rosner and Stede's (1992) planner, and in that of Vander Linden et al (1992)are just for processing instructional texts) while other sets (such as that of rst1) areclaimed to be almost register-independent. In all cases, a claim is made that a givenset of relations is sucient to enable an analysis of a previously-specied set of texts.Clearly, any theory invoking relations must address the question of how well they canbe made to t texts, and so must make this claim in some way.However, it remains to be determined what it means to say that a set of relations is`sucient' to analyse a text. As noted in Section 2.2.3, such a claim must be interpretedin the light of a theory of span structure, which species the places in a coherent textwhere relations are expected to be found. rst makes a rigorous prediction, holdingthat each clause in a text is linked to some other portion of it by a rhetorical relation;the same goes for each `composite' span created by a schema application (except thetop span, of course). Other theories impose lesser constraints: for instance, Groszand Sidner's (1986) relations link `discourse segments', typically composed of severalclauses|which means that there are many clauses between which relations are notconstrued to apply. At the other end of the scale, accounts like Vander Linden et al's(1992) suggest that relations can even exist within single clauses|although they donot yet specify exactly when such relations will be found.How should we decide how densely a text must be lled with relations in order for it tobe `adequately described'? It seems that this question can only be addressed when weknow more about what it signies for two text segments to be connected by a relation.It makes no sense to set a criterion for `descriptive adequacy' which cannot itself befurther justied; except perhaps as a working hypothesis.2 On the other hand, if wehad a theory about text processing in which relations played a role, this might well beable to tell us where to expect to nd relations in a text. Say the theory states thata reader links each paragraph to the previous one by means of relations. The notionof descriptive adequacy would be dierent for this theory than for one which claimedthat the processing of individual clauses is mediated by relations.There is a second problem with descriptive adequacy as the sole criterion for judg-ing a set of relations. Many dierent sets of relations can be used to describe anygiven text: the subtlety of the distinctions between relations is not constrained. Forinstance, while Mann and Thompson choose to split `causal' relations into ve sepa-1 rst analyses are claimed for `virtually every text' (Mann and Thompson (1988) p20), though ex-ceptions are mentioned for some registers, such as legal documents and some kinds of poetry.2 This suggestion is at odds with Mann and Thompson's (1988) position. They claim that the decisionabout the size of text units to be related is `arbitrary'|their only caveat being that the units shouldbe dened in some theory-neutral way (p6).
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 40rate groups (volitional-cause, non-volitional-cause, volitional-result, non-volitional-result, and purpose), others have chosen a less ne-grained distinc-tion: Scott and de Souza (1990) group all these relations together for the purposes oftextual realisation. Vander Linden et al combine the volitional-result and non-volitional-result categories to create a simple result relation, but keep purposeseparate. Each of these models seems feasible as a `descriptive' framework for text:it is equally feasible to split up Mann and Thompson's relations still further, creatingrelations like immediate-volitional-cause, distant-volitional-cause and so on.If we are looking to justify a set of relations, we need to have a way of deciding on anappropriate level of detail.It could be argued that although a tight specication of the requisite level of detailis not feasible, some sort of approximation can still be arrived at. For example, it ispossible to describe any text just using the relations `causal' and `non-causal'; wemight argue that such a description is a clear case of `descriptive inadequacy'. Butthis is to miss the point: Grosz and Sidner use just two relations, but their relationsare adequate (it is claimed) to achieve the task for which they were designed, namelyaccounting for the pattern of pronominalisation in texts. The essential point is, again,that it is only when relations are given some sort of theoretical role that we can evenbegin to talk about descriptive adequacy. The standards of adequacy are set by thedemands of the theory in which the relations gure. The theory will determine whatinformation about a text relations are supposed to capture; we can then ask whetherthe description they provide is in fact sucient to capture that information.In short, the criterion of descriptive adequacy, while in some sense essential for any setof relations, is far from being able to stand on its own as a method of justication.3.3 Associating Relations with Cue PhrasesCue phrases3|clausal/sentence connectives such as but and because|have providedanother source of evidence for justifying a set of relations. Such phrases are oftenconceived as signalling relations in a text: thus, for instance, because can be used tosignal the presence of a cause relation:(3.1) Jane fed Lars because he was getting so hungry.It is important to recall that we are interested in looking at the set of cue phrases, inorder to motivate a set of relations. As emphasised in Section 1.2, this task is distinctfrom the `rst-order' task of identifying relations in actual texts. A study of cue phraseswill certainly not suce for this latter task; it is widely accepted that relations can be3 What I am calling `cue phrases' have been given many dierent names in the past: `conjunctiveelements' (Halliday and Hasan (1976)), `clue words' (Cohen (1984)), `cue phrases' ((1986)), `discoursemarkers' (Schirin (1987)), `meta-technical utterances' (Zuckerman and Pearl (1986)). Variousdierent ways of dening them have been suggested, and the dierent denitions pick out slightlydierent sets of phrases. For the moment, the class of cue phrases can be identied by typicalexamples, such as however, then, previously, or, next, while. I will propose a more rigorous denitionof my own in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 41unmarked in text, so cue phrases will only be a partial source of information in thisregard.3.3.1 An Atttractive Source of Evidence for RelationsCue phrases would certainly be convenient as a source of evidence for a set of relations.There are a large number of them, and the dierences between them can be quitesubtle; associating cue phrases with relations would yield a sophisticated classicationof relations. For instance, Elhadad and MeKeown (1990) have noted some subtledierences between but and although, phrases which are often inter-substitutable:(3.2) a. He failed the exam but he's smart. Let's hire him.b. *He failed the exam although he's smart. Let's hire him.We would expect these dierences to be reected in the set of relations if we constructedit to mirror the set of cue phrases.At the same time, using cue phrases as a source of evidence would give us a way todecide at what level of detail to stopmaking distinctions. If alternative cue phrases existto pick out two similar relations (as in the above cases), then they can be distinguished.But there would be no need to create two separate relations if no cue phrases exist fordistinguishing them in text. Thus, for example, there would be no need to distinguishbetween `female-volitional-cause' and `male-volitional-cause'.Finally, cue phrases simply provide an extra source of information when it comes toworking out relation denitions. Many systems for justifying a set of relations start`from rst principles', without any preconceptions about which relations are eventuallygoing to be decided on. Thus Maier and Hovy's (1991) taxonomy of relations is basedon Halliday and Hasan's (1976) analysis of the functions of language as `ideational,interpersonal and textual'; Hobbs' (1985) classication is based on similar abstractconsiderations about `the situation in which discourse between a speaker and a listenertakes place'. It is certainly essential to have such high-level concerns in mind whenworking out relation denitions|but the task would be considerably eased if we couldalso make use of information about the applicability of cue phrases. This is becausewe can nd out about all the situations in which a relation can be used, in advanceof working out its denition|we just need to examine the range of ways that theappropriate cue phrase can be used in discourse. For instance, having posited thata relation exists which is signalled by the cue phrase although, we can consider thedierent contexts in which although can be used, and try to abstract from these tocreate a denition of the relation itself. The ability to draw on concrete linguisticexamples is likely to be of considerable help.3.3.2 Previous Work with Cue PhrasesAs was seen in Chapter 2, a number of researchers have made use of cue phrases indetermining a set of relations. While Halliday and Hasan (1976) are only interestedin classifying the linguistic resources available for signalling relations, other theorists
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 42have used the cohesive resources in a language as `evidence' for a set of underlyingcoherence relations, which can themselves be marked or unmarked. The work of Ballardet al (1971) and Longacre (1983) follows this strategy, appealing to surface syntacticphenomena in the motivation of `deep' interclausal relations:It is our contention. . . that a surface taxonomy of form within a languagedetermines a similar taxonomy of deep relations, and that the two tax-onomies stand and fall together. Ballard et al (1971), p75According to this approach, the existence of a cue phrase in a language is testimony tothe existence of a particular type of interclausal relation, and this relation can applybetween clauses even in the absence of the cue phrase. Among the attractions of thismethod, Ballard et al note one I already mentioned|that it enables us to x the levelof detail of the analysis:The deep grammar. . . stops short of dissolution into general semantic orlogical categories. It stops in fact where the structure of a given languageindicates a cut-o point in that it sets up no more deep structure categoriesthan are required to account for surface encodings. Ibid.Martin (1992) follows a similar strategy, suggesting that the relations in a text arein principle markable by surface conjunctions. His classication of cue phrases is ex-tremely detailed, and is a clear testimony to the benets of cue phrases for creating asubtle taxonomy.Several other researchers make reference to cue phrases when putting forward a setof relations. For instance, Hobbs (1985) uses cue phrases as an informal method ofdeciding on which of his relations applies in a text|if you can insert then between twosegments, then the occasion relation `is an excellent candidate'. But he is emphaticthat such tests do not gure in the denitions of the relations he presents. Scott andde Souza (1990), in a study of how rst relations can be textually marked, found thata large number of them map closely onto cue phrases. Sanders et al (1992, 1993) alsoidentify `prototypical markers' for each relation in their taxonomy, although the mainjustication for the taxonomy (to be examined in Section 3.4) is not concerned withlinguistic issues. Even Mann and Thompson's (1988) relations, which are expresslydened without reference to surface linguistic phenomena, can often be associatedwith classes of cue phrase.3.3.3 Problems with Reliance on Cue PhrasesTo sum up: there are many advantages to be gained in using cue phrases to decideon a set of coherence relations; and cue phrases have been quite widely used for thispurpose. However, an important problem remains for all of these attempts to date:the decision to link relations to cue phrases itself needs to be justied. Without such
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 43a justication, we still lack a reason to prefer the chosen set of relations over otherpossible sets.To illustrate the problem, consider the text in 3.3.3:(3.3) Bob cooked supper that night. His wife had been working hard at the oceall day.The current suggestion is to account for the coherence of this text by saying that thetwo clauses are linked by `some relation which can be signalled by a cue phrase'. (In thiscase, because seems the most likely cue phrase for the job.) But why should this because-based relation be any more appropriate in explaining coherence than relations likevolitional-cause or cause-of-cooking-event, which don't happen to correspondto cue phrases? How can we use the association with a cue phrase to argue againstsomeone who proposes an alternative relation?Somehow an argument must be given that relations linked to cue phrases tell us some-thing about the text that relations otherwise classied do not. But neither Longacrenor Martin (who are most explicit in their appeal to cue phrases) provide such anargument: in fact, justication seems to remain principally in terms of descriptive ad-equacy; and it has already been argued (in Section 3.2) that such an appeal is of littleuse by itself. To reiterate the point made in Section 3.2: the notion of `descriptive ade-quacy' cannot really be used on its own to evaluate a descriptive formalism. It needs togo hand in hand with a theory about the thing described: then we can ask whether theformalism is adequate to provide a description in the appropriate theoretical terms. Sofor a sounder justication of the reliance on cue phrases, what is needed is some sort oftheory about text, which would show why linking relations to cue phrases makes themparticularly revealing as descriptive constructs. At that point, it would be reasonableto prefer them over any set of relations which could not be given such a theoreticalrole. But such a theory still needs to be provided.3.4 Looking for `Psychologically Real' RelationsA third method for justifying a set of relations begins immediately by giving thema theoretical role. The central idea is that relations model psychological constructs|that is, they tell us something about the psychological processes which occur in peoplewhen they create and interpret text. A given relation can then be justied by producingevidence that it is one that people actually use when processing text. This is why itmakes sense to use the relation to link two text spans: because it models part of theprocess which actually led to these spans being juxtaposed as they are. By using arelation conceived of as psychologically real, we are not just describing the text in anarbitrary manner, but contributing to an explanation of why the text is the way it is.Clearly, this conception of relations gives us exactly the sort of `theory about text' thatwe need in order to justify the use of relations as an appropriate descriptive device.Many theories of relations make an appeal to psychological notions. As mentioned inthe previous chapter, Hobbs (1985) thinks of his relations as `text building strategies',
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 44used by the speaker to facilitate the job of the listener. And he makes some suggestions(p22) about the nature of these strategies. To re-iterate the quote given at the outset:It is tempting to speculate that. . . coherence relations are instantiations indiscourse comprehension of more general principles of coherence that weapply in attempting to make sense out of the world we nd ourselves in,principles that rest ultimately on some notion of cognitive economy.Mann and Thompson's (1988) relations also embody psychological insights. Relationsare functional constructs, associated with the particular eects a writer intends toachieve; relation denitions make extensive reference to the psychological states of thereader and writer. Yet no evidence is given that the rst relations are the ones peopleuse: justication of the relations is again purely in terms of their `descriptive adequacy'in the hands of discourse analysts.By far the most thorough investigation of the idea that relations are psychologicallyreal comes from Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1992, 1993). Any theory proposingthat relations `model psychological constructs' must address two key issues. Firstly,some kind of account of human text processing is needed, which makes it clear whatrole is played in the mechanism by `relation-like' constructs. Secondly, there has to besome way of investigating these psychological constructs, and working out what theyare. Sanders et al address both of these requirements.3.4.1 An Overview of Sanders et al's WorkParameterising the Space of Relations using `Cognitively Basic' PrimitivesSanders et al approach the issue of psychological reality from the perspective of textunderstanding. Understanding a discourse involves constructing a coherent mentalrepresentation of it, and this in turn involves setting up appropriate links between therepresentations of its various segments.These coherence links, it is argued, are likely to be established using general cognitiveresources. During comprehension, the segments of the discourse are integrated into alanguage-independent representation; part of the reader's general framework for mak-ing sense of the world. Coherent texts are likely to be structured in such a way as tofacilitate this integration|so Sanders et al propose that coherence relations should beinvestigated by looking for the `cognitively basic' features which must underlie them.Four `cognitively basic' primitives are identied, according to which relations can beclassied: these are described below. Basic operation. Every relation is deemed to have either a causal or an additivecomponent. causal relations are those where a `relevant' causal connection existsbetween the spans; all other relations are additive. a is an example of a causalrelation; b is an example of an additive one.a. The drive to the arrivals was closed so that nobody could leave theterminal.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 45b. Centraal Beheer's turnover is about 2.4 billion guilders. In 1988the prots increased from 75 million to 103 million guilders. Source of coherence. Every relation is coherent on semantic or pragmatic grounds.It is semantic if the spans are related in terms of their propositional content andpragmatic if they are related because of their illocutionary force. a is an exampleof a semantic relation; b is an example of a pragmatic one.a. Theo was exhausted because he had to run to the university.b. Theo was exhausted because he was gasping for breath. Order of segments. This distinction only applies to causal relations; they aredeemed to have basic order if the antecedent is on the left, and non-basic orderif it is on the right. a is an example of a basic relation; b is an example of anon-basic one.a. The drive to the arrivals was closed, so nobody could leave theterminal.b. Nobody could leave the terminal, because the drive to the arrivalswas closed. Polarity. A relation is positive if its basic operation links the content of the twospans as they stand, and negative if it links the content of one of the spans to thenegation of the content of the other span. Negative polarity relations typicallyinvolve either a violation of expectation, where the expectation derives from acausal basic relation; or a contrast, where the basic relation is additive. a is anexample of a positive relation; b is an example of a negative one.a. Because he had political experience, he was elected president.b. Although he had no political experience, he was elected president.These four parameters can combine to form twelve `complex' relation types. For eachtype, Sanders et al provide one or more sample rst-like relations: for instance, cause-consequence (basic operation = causal; source of coherence = semantic; order =basic; polarity = positive); or claim-argument (basic operation = causal; source ofcoherence = pragmatic; order = non-basic; polarity = positive). Each of the relationsis associated with a `typical' connective word used for marking it.Evidence for the ParameterisationSupport for the four parameters is provided by a number of empirical experiments.The rst of these used discourse analysts as subjects: they were given denitions ofall the relations, and asked to decide which relations were appropriate for a number ofsample texts. The second experiment used `naive' subjects who did not know aboutthe relation denitions: they were shown sample texts without explicit connectives,and had to decide which connective word was most suitable. Both experiments weredesigned to test how much agreement there is on how to use the relations. In bothcases it was found that there was a fair amount of agreement between subjects. Equallyimportantly, where there was disagreement over which relation to use, it tended to be
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 46over the value of a single parameter only|this provides support for the independenceof the decisions about the dierent parameters.However, in both experiments, there were dierences in the strength of evidence fordierent parameters. In the rst experiment, there was hardly any confusion over thevalue of the polarity parameter. But for negative polarity relations, there was a greatdeal of confusion about the source of coherence parameter: in fact, this parameter isthe least agreed upon for all classes of relations. This nding is replicated in secondexperiment: agreement is lowest for source of coherence.A third experiment also used discourse analysts as subjects: here the task was tocompare the coherence relations in a number of dierent sample texts, and to groupthose texts which used the same relation. The results showed four distinct clustersof relations: positive causal relations, positive additive, negative relations, and `condi-tional' relations (a subtype of causal relation). Again, source of coherence is not welldistinguished|there is no evidence for this parameter amongst negative relations, andbetween positive relations there is not much. Finally, in this experiment, no evidenceat all is found for the order of spans parameter.The last experiment was targeted specically at the source of coherence parameter.It was hypothesised that confusions regarding this parameter would be lessened ifrelations were presented in contexts rich enough to disambiguate them. The subjectswere again discourse analysts; the task was similar to that in the rst experiment.Only those relations with positive polarity were examined. For these relations, underthese conditions, it was found that a distinction can indeed be made between semanticand pragmatic relations.3.4.2 Some Problems with Sanders et al's ParameterisationWhile the initial idea that `relations are psychologically real' provides a very promisingmethod for justifying a set of relations, deciding on exactly which set of relations ispsychologically real presents problems of its own. The experiments reported abovecan be criticised on a number of grounds: they do not provide conclusive evidence forSanders et al's four-way parameterisation.Problems with Specic ParametersFirstly, two of the parameters are supported much less strongly than the others. Therst three experiments give only weak support for source of coherence. The nal ex-periment only gives support for this parameter for a subset of the relations in the set;and then only under ideal conditions.Questions can also be raised about order of spans: there was no evidence at all tosupport this parameter in the third experiment. The rst experiment showed thatanalysts could distinguish between basic and non-basic order; but this just shows thatthey could use the relation denitions they were given, it does not legitimise thesedenitions.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 47How do you Choose a Set of Parameters to Test?The problems with source of coherence and order of spans throw up a more generalproblem with the experimental methodology|that of deciding on a set of parametersto test. Sanders et al (1993) take a lot of trouble giving a priori justications foreach parameter; but there is still no systematic approach towards deciding on theset. For instance, we have no way of knowing that all the relevant parameters havebeen identied. Maybe there are more than four: `hypotheticality' could be anothercandidate, in view of the results of the third experiment.One argument given for the four chosen parameters is that they result in a productivetaxonomy|in other words, that every combination of parameter values seems to yielda plausible relation. This point is cited as one reason why temporal relations are notincluded as a parameter. But for a start, Sanders et al's four chosen parameters donot currently result in a completely productive taxonomy: the fact that order of spansis only dened for causal relations means that it has four `empty' slots. Moreover,why should we expect that the cognitive factors which underlie coherence relationswill result in a neat parameterisation? It seems perfectly plausible that some factorsare only relevant for a particular type of coherence relation.Some Questions about the Experimental ParadigmsTwo kinds of experiments are carried out by Sanders et al. In one kind, the subjects arediscourse analysts and the task makes explicit reference to coherence relations: textshave to be analysed using relations, or sorted into groups on the basis of the relationsthey use. In the other kind of experiment, the subjects are `naive' about theories ofdiscourse, and the cue phrases they use are taken as evidence of the relations that theyperceive in a text. Both types of experiment are open to question. It is not certainthat results obtained from discourse analysts, thinking explicitly about relations, canbe taken as evidence for the kind of relations that people normally use when theyprocess text. Neither can the evidence from cue phrases be taken as conclusive: whyshould we suppose such a tight association between cue phrases and the constructs wemake use of when processing text? At the very least, an argument must be given for thispolicy. Otherwise, we are making unfounded assumptions about the very constructswe are investigating.The Grain-Size of Relations in the TaxonomyFor Sanders et al, the twelve combinations of parameter values do not pick out individ-ual relations; rather classes of relations. Thus, for example, two `prototypical relations'are identied which are causal, semantic, basic and positive|cause-consequence andcondition-consequence. How are these individual relations identied? How manyof them are required? Sanders et al talk about these extra relations as needed toachieve `descriptive adequacy'; but once again, it is unclear how this criterion is to beinterpreted. What needs to be described? At the outset, relations were conceived ofas modelling the cognitive constructs involved in human text processing. Does thismean that such constructs exist at a ner level of detail than can be specied by the
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 48parameters? If so, additional principles are surely needed for picking them out. And ifnot, then what is the point in rening the taxonomy beyond the level of detail providedby the parameters?To sum up: a number of problems remain with Sanders et al's justication of a set ofrelations|although their enterprise of looking for evidence for cognitive text-processingconstructs certainly seems the most attractive way of eecting a justication. In thenext section, an alternative source of evidence for these cognitive constructs is pro-posed, which (hopefully) overcomes many of the problems that have so far been raised.3.5 A New Motivation for Relations: Linguistic Evidencefor Psychological ConstructsSo far, we have looked at two methods for justifying a set of relations. One suggestsusing the space of cue phrases in a language to work out a taxonomy. This enables anextensive and detailed taxonomy to be worked out; but it is unclear what explanatoryrole relations thus justied are to play in a theory of discourse coherence. The othermethod is based on the idea that relations model the psychological constructs whichmediate the production and interpretation of discourse. Here, the theoretical role ofrelations is clear; but diculties arise in the attempt to discover what these constructsmight actually be.It will be noticed that the advantages and the problems for these two approachesare complementary. The central idea in what follows is that the approaches can becombined, so as to capitalise on their advantages and minimise their drawbacks, bytaking cue phrases as evidence for cognitive text-processing constructs.3.5.1 The Central ArgumentThe claim to be established is the following: that the existence of a cue phrase ina language is good grounds for inferring the existence of a corresponding `relational'construct in the cognitive apparatus of those who use the language. It will be arguedthat a language is likely to contain resources for making explicit all the relations whichplay an important part in human discourse processing. An additional argument will begiven as to why cue phrases are a particularly appropriate kind of `linguistic resource'to study.The implications of this argument can be illustrated by giving an example. It wouldmean, for instance, that the existence in English of the word however points towardsthe existence in speakers of English of a text structuring strategy which can be signalledin text by using that particular phrase. Again, it is important to note that I am notsuggesting that cue phrases can be relied upon to identify the relations in actual texts|as has already been pointed out, relations will not always be explicitly signalled. My
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 49suggestion is rather that the set of cue phrases in a given language can be used todetermine a set of relations: how these relations are identied in particular instancesis a separate question.The claim being made is far from self-evident. Two quite dierent sets of things arebeing associated; a set of clause/sentence connectives and a set of cognitive strategies.Why should we assume that there is a connection? Or at least, why should we assumethat the connection is strong enough to warrant cue phrases being used as a centralsource of evidence? Some researchers do assume such a connection without discussion|for instance in Sanders et al's experiments, subjects' use of cue phrases is taken to reectthe relation they are thinking of. Yet it could be that the mapping between cognitiverepresentations and cue phrases is not just a simple one-to-one: the relations peopleuse might be more subtly delineated than is suggested by the range of cue phrases in alanguage; alternatively, they might be more broadly classied, so that the distinctionsbetween cue phrases give a false impression of the accuracy with which relations arespecied. These are real possibilities: if we want to make a direct link between cuephrases and cognitive constructs, we must provide an argument for so doing.The claim that cue phrases mirror people's text-structuring mechanisms will be sup-ported in three stages. Firstly, a clearer idea will be sought about what such mecha-nisms might be expected to be like, and what their role could be in the tasks of textcreation and text comprehension. Next, a model of the process of `communication via atext' will be advanced, in which the communication of relations between a writer and areader plays an important role. Lastly, it will be argued that since the communicationof relations is an important feature of communication via a text, it is to be expectedthat language contains ways of making relations explicit.3.5.2 What Are `Psychologically Real Relations'?In this section, the nature of the psychological constructs we are looking for is exam-ined in more detail. We are interested in how people represent the relations betweensegments of text, for the purposes of text comprehension and text construction, andhow the representations are used in these tasks.In one sense, the idea that `people use relations to structure text' is almost triviallytrue: clearly, people form some representation of the relations between text segments,because texts are more than just collections of clauses, and people can recognise thedierence between a coherent text and a collection of clauses. Somehow, the wayclauses are combined in coherent text is being modelled: the real issue to address iswhat these models are like, and how the models inuence text processing. And herethere are many open questions. Do people use the same structuring strategies forreading as for writing? Do we really use a `xed set' of strategies, or are more generalmechanisms in operation? Do we represent inter-segment relations using the sameresources we use to represent the content of sentences, or are they treated in a dierentway? These issues and others will be addressed below.It is important to note that we are not yet asking about how to dene the relationswhich people use|this question is dealt with in the two following chapters. The presentconcern is rather to ask what sort of psychological constructs relations might be, and
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 50what processing purposes they might serve.Relations In Discourse InterpretationA basic preliminary observation is that people nd it easier to process texts if theyare more than just a collection of clauses. It is not just that we can recognise thedierence between a coherent text and a collection of clauses; we actually use somerepresentation of the relations in a text to help us process it. This can be seen, forinstance, in a study by Meyer and Freedle (1984). Pairs of texts were prepared whichdiered only in the relations between groups of sentences: for example, in one text,the elements of content were linked by causal relations, and in the other, they werejust presented as a collection. In this case, subjects' recall was much better for theformer texts; this suggests that the presence of causal relations somehow facilitatestext processing or storage.Further studies show that the signalling of relations in a text facilitates its interpre-tation. For instance, Haberlandt (1982) shows that reading time is improved by theaddition of linguistic markers; Segal et al (1991) show that the presence of interclausalconnectives in a text helps subjects decide how to classify the connections between itsclauses. We should not assume in interpreting such studies that particular surface cuesmark particular coherence relations|this is the very claim that we are trying to justify.But the general nding that connectives facilitate discourse processing can be taken asa sign that relations between spans of text are somehow involved in the process: theseexperiments again show that it is important for readers to work out how text segmentsare linked together.Alternative Conceptions of Psychological RealitySanders et al base their taxonomy of relations on a `psychologically plausible' accountof how the relations in a text are interpreted. They begin by claiming that relationsof the kind proposed in rst are implausible as psychological constructs, because theyare treated as unanalysed units:from a psychological point of view, Mann and Thompson's ideas are notvery convincing, because they assume that all relational propositions arecognitively basic. If, for example, a relation like evidence occurs in a dis-course, people interpret the discourse by referring to the cognitively basicnotion of the evidence relation. . . Such an assumption is rather implausi-ble. Sanders et al (1992) p4The idea that people should have `in the head' a complex construct such as the evi-dence relation is seen as unlikely. For Sanders et al, it is more plausible to decomposerelations according to more `general' principles of cognition such as causality and po-larity: it is then claimed that such principles are used jointly to infer relations such asevidence. This is thought to be more plausible than the idea that each relation is acompletely separate purpose-built construct.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 51However, it is not clear that general principles of cognitive organisation are the onlyones which can be considered `psychologically plausible'. A much broader conceptionof psychological reality seems possible, especially when we consider that reading andwriting are highly skilled, practised activities.Psychological studies of skill acquisition frequently point towards a model in whichpractice at a task leads to the development of specialised mechanisms, specicallytailored for performing the task in question. Such mechanisms have been posited inmany dierent domains. For instance, Reason (1979) suggested that everyday tasks likedriving and cooking are carried out by a system of motor programs, operating witha certain degree of autonomy. Models of linguistic processing also commonly involvesets of specialised constructs evolving during the course of practice: pdp models area case in point. Consider, for instance, Rumelhart and Norman's (1982) model of theperformance of skilled typists: here, every word in the lexicon is associated with anaction schema, which when activated, sets o a chain of events leading to a sequenceof keypresses. Such schemata develop as a typist's skill increases; they are clearly not`cognitive primitives' in Sanders et al's sense. And yet, they (or something like them)denitely seem to be `used by people' in performing tasks.The idea of a set of specialised constructs capturing regularities at the lexical level isextensible upwards to larger levels of structure. It is possible to imagine constructscorresponding to coherence relations evolving in the same way: producing and under-standing large pieces of text are highly practised tasks, and it does seem plausible thatmechanisms are developed specically for them. When thinking of psychologically realrelations, therefore, we do not have to limit ourselves to thinking about general `cog-nitively basic' principles. However, this is not to say that general cognitive principlesshould not feature at all in a psychological theory of relations. A complete theorymight well envisage relations partly in terms of general cognitive resources, and partlyas learned strategies for structuring discourse.Relations in Discourse ProductionSanders et al's account of psychological reality is mainly based on the task of discourseinterpretation: how coherence relations are inferred from passages of text. It is sug-gested that relations have a role in discourse production as well, but this role is notexamined in any detail. This may be because less research has been done on howextended passages of discourse are produced|nevertheless, there are some studies,particularly about written discourse production, and it is instructive to consider howcoherence relations can be tted into existing theories.Psychological theories of writing are still at a relatively early stage compared to theoriesof discourse interpretation, the diculty being how to get an experimental handle onthe process. Some studies (eg de Beaugrande (1984)) have used lms of writers at work,and analysed pauses and crossings-out; but this source of evidence is unlikely to berich enough to provide a full account of the processes involved. Most current theoriesare based on another technique|protocol analysis. In this paradigm, subjects areasked to `verbalise' while they write, about what they are thinking about and how theyare performing the task that they have been set.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 52Again, this source of evidence is questionable: it is unlikely that all the mechanismsinvolved in writing are amenable to verbalisation. Despite this, some initial theoriesof written composition have been formulated, which look plausible as far as they go.Perhaps the best known theory is that of Flower and Hayes (eg Flower and Hayes(1980), Hayes and Flower (1980)). This theory draws on spoken protocols, and also onthe the notes taken by writers. It is suggested that the task of writing involves threeseparate sub-processes:Planning: this process itself has three components. In the generating component, information relevant to the writing task is re-trieved from long-term memory. The topic of the text is the initial search key;thereafter, the search key is the last item to be retrieved. The process stops whenirrelevant items begin to be produced, and loops back to previous items to lookfor other relevant information in the same way. In the organising component, the most useful generated items are selected andorganised into a writing plan. A number of operators are used to eect theorganisation|for instance, `identify as a possible rst or last topic', `search fora previously noted topic subordinate to present topic', `order with respect to apreviously noted topic'. In the goal-setting component, criteria are identied by which to judge the text,and they are stored for later use in editing.Translating: this involves creating sentences out of the organised material.Reviewing: again, there are two components to this process, reading and edit-ing. The material so far produced is read, segment by segment, and each segmentis edited in turn. The editing process detects and corrects inaccuracies in meaning,violations in writing conventions, and mismatches between the writer's intentions andthose apparently expressed in the text.The order of the processes is roughly as outlined above|although the editing processcan cause the system to be re-entered at various dierent stages. In fact, editing andgenerating can interrupt any of the other processes.Much of this model seems little more than a `common sense' view of writing. But whileit is clearly not very elaborate, it seems likely that the writing process is broken downin something like the way proposed. A number of hypotheses correlating stages in theprocess with the form of subjects' notes and protocols seem to be borne out. In whichcase it must be asked: how (if at all) do coherence relations t into the model?There are several possible answers. For one thing, relations could be involved in thegeneration component, as aids to the retrieval of relevant material from memory. Ifthe content of one portion of text has been decided, then a coherence relation could give
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 53us useful information about other items of content which could feature in adjoiningportions of text. A set of relations could provide a standard repertoire of methodsfor accessing relevant content. Evidence for this idea comes from a study of youngwriters by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987). Children experience particular problems innding content in their compositions: this study examines the eect of cueing childrenwith suggestive prompts when they `dry up'. The prompts given are predominantlycue phrases|for instance even though, also, for example. Given such cues, childrenare frequently able to produce more material for their compositions. Bereiter andScardamalia suggest that the cues `appear to stimulate the children to search for newnodes in memory that meet the logical requirements of the sentence openers' (p62).More mature writers, it might be supposed, will have internalised such cues, so thatthey can initiate the search for content themselves instead of waiting for an externalprompt. We would not want to suggest that these internalised cues can be mappeddirectly onto surface cues. But this experiment does show that whatever form theytake, methods for accessing new and relevant content are of great use in creating text.Another possible role for relations is in Flower and Hayes' organisation component.The operators used in this component are used to structure elements of content alreadyaccessed. Many of them work with pairs of topics, for instance by deciding which oftwo topics to mention rst, or whether one topic is subordinate to another. Coherencerelations (which might well feature ordering constraints or incorporate hierarchicalconcepts like subordination) could be involved in making such decisions.4It is interesting to note that the above uses for relations correspond quite closely to theuses found for relations in current text generation programs. Hovy (1988) uses relationsas planning operators for working out text structure; Moore and Paris (1989) incor-porate relations into planning operators, and in addition use these operators to accessnew elements of content to be generated. Many other subsequent systems have a simi-lar design. It would be disingenuous to draw conclusions about human text processingmechanisms by looking at the way current text generation programs operate|but whenconstructs used in generation systems are found to resemble constructs hypothesisedin psychological models, it seems worth mentioning the fact.To sum up: it is plausible to think of coherence relations as modelling a set of strategiesused by people to access and organise elements of content when planning text. Theconception of relations as planning operators seems useful for psychological modellingas well as in computational systems.A `Basic Level' of RelationsOne problem for the above idea is that it is hard to nd any single relation that isnot sometimes going to be useful for `accessing and organising material'. For instance,4 A third possible role for relations is in the translation component, where the plans thus far builtare converted into sentences. If relations were involved in the construction of plans, and at the sametime associated with surface linguistic expressions, then the task of translation would be considerablyfacilitated: the relevant linguistic expressions would be predetermined by the plans. However, thisidea cannot be used in the present argument, because|again|it assumes the conclusion we aretrying to reach; that cue phrases can be used as evidence for relations.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 54consider a `possible' relation like `brother-event', where one span introduces a per-son, and the other span presents something happening to that person's brother. Sucha relation would be helpful, almost by denition, in generating Example 3.4:(3.4) Lars xed the boat. His brother had holed it by bashing into the jetty.Having decided on producing the rst clause, brother-event could be used as asearch cue to retrieve the material in the second clause. If coherence relations areto be thought of as strategies for accessing and organising material, why shouldn'tbrother-event count as a coherence relation?One answer is that this relation is seldom a useful one when it comes to producing acoherent text. In most cases, if this relation is used, an incoherent text results:(3.5) *Lars xed the boat. His brother was a sergeant in the Danish police.Furthermore, in the coherent cases, it is likely that an alternative relation can alwaysbe found. In 3.4 above, other relations such as background or cause could havebeen used; and these are more often useful when it comes to structuring text.But this explanation is not yet completely convincing. It could still be claimed thatbrother-event is useful in particular cases, such as Example 3.4. The relation`brother-event' must have some kind of mental representation: if the reader orwriter did not appreciate that it was Lars' brother who had holed the boat, thensomething would be missing from their representation of the text.Of course, we can appreciate that in this example, Lars' action is not caused by justany event, but by an event involving his brother. Likewise, each cause relation willbe unique in certain ways: the point is that cause is an abstraction from particularinstances of relations. When I suggest that cause has `psychological reality', I am notclaiming that we only represent relations at this level of abstraction, but that it is usedfor some purposes.It is useful to take an analogy from another eld of psychology at this point: Rosch'stheory of categorisation (eg Rosch et al (1976), Rosch (1978)). Rosch claims that inorder to form strategies for dealing with the innite variety of stimuli we are faced within the world, we have to work with abstractions, since we are nite processing devices,and we cannot have a particular strategy for each stimulus. Thus we have to treatsome stimuli as equal: Rosch calls the level of abstraction at which we operate thebasic level. The basic level is thought of as optimising the trade-o between usefulcategories and general categories. For instance, `chair' is a basic level category: if wehave to write down all the things you can do with a chair, the list will be much longerthan the list of all the things you can do with a piece of furniture (a superordinatecategory), and not much shorter than the list of things you can do with an armchair (asubordinate category). Rosch claims that for some purposes, we work with the concept`chair' rather than with more specic concepts. Yet at the same time, of course, wecan recognise individual chairs and tell them apart. Dierent tasks call for reasoningat dierent levels of abstraction.










WRITER READERFigure 3.1: A Model of Communication Via a Textreally matters: readers need to be able to do it. It is this which makes it likely thatways exist for identifying relations explicitly.What arguments can be given for the idea that writers and readers use the samerelations? A number of points can be made. Firstly, if we assume that writers learn howto structure their texts by reading other peoples' texts, it seems likely that there will bean overlap in the methods used in reading and writing. More importantly, argumentscan be given from the perspective of computational eciency. The knowledge that axed set of relations is used to structure text permits a big reduction in the search
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 56space for both reading and writing. When a reader is working through a text, (s)hewill know that the next segment of text will be related to the current segment in oneof a xed number of ways. If the set of relations includes a causal relation, thenthis is one of the alternatives the reader must always consider. Relations which arenot in the set do not even need to be considered. Imagine a `possible' relation whichis unlikely to feature in the actual set; for instance the `brother-event' relationmentioned above. The argument is, that at some stage of processing, the question ofwhether brother-event holds is not one which needs to be asked; whereas a relationlike cause is always going to be a possibility. Take a text like 3.6:(3.6) Lars woke up early one morning. His brother was being noisy in the kitchen.The obvious interpretation of the relation in this text is cause, with the rst spanas the nucleus. But if brother-event were a relation in the set, then this would bean alternative: in this case, we wouldn't know which kitchen was involved, or whenLars' brother was being noisy in it. The text would be much more ambiguous, andit would be likely to be harder to process. It is a sign of how heavily we can rely onthe conventional set of relations that we nd it hard to even imagine a relation like`brother-event'.Writers will also prot from the conventional use of one particular set of relations. Inexample 3.6, the writer knows that enough has been done to disambiguate the relationin question, because the reader will not be expecting a relation like brother-event:so there is no need to make the causal relation explicit. In order to achieve coherence,texts only need to be specied with sucient detail to allow the reader to work outwhich of the limited number of relations is being used.From the point of view of computational eciency, then, a strong case can be madefor the use of a standard, smallish set of relations, by both readers and writers.3.5.4 The Need to Signal Relations in TextThe nal stage in the argument builds on the idea worked out in Section 3.5.3, thatthe communication of relations `really matters'. It is shown how this idea can be takento support the strategy of using cue phrases as evidence for the relations that readersand writers use.The argument is as follows: if people actually use a certain set of relations whenconstructing and interpreting text, it is likely that the language they speak containsthe resources to signal those particular relations explicitly. If people plan texts bybuilding a structure of relations, and understand texts by working out this structure,then being able to mark relations explicitly in text will facilitate the communicationprocess, by making it easier for a writer to indicate to a reader which relation isintended. As a consequence, ways of signalling relations in text would be extremelyuseful.Of course, relations do not always need to be signalled in text. Often, they will beinferrable without explicit signals, as in example 3.6 above. The inference can be dueto contextual information, or to the reader's general knowledge, or to the conventional
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 57use of a subset of possible relations. However, it is unlikely that any relation exists thatis always inferrable in these ways. For one thing, the amount of relevant knowledgethat the reader has is not always under the writer's control. Consider a text like 3.7:(3.7) Bill was laughing. Frank was angry with him. . .Here, if we don't know more about the situation, we don't know whether Bill is laughingbecause Frank is angry, or whether Frank is angry because Bill is laughing. It is usefulto have linguistic devices, like the cue phrases because or as a result, to distinguishthese possibilities.It is not strictly true to say that the reader's knowledge is beyond the control of thewriter. In the above example, the writer could have given enough prior context todisambiguate one or the other reading. But using cue phrases is a much simpler wayof providing the necessary information; from the point of view of eciency, it is anattractive option.So|again from the point of view of eciency|we can argue that if the communicationof relations is important, then simple linguistic means (such as cue phrases) will existfor identifying them in text. If this is indeed the case, then we can look at the rangeof cue phrases in a language to give us an indication of the relations that people usein constructing and interpreting texts in that language.3.5.5 SummaryTo sum up the argument that has been presented: In Section 3.5.2, the idea that `people use a set of relations when they processtext' was eshed out. A conception of relations as constructs developed duringthe course of practice was proposed. Rosch's notion of the basic level was invoked,to illustrate how a particular level of abstraction is suitable for particular tasks. Itwas also used to emphasise that just because we work at this level of abstractionfor some purposes, it does not mean that for other purposes we cannot representthe relations in discourse with more ner detail. In Section 3.5.3 it was suggested that if readers and writers use relations, then itis likely they use the same set. The argument was on the grounds of eciency:the conventional use of one particular set would reduce the search space for bothreading and writing tasks. Finally, in Section 3.5.4, it was argued that if the communication of relationsis of real importance in the communication of a writer's ideas via a text, thenit is likely that simple linguistic means exist for identifying relations explicitly.Again, the argument was on the grounds of eciency: language, if it is an ecientcommunicative tool, should contain such devices. If the above arguments go through, then it is permissible to take connectivedevices like cue phrases as evidence for the set of relations that people use.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 583.6 Some Objections to the ArgumentThe argument might be considered quite speculative in some places; particularly thosewhich make reference to considerations of processing eciency, or which propose theinvestigation of psychological constructs through an analysis of language. Some ofthese issues are addressed in this section.3.6.1 Can you really investigate psychological constructs without do-ing any psychological experiments?As a method of studying psychological constructs, the technique being proposed isvery unusual. How can we expect to nd out about human processing mechanismsjust by studying linguistic phenomena? How could we possibly conrm or refute anyconclusions we came to? Almost without exception, psychological theories are basedon data about how humans perform experimental tasks. In this technique, `a language'is the source of all relevant data: is this really permissible?Admittedly, the technique is unconventional as a psychological methodology. However,many objections have already been mentioned concerning the experimental paradigmsused to study human text structuring mechanisms. To sum up some of the pointsin Section 3.4.2: when subjects are asked to talk explicitly about the relations theyuse while they are processing text, it is not certain that the tasks they perform areexactly those they normally perform. If subjects are `naive', it is not certain thattheir understanding of what coherence relations are is suciently clear; if they arediscourse analysts, it is possible that their intuitions are tainted by biases towards onetheory or another. There are methods of studying relations without making subjectsthink about them explicitly|in particular, recall and reading time can be examined.But these methods are indirect: they can only be used to choose between varioushypotheses, not to form hypotheses in the rst place. And nding an experimentalindicator of the relations used in generation promises to be an even harder task. Cuephrases cannot themselves be used, until an argument is given to suggest why cuephrases and cognitive constructs should stand in a one-to-one relation with each other.But if we have such an argument, then there is little point in conducting an experimentusing cue phrases as evidence for relations: the argument allows us to look directly atthe cue phases in the language to nd out about the constructs people employ.To put the positive case for studying language to nd out about psychologically realrelations: it just seems that language provides an enormously rich source of evidencefor studying the ways in which people structure text, and it would be a pity to ignoreit. As the next two chapters show, the set of cue phrases in English is very largeand diverse, and it is structured in all sorts of interesting ways. Some very subtledistinctions between relations are captured by the dierent phrases|in comparison,the experimental methodologies outlined above seem relatively impoverished sourcesof data. Of course I am not saying that psychological experiments cannot also be usedto investigate the relations people use. I am just arguing that the method of analysingcue phrases is a legitimate (and attractive) alternative.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 593.6.2 It might be useful if there were a cue phrase for every relationpeople use: this doesn't mean there will be one.This objection goes to the heart of the argument being advanced. It suggests that weare not permitted to rely on language being perfectly ecient as an instrument for thecommunication of relations. What grounds are there to suppose that cue phrases willexist in a language just because it would be useful if they did? For one thing, we needto be certain that language is exible enough to adapt to the requirements of its users.On top of that, it may not be just a matter of exibility: maybe eciency isn't theonly constraint on the way languages change. Other conicting factors may also beinvolved|for instance, a stylistic trend in favour of terse, simple sentences|such thatthe end result only partially satises some constraints. The argument could, in short,be considered Panglossian, arming that `language has evolved to be the way it is,and therefore the way it is must be the most ecient'. If this were the case, it mightwell put the proposed methodology in jeopardy.We would not want to have to rely on `the eciency of language' as an article offaith. Fortunately, there do seem to be at least some indications that cue phrases haveevolved through considerations of eciency. For one thing, many cue phrases are singlewords, or idiom chunks,5 which are conventionally treated as single words. Moreover,the etymology of many cue phrases suggests that they have evolved from longer, lessformulaic phrases. For instance, Halliday and Hasan (1976, p230) list several connectivewords which were originally more complex phrases, containing anaphora, and makinguse of the `compositional' resources of the language. Such words include therefore,thereupon, whereupon, and so on. In addition to this, there are cases of new cue phrasesbeing invented where there is a need for them. For instance, the phrases i and justin case have been coined in logical and philosophical genres of text respectively, toreplace the longer and more unwieldy phrase if and only if. There are many examplesof cue phrases evolving in this way: they provide some support for the idea that theset of cue phrases will reect the set of relational constructs we use.3.6.3 Cue phrases aren't the only way of signalling relations.As far as it goes, the argument gives no reason why cue phrases should be studied tothe exclusion of other linguistic devices for signalling text structure. In fact, the prin-cipal criticism made about the present methodology (Bateman and Rondhuis (1994),Seligman (1994)) has been that it concentrates exclusively on cue phrases.There are certainly other means of signalling discourse structure. A great many re-searchers (see e.g. Moens and Steedman (1988), Lascarides and Asher (1993)) haveshown that tense and aspect are cues to the temporal structure in a text. Scott andde Souza (1990) have explored a large number of syntactic devices as signallers of rstrelations. Several researchers (e.g. Sidner (1983), Grosz and Sidner (1986)) have sug-gested that the pattern of pronominalisation in a text provides information about itsthematic structure. Delin and Oberlander (1992) investigate the discourse structures5 Phrases whose meaning is not a function of the semantics of the individual words of which they arecomposed.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 60signalled by it-clefts. In short, it is uncontroversial that discourse structure can beexpressed through a wide range of surface linguistic devices.In the light of these examples, the present emphasis on cue phrases should really beseen as just a starting point in working out a theory of discourse coherence. Ideally,other cohesive strategies should also be considered. However, the general idea that theinvestigation should be driven by the range of available resources remains the same.In addition, there are some good reasons for beginning by looking at cue phrases. Forone thing, cue phrases are a relatively homogenous set of linguistic devices, whosedierent eects can be fairly easily compared amongst one another. Furthermore,many alternative cohesive strategies also have cue phrase counterparts. For instance,temporal relations can be signalled by phrases like previously, afterwards or while.Finally, it can be argued that structures which cannot be signalled by cue phrasesshould not be modelled using coherence relations, but with some other theoreticalconstruct. This argument will be taken up in Section 7.2.3.6.4 Dierent languages have dierent cue phrases.In cross-linguistic studies, it has been found (eg Ballard et al (1971), Longacre (1983))that dierent languages often have dierent sets of cue phrases. Longacre, in justifyinghis set of relations, uses cue phrases from a number of dierent languages as evidence.This goes against the argument being suggested here: if a cue phrase doesn't existin a certain language, we would have to say there was no need for it. This in turnwould mean advocating dierent structuring mechanisms in people speaking dierentlanguages.However, this objection is not insurmountable. For one thing, the dierences betweenthe sets of cue phrases in dierent languages are not that great. It is quite surprisinghow much similarity there is between English cue phrases and those in the Philippinelanguages which Ballard and Longacre study. And between European languages, whichare much more closely related, it is likely that the dierences are even smaller.Furthermore, dierences between the sets of relations in two languages might be at-tributable simply to the dierent registers of discourse used in these languages. Inspoken language, for instance, phrases like lastly or to summarise are very rare; maybewe would not expect to nd them at all in a language with a largely oral tradition, orin one without any writing at all. All this means is that speakers of this language havenot needed to internalise the constructs developed by English speakers in the courseof learning how to read and write.Finally|to pre-empt some of the discussion in later chapters|while cue phrases fromone language may not always translate directly into cue phrases in another language, itmay still be that the dimensions along which cue phrases vary are the same in the twolanguages. Thus, at a more abstract level, interesting similarities may still be found. Totake a simple example, there is no single cue phrase in English to translate the Germancue phrase wenn; two phrases (if and when) are needed to do the job. However, thereare other phrases in English|for instance then|which seem to manifest just the kindof ambiguity that wenn does. See Chapter 6 for further discussion of this idea.
CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING A SET OF RELATIONS 61In any case, it is not inconceivable that dierent language communities use dierentstructuring mechanisms even for producing similar registers of discourse. As mentionedin Section 3.5.3, one psychological role for relations could be as conventions, such thatthe reader knows what set of relations the writer is working with, and the writerknows which relations the reader will be expecting: dierent languages could make useof dierent conventions. It is important to remember that `psychological constructs', inthe sense that we are talking about them here, do not have to be `cognitive primitives'posessed by all humans. An equally plausible idea is that relations model a mixed bagof constructs, some of which are cognitive primitives and some of which are acquiredthrough exposure to a particular language community.3.6.5 What about relations between large segments of text?One of the attractive features of coherence relations is their insensitivity to span size.Indeed, this feature was taken in Chapter 2 to be central to the notion of coherencerelations. However, cue phrases seem primarily designed for linking clauses or sentencestogether. In linking relations to cue phrases, do we not risk ignoring the issue of higherlevel relations?This objection is telling if we adopt a straightforward conception of cue phrases asclause or sentence conjunctions; however, we will actually be working with a moregeneral and informative denition of cue phrases (to be outlined in the next chapter,in Section 4.2). This denition moves away from a syntactic conception of cue phrases,allowing more complex phrases such as this is because and following this. Stock phrasessuch as these, which make use of propositional anaphora, can signal relations betweenlarge spans of text, and hence (according to the argument in this chapter) can be usedas evidence for identifying those relations.3.7 Summary: A New Proposal for Motivating RelationsIn this chapter, a methodology has been suggested for working out a `standard' setof coherence relations. Coherence relations are thought of as psychological constructsused in planning and interpreting discourse, and it is suggested that the cue phrasesin a language can be used as evidence for these constructs.This argument leaves us with a fairly strong general prediction; namely, that the setof relations which corresponds to the set of cue phrases will suce to describe therelations in all coherent texts. In the remaining chapters, this prediction will be renedand tested.
Chapter 4A Data-Driven Methodology forMotivating a Set of Relations4.1 IntroductionIn the previous chapter, it was argued that linguistic devices (in particular, cue phrases)can be taken as evidence for relations, provided these are thought of as constructswhich people actually use when creating and interpreting text. This chapter describeshow a set of relations can be determined and justied in the light of this argument.The methodology is incremental|it consists of a series of relatively simple linguistictests, which can be performed quite systematically, with a minimum of inter-analystdisagreement.To begin with, in Section 4.2, a suitable method is sought for dening `cue phrases',without relying on terminology from existing theories of discourse. Cue phrases mustbe characterised independently in order to avoid circularity: since they are to be usedto motivate relation denitions, no reference can be made to their role in signallingrelations. Instead, a linguistic test for cue phrases is proposed, which makes use ofreaders' intuitions about the coherence of certain constructed mini-discourses.Section 4.3 describes how a corpus of cue phrases is gathered using this test, andprovides some preliminary discussion of its size, and the variation within it. In Sec-tion 4.4, a second linguistic test is presented, for classifying cue phrases into groupsof synonyms and hyponyms: the test basically determines whether one cue phrase issubstitutable for another. The results of the test are presented in the form of sub-stitutability diagrams, which are explained and illustrated in Section 4.5. Usingthe test, a taxonomy of cue phrases is constructed: this taxonomy is described inSection 4.6. 62
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 634.2 Firming Up the Notion of `Cue Phrase': A Test forRelational PhrasesThe rst task is to formulate a precise denition for the class of phrases which isunder investigation. Some denitions of `cue phrases' exist already, but these areoften internal to the theory of discourse being proposed. For instance, Cohen (1984)denes `clue words' as `special words or phrases directly indicating the structure of theargument to the hearer'; Hirschberg and Litman (1993) dene cue phrases as `wordsand phrases that directly signal the structure of a discourse'. With such denitions,in order to decide what counts as a cue phrase, we already need to know what `thestructure of a discourse' is. In order to avoid circularity, the constructs used in thediscourse theory must be justied using some other criterion.As an alternative to this approach, cue phrases, if given an independent denitionat the outset, can be used in motivating the constructs used in the discourse theory.This is the approach adopted here, and sanctioned by the arguments in the previouschapter.In an attempt to come up with a precise yet theory-neutral denition of cue phrases,a linguistic test is proposed which picks out a certain set of phrases as they occur innatural discourse. The test is given in Figure 4.1 below. It is designed to pick out allsentence and clause connectives, but to stay away from methods of realising relationswithin a single clause.In order to avoid any terminological confusion, we can refer to the class of phraseswhich pass this test as the class of relational phrases|although since this is quitea mouthful, the term `cue phrase' will continue to be used, with this new technicalmeaning.The central idea behind the test is that cue phrases have a function which extendsbeyond a single clause. They link clauses and sentences together to create larger unitsof text; therefore they cannot be made sense of when associated with one clause inisolation. Thus the clause(4.4) Because Bill owed John moneyis impossible to understand without prior linguistic context, but can be understoodwhen the cue phrase is removed:(4.5) Bill owed John money.In order to make the test work, any anaphoric or cataphoric expressions in the clauseto be isolated must be replaced by their referents; otherwise it would be impossible tointerpret out of context regardless of whether or not it contained a cue phrase. However,propositional anaphora within the candidate phrase should not be substituted: thuscomplex constructions like because of this or for this reason will also be identied ascue phrases. There are good grounds for opting to allow anaphoric expressions withincue phrases: as Halliday and Hasan (1976) point out, many bona de cue phrases
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 641. Isolate the phrase and its host clause. The host clause is the clause with which the phraseis immediately associated syntactically; for instance, if the passage of text to be examined is(4.1) . . . John and Bill were squabbling: John was angry because Bill owed him money.That was how it all started . . .then the isolated phrase and clause would be(4.2) because Bill owed him money.2. Substitute any anaphoric or cataphoric terms in the resulting text with their antecedents,and include any elided items. For the above clause, this would result in(4.3) because Bill owed John money.Propositional anaphora within the candidate phrase itself should not be subsituted, however.Thus if the candidate phrase is because of this, the propositional anaphor this should remain.3. If the candidate phrase is indeed a relational phrase, the resulting text should appear in-complete. An incomplete text is one where one or more extra clauses are needed in orderfor a coherent message to be framed. The phrase because Bill owed John money is incom-plete in this sense: it requires at least one other clause in order to make a self-containeddiscourse. Even the fact that it could appear by itself on a scrap of paper (say as an answerto a question) does not make it complete; the question is essential context if it is to beunderstood.Note that it is only additional clausal material which is to be removed in the test. Anyadditional contextual information necessary for the comprehension of the clause (for instance,knowledge of the referents of denite referring expressions like John and Bill) can be assumedto be present.4. Any phrases which refer directly to the text in which they are situated (such as in the nextsection, as already mentioned) are to be excluded from the class of relational phrases. Suchphrases pass the test|but only because their referents have been expressly removed throughthe operation of the test itself.5. Phrases which pass the test only because they include comparatives (for instance moreworryingly, most surprisingly) are also to be excluded from the class of relational phrases.Stripped of the comparatives, such phrases do not pass the test. Comparatives like moreand most introduce a very wide range of adverbials, bringing the compositional resourcesof the language quite strongly into play. Since we are more interested in stock words andphrases that have evolved to meet specic needs, phrases involving comparatives will not beconsidered as relational phrases.6. Sometimes, more than one cue phrase can be found in the isolated clause (eg and so, yetbecause). In such cases, both phrases should pass the test when considered individually inthe same context. In other words, the host clause should appear incomplete with eitherphrase. Figure 4.1: Test for Relational Phrases
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 65derive etymologically from phrases involving anaphora (consider words like thereforeand thereby); so it seems reasonable also to allow as cue phrases expressions with anexplicit anaphoric component.The test is designed to give a reasonably objective way to pick out a set of phrases toact as the object for further study. It calls on analysts' intuitions, but there is no needfor `coherence relations' to be explicit in their minds: judgements are purely aboutwhether or not given clauses make sense when isolated from their context. There areof course many cases where the test is hard to apply. One problem in the applicationof the test is to decide whether the required context for a mini-discourse is linguisticor non-linguistic. For instance, consider this discourse:(4.6) But you can't just leave us here!It is possible to imagine this discourse with no previous utterances at all. All the same,it needs to be interpreted as a reaction to a previously existing propositional attitude(in this case, perhaps an intention to leave), and so can arguably be interpreted as partof a relation between propositions.It might be considered that the test is overly restrictive in some cases. For instance, asit stands, several phrases used to signal `purpose'-type relations are excluded. Considerthe following two cases:(4.7) Bill escaped from prison by bribing a guard.(4.8) Bob used the crowbar to lever open the window.Bribing a guard is not a full sentence, and cannot stand alone; Lever open the windowcan be interpreted as a sentence, but only as an imperative, quite dierent from itsoriginal meaning. Other phrases used by Vander Linden (1992) to signal purposiverelations are even more clearly ruled out, such as the preposition for:(4.9) Bob used the crowbar for extra leverage.Since the relation here is realised within a single clause, the candidate phrase's hostclause contains both parts of the relation, and can only be interpreted when the phraseis present!It would be useful to have a way of expanding the test to allow for additional phrasessuch as these. But the decision here has been to keep the test reasonably simple,rather than to extend it until it covers exactly the range of phrases we think shouldbe included. Hopefully, when the present corpus of phrases has been analysed, a moreprincipled method for identifying cue phrases can be found.11 Note that as it stands, the test works less well in other languages, where connectives often exerta grammatical inuence on their host clauses. (For instance, German subordinators can alter theposition of the verb; conditional phrases in many languages require a clause in the subjunctive.) Itmay be that the standardisations of clauses required to overcome these problems are also sucientto expand the test's English coverage in some of the ways required.
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 664.3 Gathering a Corpus of Cue PhrasesUsing the test, a corpus of cue phrases has been gathered. In order to limit thescope of the investigation, the source texts were all from the same genre of discourse:`academic' writing, such as can be found in journals or academic books. It is likelythat dierent registers of text require slightly dierent sets of cue phrases: for instance,phrases like just then, whereupon and sure enough occur in narrative discourse but areunlikely to appear in academic articles. At the same time, the texts analysed in thisstudy occasionally switch into dierent genres; for instance, a narrative genre is oftenadopted to describe a case study. (For this reason, the corpus contains some phraseswhich might not seem typical of `academic' writing.)All corpus analysis was carried out by the author. 226 pages of text were analysedaltogether, from twelve dierent authors. This yielded a corpus of around 200 phrases.There was found to be extensive use of a core of phrases across all the authors: forinstance, and, since, if, and but were used by all twelve; on the other hand, however,and also were used by eleven; and then, for example, because, when, and although wereused by ten.2Following the study, the corpus was somewhat enlarged, again by the author, as newphrases not encountered in the original analysis were discovered. Some of these phrasesmight well have been found if a larger amount of text had been searched. Others are nottypically found in `academic' discourse, but have been included because they provideinteresting contrasts for subsequent discussion. For each new addition, contexts havebeen found in which new candidate phrases pass the cue phrase test. The enlargedcorpus, containing some 350 phrases, is given in Appendix A. While there are doubtlessother phrases still to be included, it is the largest corpus of connective phrases that Iam aware of in the literature.Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 report the results of two preliminary analyses carried out onthe corpus.4.3.1 The Syntactic Diversity of cue PhrasesCue phrases fall into ve syntactic classes (as dened by Quirk et al (1972)): Coordinators: these always appear in between the clauses they link; the clausescan be in separate sentences or in the same sentence. If in the same sentence,no punctuation is required in addition to the coordinator; and if combined ina sequence with other cue phrases, coordinators always appear leftmost in thesequence. For example:(4.10) a. An object may move but it remains the same object. . .b. A general rule is needed to prevent comparative constructions. Orsome rule is needed that will say: `if a word cannot . . .2 Of course, it might be objected that if . . . [then] is really the cue phrase, rather than simply if; thetest for cue phrases does not capture this as it stands. The issue of the inter-dependence of cuephrases is raised in Section 4.4.
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 67 Subordinators: these introduce subordinate clauses in complex sentences. Thesubordinate clause can be on the left or the right of the main clause, but thesubordinator is always on the left of the subordinate clause. For example:(4.11) a. Although it is common sense that labels are related, this is a dicultidea to explicate.b. One further illocution should be considered before we discuss somevariants. Conjunct adverbs: these modify whole clauses, and can appear at dierentpoints within them, although there is often a default position for particularphrases. There are also syntactic constraints on exactly which positions con-junct adverbs can occupy: at the beginning of a clause, between subject andverb, between any auxiliary verbs, between auxiliary verb and main verb, after acopula if there is one, before a sentential complement if there is one. For example:(4.12) a. The parallel between permissibility and possibility has been ex-ploited by many linguists. There are, however, two important dis-tinctions between them . . .b. We will select only those hypotheses we deem relevant. As a con-sequence, our discussion diers from the usual views . . . Prepositional phrases: these often contain propositional anaphora referringback to the previous clause. For example:(4.13) a. It has a high degree of opacity. In that respect it resembles glass.b. The plate extends as far as the Pacic coast. At this point it slopesdown.The distinction between prepositional phrases and conjunct adverbials is oftenhard to make. I have tended to include phrases in the latter category if they arebest analysed as idiom chunks, and in the former category if they retain a fairdegree of compositionality|see Section 4.3.2 for further details. Phrases which take sentential complements: these often introduce a par-ticular intentional stance with respect to the content of the clause they introduce.For example:(4.14) a. An act that is physically impossible cannot occur. (. . . ) It followsthat the language used . . . is often straightforward.b. It may seem that we are making too much of orientation; but char-acteristic orientation is not an idiosyncrasy.4.3.2 The Space of Cue PhrasesOne nding that emerged from a study of the corpus was that the cue phrases fell intotwo groups. It was possible to envisage a compositional semantics for some phrases: for
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 68instance, the semantics of the phrases many years later, a few years later, and twenty-ve years later can be seen to depend on the semantics of the constituent phrases manyyears, a few years, and twenty-ve years; and these in turn depend on the semanticsof the determiner phrases many, a few, and twenty-ve.Other phrases in the corpus, which we might refer to as simple phrases, are impossibleto break down in this way. This might be because they are single words, or alternativelybecause they are idiom chunks, which are dened precisely as multi-word phrases whosesemantics is not compositional. Examples of idiom chunks in the corpus include onthe other hand (in contrast with the ungrammatical o the other hand), after all (incontrast with before all), and given that (in contrast with taken that).A great many phrases seem to be partly compositional|for instance, the meanings ofon the one hand and on the other hand can be thought to hinge on the meanings of oneand other, but not on the meaning of hand: the phrase on the other foot is nonsense asa marker of a relation. There are many other phrases of a similar `semi-compositional'status; but there seem to be no hard-and-fast rules for working out how such phrasesare formed, and it is easiest at the outset simply to treat them as unanalysed atomicelements.The existence of compositional cue phrases has an important consequence: it makesthe class of cue phrases innite in size. Phrases like very very . . . very many years laterare technically members of the class, even though in practice they will never occur.This means that in order to describe the class, it is necessary to lay down rules for howcompositional cue phrases can be constructed. These rules will be syntactic in nature.For instance, the following two rules are helpful in expanding the charted space of cuephrases: There is a class of words which modify all subordinators and only subordinators;these words are even, just, except, only and especially. Thus we can constructcue phrases like only where, except before, and just on the grounds that. Thereare exceptions to this rule (for instance, *except in case), but it still provides auseful generalisation. Temporal phrases can also be modied in a systematic way. The conjunct adverbsearlier, afterwards and later, as well as the phrases before and after (which canbe conjunct adverbs or subordinators), can all be modied by any expressiondenoting a length of time; for instance three days after, a minute earlier, andsome time before. The modiers always precede the head phrases.The general syntactic concepts of head and modier can be used to analyse anyphrase, regardless of its syntactic category. Compositional cue phrases can typicallystand alone without modiers|for instance, later and after by themselves are stillcue phrases. In what follows, modiers have been stripped wherever possible. Toreiterate the point made in Section 4.2: we are not interested in phrases in which thefull compositional power of the language is brought to bear; we are interested in the`stock' words and phrases, which have evolved to meet specic communicative needs.
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 694.4 Organising the Corpus: A Test for SubstitutabilityThus far, we have used a simple test for detecting cue phrases in text, and on the basisof this we have gathered a corpus of cue phrases. The phrases have been classiedaccording to their syntactic properties, so that an idea can be obtained of the completespace of phrases. But since we are principally interested in cue phrases as signallers ofdiscourse structuring strategies, a classication of phrases according to their functionin discourse is our central objective.In keeping with the data-driven methodology adopted thus far, the classication willbe made by means of a simple linguistic test, rather than by making theoretical claimsabout the semantics or pragmatics of the phrases in the corpus. The test is to do withsubstitutability. Very broadly, if two phrases are inter-substitutable in a passageof discourse then they should be classied in the same category. If one phrase canalways be substituted for another, but not vice versa, then the latter phrase shouldbe classied in a category subordinate to that of the former phrase. In this way ataxonomy of synonyms and hyponyms can be constructed. It will also be interestingto represent those groups of phrases which can never be substituted for each other,and those which can sometimes be substituted for each other, in certain contexts.The approach here is similar in many ways to that taken in the WordNet project(Beckwith et al (1990), Miller et al (1990)). WordNet is a lexical database organisedon psycholinguistic principles: it comprises taxonomies of nouns, verbs and adjectives,which represent various dierent relationships between words, such as synonymy andantonymy. The classication of cue phrases makes use of dierent relationships, butthe idea of a hierarchical taxonomy of words and phrases is the same.The test for substitutability is given in detail in Figure 4.2. The main idea is that thetester considers a cue phrase in a context where it naturally occurs, and then considerswhich other phrases (s)he, as a writer, would be prepared to use in its place. This is atask which occurs quite regularly during the course of normal writing. The tester mightimagine that the original phrase has been used recently in the preceding discourse, andneeds to be changed for reasons of `elegant variation'.As it will be seen, the conditions for substitutability are slightly less constrained thanthose under which one phrase can simply replace another. To begin with, we are notinterested in whether two phrases can take the same grammatical position in a clause;rather, we are interested in whether they have the same function in signalling discourserelations between the clause and other units. For instance, a conjunctive adverb likenevertheless might have the same function as a coordinator like but, but the lattercan only appear at the beginning of a clause, so simple replacement will not alwaysbe possible. In view of this, candidate phrases can be substituted in the clause in adierent position, from the original phrase, if necessary.For another thing, when it comes to comparing the original text with its counterpartcontaining the candidate phrase, there are some factors which are not taken into ac-count. Stylistic mismatches are ignored; moreover is thus a legitimate substitute forand in some contexts, even though the latter may be less formal. The following exam-ples of substitutability are therefore legitimate:
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 70Grease is the time, is theplace, is the motion;  andpmoreover,p furthermore,  Grease is the way you arefeeling.The size of the units of text being linked is also a factor to be disregarded. Becausetends to connect smaller spans than this is because; but other than this, there is littledierence between the two phrases. Finally, the amount of background knowledgepossessed by the reader is treated as a variable in the test. The phrase and can besubstituted for the phrase because, but only if we assume that the reader can infer thata causal relation is being expressed. See Figure 4.2 for further explanation of all thesepoints.Some Terms Based on the Notion of SubstitutabilityThe test in Figure 4.2 identies when one candidate cue phrase is substitutable foranother phrase in a given context. If we generalise over all possible contexts, threedierent relationships between two cue phrases can be distinguished:always(x; y) , in every context where y appears, x is substitutable for ysometimes(x; y) , x is substitutable for y in some contexts where y appears,but not in all of themnever(x; y) , in every context where y appears, x is not substitutable fory.These three relationships exhaust the possible substitution relationships between x andy: for any pair of cue phrases, exactly one of them holds.The denitions of always, never and sometimes form the basis of four compositerelationships between cue phrases:x and y are synonymous , always(x; y)^ always(y; x)x and y are exclusive , never(x; y) (^never(y; x))x is a hyponym of y (y is a hypernym of x) , always(y; x)^ sometimes(x; y)x and y are contingently substitutable , sometimes(x; y)^ sometimes(y; x)Again, for any pair of cue phrases, exactly one of these relationships holds. Theconcepts of synonymity, hyponymity/hypernymity, exclusivity and contingent substi-tutability will be used in most of the discussion which follows.Examples of Substitutability RelationshipsIn order to present examples of substitutability relationships, diagrams such as thatin 4.20 will be used:First span of text. 8><>: C1p C2p C3 !p (C4)# C5 9>=>; second span of text. (4.20)
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 711. Consider any cue phrase from the corpus in a text where it naturally occurs. Imagine you area writer who has just produced this text, but needs to choose an alternative phrase (perhapsbecause you have just used the original phrase, and do not want to repeat it).2. Remove the cue phrase from its host clause, and insert any other phrase from the corpus(the candidate phrase) into the same clause, at any appropriate position.3. If need be, the punctuation of the new discourse can be altered to make it more suitablefor the candidate phrase. For example, if the phrase so is being replaced by the phrasethis implies that, it may be necessary to replace a comma with a full stop and create a newsentence.4. If need be, the new discourse can be supplemented with additional or alternative cue phrasesin other clauses. There are sometimes dependencies between the cue phrases in a text (forinstance between if and then, or between either and or), so changing one phrase might requirechanges to others.5. If it is possible to use the resulting discourse in place of the original discourse, then thecandidate phrase is said to be substitutable to the original phrase in that context.The notion of `being able to use one discourse in place of another' is expanded below. It is not sucient that the new discourse can be used to describe the same set of eventsin the world as those which the old one describes. For instance, the adverb afterwardsand the subordinator before are truth-functionally equivalent in that they are bothsuitable for describing two events in temporal succession. But they are not alwaysequally appropriate:(4.15) Bill was always interested in books. He could read before he could walk.(4.16) Bill was always interested in books. He could read; afterwards he could walk.In addition to describing the same eventualities, it must be ensured that the newdiscourse achieves the same goals as the old discourse achieved. Some dierences between the two discourses can nevertheless be overlooked|for onething, stylistic discrepancies can be disregarded. The cue phrase hence can often besubstituted for the cue phrase so, the only dierence being in the `formality' of theresulting discourse:(4.17) I'm just back from a holiday in France so there'll be no need to bring wine.(4.18) I have just returned from France; hence there will be no need to bring wine.Stylistic changes to the new text may thus be needed in order to accommodate thecandidate phrase. Dierent cue phrases are appropriate for linking portions of text of dierent sizes. Forinstance, because typically links clauses within a compound sentence; this is becausetypically links whole sentences. Such dierences are to be overlooked in the test.In some cases, changing the punctuation is sucient to accommodate the candidatephrase; but in others, it might be necessary to alter the length of the spans of textbeing linked, by substituting a precis or by adding additional relevant material. A nal factor to be disregarded is the amount of background knowledge the reader isassumed to possess. For instance, and can often be substituted for yet, but only if thereader will be able to infer the appropriate contrastive relation. Consider Example 4.19:(4.19) Mike was ravenous, yet he ordered watercress salad.Here, a substitution by and is only permissible if we can assume that the reader knowsthat petit fours are snacks, and hence that Mike's order comes as a surprise.Figure 4.2: The Test for Substitutability
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 72The items between the braces are all cue phrases. C1 is the original cue phrase; C2 isa phrase which in this context is substitutable for C1. C3 is substitutable for C1 in thegiven context, but it must rst be moved to a dierent position in C1's clause (in thiscase to the right). C4 is also substitutable for C1 in the given context, but it requireseither a change to one of the other cue phrases in the text (due to a dependency betweencue phrases), or a change to the size of the spans involved (due to the suitability ofdierent cue phrases to spans of dierent sizes). All of these changes are permittedby the test for substitutability. Finally, C5 is not substitutable for C1 in the givencontext, even allowing for the changes the test allows.3It should be noted that the text on either side of the braces can in principle be as longas is needed to make the original context clear. In practice, one or two clauses' worthof context will normally be given on each side. As was noted in Section 1.1.2, the ideaof presenting the context of a text `in its entirety' is problematic; however, it is hopedthat the contexts provided in the examples which follow will be sucient to give thereader a good idea of the texts.A few examples of the test for substitutability can now be given. For instance, thephrases to start with and to begin with are intersubstitutable in all contexts, and hencetermed synonymous: two examples of their intersubstitutability are given in texts 4.21and 4.22. Cyril setaboutpreparingbreakfast. n To start with,p To begin with, o he put some porridge on to boil. Next, heset out four bowls. . . (4.21)Sid's got nohope ofwinning therace. n To begin with,p To start with, o he's out of training. For another thing he'llbe running against Otto Schultz, who hasn'tlost all season. . . (4.22)In the case of to start with and for a start, the relationship is not bidirectional: theformer phrase is more general than the latter.Sid's got nohope ofwinning therace. n To start with,p For a start, o he's out of training. For another thing he'llbe running against Otto Schultz, who hasn'tlost all season. . . (4.23)Cyril setaboutpreparingbreakfast. n To start with,# For a start, o he put some porridge on to boil. Next, heset out four bowls. . . (4.24)In texts such as 4.24, for a start does not seem an appropriate substitution|it gives thetext an argumentative tone which is lacking in the original, which is purely narrative.From examples such as these, we can conclude that to start with is a hypernym of fora start.3 It should be borne in mind that the text may still be grammatical with C5; it may even stillmake sense with C5. The point is that just C5 cannot be used as a replacement for C1 in thecontext. The hash sign used to indicate non-substitutability must therefore be interpreted somewhatdierently from hash signs as conventionally used in linguistic examples, which often denote `ill-formed discourse'.
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 73The phrases lastly and moreover are contingently substitutable. In some contexts theyare both appropriate:Sid's got no hope of winning the race. Forone thing, he's out of training. For anotherthing, he's best at altitude, and he'll berunning at sea level. n Moreover,p Lastly, o he's pittedagainst OttoSchultz, whohasn't lost allseason. (4.25)But in some contexts, lastly cannot be replaced by moreover:Cyril set about preparing breakfast. Tostart with, he put some porridge on to boil.Next, he set out four bowls. n Lastly# Moreover o he sliced somebread readyfor toasting. (4.26)And in other contexts, moreover cannot be replaced by lastly:Sid's got no hope ofwinning the race. For onething, he's out of training. n Moreover# Lastly o he's best at altitude, andhe'll be running at sea level.In addition, he's pittedagainst Otto Schultz, whohasn't lost all season. (4.27)When applying the test for substitutability, a question arises as to how subtle we shouldbe in distinguishing between cue phrases. It is often noted that `true synonyms' are ex-tremely rare: indeed, in some of the above examples where substitutability is claimed,one phrase might appear slightly more appropriate to some readers even though noparticular reason suggests itself. Typically, a rule can be envisaged which relates vari-ous features of a text to the cue phrases which are most appropriate. But in a contextwhere both phrases are acceptable, one being just marginally better than the other,generalisations are often hard to make: In such cases, we will err on the side of gener-ality, and allow that substitutability is possible. If, subsequently, we are able to nda reliable rule, of course this decision can be reversed, and subtler distinctions made.But it should be borne in mind that we are principally concerned with making broadclassications within the set of cue phrases, rather than descending into the minutiaeof `descriptive linguistics'|and the test for substitutability is perfectly adequate forthis task.4.5 Substitutability DiagramsIn this thesis, a diagrammatic representation of substitutability relationships is used.The diagrammatic notation allows information about many pairs of cue phrases to bepresented simultaneously, in a form which is relatively easy to understand.The diagrams consist of nodes containing (possibly empty) sets of cue phrases, con-nected by a structure of directed arcs. Figure 4.3 shows the simplest structural re-lationships that can exist between two nodes A and B: hypo(A;B), excl(A;B) andcs(A;B). Informally speaking: If hypo(A;B), then phrases which are in A are hyponyms of phrases in B.
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 74 If excl(A;B), then phrases which are in A are exclusive with phrases in B. If cs(A;B), then phrases which are in A are contingently substitutable withphrases in B (provided no other relationship between A and B is documented|see Section 4.5.1). Phrases which appear at the same node are synonymous.









hypo(A, B)Figure 4.3: Three Possible Structural Relationships Between NodesNote that the excl and cs relationships apply between `sister' nodes; i.e. nodes whichhave a common mother node. The dierence between excl(A;B) and cs(A;B) relatesto whether or not their arcs meet on the mother node. This notation is chosen to allowthe representation of hypernyms shared between exclusive or contingently substitutablephrases.4.5.1 Contingent Substitutability RelationshipsThe relationship of contingent substitutability is overridden by other relationships indiagrams where a conict is present. For instance, in Figure 4.4, x and y are representedas exclusive (through the arcs that touch on the mother node), but also as contingentlysubstitutable (through the arcs which do not touch). In cases where a conict such as
x yFigure 4.4: An Overridden Contingent Substitutability Relationshipthis one is present, the contingent substitutability relationship is overridden. (In thisexample, of course, the additional arc representing contingent substitutability does nouseful work, and it would be much clearer to leave it out; the diagram is just used as asimple illustration of how a contingent substitutability relationship can be overridden.But see the following section for cases where overridden contingent substitutabilityrelationships do have a useful role.)






(i) (ii)Figure 4.5: Two Examples of InheritanceContingent substitutability relationships are also inherited from phrases in a daughternode to phrases in its mother node. Thus, in 4.5 (ii), z and y are contingently substi-tutable. Note again, however, that these relationships can be overridden if they conictwith other relationships. Thus, in Figure 4.6, while x is contingently substitutable withy, z does not inherit this property because it is explicitly shown to be exclusive to y.The inherited contingent substitutability relationships between x and z, and betweenz and itself are also overridden.
z
yx
wFigure 4.6: Overridden Inherited Contingent Substitutability RelationshipsThere are, however, cases where inheritance in a substitutability diagram causes gen-uine contradictions. For instance, Figure 4.7 is an illegal diagram: z is represented byinheritance as exclusive with itself; and exclusivity cannot be overridden.Substitutability diagrams are intended to represent the relationship between each pairof phrases which appear in it|in other words, to provide all the substitutability infor-mation that it is possible to provide about the phrases involved. A nal requirementto this end is to specify that diagrams must have a single top node. The diagram in
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w
z
yxFigure 4.7: An Illegal Substitutability DiagramFigure 4.8 is not permitted, because it does not document the relationship betweenx and y. Requiring that a single node dominates both x and y ensures that their
x y
zFigure 4.8: Another Illegal Substitutability Diagramrelationship will be represented.4.5.3 Formalising the Semantics of Substitutability DiagramsA set of rules for determining the relationships between phrases in a (legal) substi-tutability diagram is given in this section. The rules draw on the denitions of always,never and sometimes, which are re-iterated below:always(x; y) , in every context where y appears, x is substitutable for ysometimes(x; y) , x is substitutable for y in some contexts where y appears,but not in all of themnever(x; y) , in every context where y appears, x is not substitutable fory.The following rules are for deriving new substitutability relationships from existingones: always(x; y)^ never(x; z) ) never(y; z)always(x; y)^ always(y; z) ) always(x; z)never(x; y) ) never(y; x)sometimes(x; y) ) sometimes(y; x)always(x; y)^ sometimes(x; z) ^ :always(z; y)^ :never(y; z) ) sometimes(y; z)The following rules are for deriving substitutability relationships from structures in
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 77a substitutability diagram. (They should be seen as replacements for the informaldenitions given in Figure 4.3.) x 2 A ^ y 2 A ) always(x; y)x 2 A ^ y 2 B ^ hypo(A;B) ) always(y; x)x 2 A ^ y 2 B ^ excl(A;B) ) never(x; y)x 2 A ^ y 2 B ^ cs(A;B)^ :always(x; y)^ :never(x; y) ) sometimes(x; y)x 2 A ^ :(y 2 A) ^ always(x; y) ) sometimes(y; x)The intended denition of sometimes(x; y) relies on a closed-world assumption aboutalways and never relationships. In order to compute the complete set of relationshipsin a diagram, all the always relationships should rst be computed, then all the neverrelationships, and nally the sometimes relationships.4.5.4 Empty NodesSome nodes in a diagram do not contain any cue phrases at all. At the very top ofthe hierarchy, an empty category is necessitated by the formalism chosen for depictingsubstitutability relationships: if two phrases are exclusive or contingently substitutable,a common superordinate category must be shown whether or not they have a commonhypernym. We can use the graph-theoretical category top (or >) to fulll this purpose(see Figure 4.9).
T T
previously afterwards and becauseFigure 4.9: Two Uses of the Empty `Top' CategoryEmpty nodes can also appear lower down in the taxonomy. These are not essential|adiagram can always be redrawn without them|but they often make diagrams easierto read. Imagine we have three phrases, X , Y and Z. X and Y are exclusive, so are Xand Z; but Y and Z are contingently substitutable. Figure 4.10 shows two alternativeways of representing all these relationships: in many cases, the method involving theempty category is neatest.4.6 The Taxonomy of Cue PhrasesThe central task is now to incorporate as many of the cue phrases as possible into asingle substitutability diagram. Ideally, the aim is to document the substitutabilityrelationship between each pair of phrases in the corpus. Of course, this is a hugenumber; assuming there are N phrases in the corpus, the total number of relationships
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T
T
Y ZX X Y ZFigure 4.10: Empty Categories Lower Down in the Taxonomydocumented will be (N  (N   1))=2. For N  330, as in the present case, the numberof relationships will be over 50,000. Clearly it makes sense to begin by looking for allthe relationships within a subset of the complete corpus.Currently, around 150 phrases have been incorporated into a single substitutabilitydiagram, documenting some 11,000 relationships, which will be referred to as the tax-onomy of cue phrases. The complete diagram is given in Appendix B, along withdetails of its organisation, and copious examples to motivate it. The following sectionspresent an extract from the taxonomy, and summarise some of its most importantcharacteristics.4.6.1 Construction of the TaxonomyAs with the corpus of cue phrases, the taxonomy of cue phrases was constructed entirelyby the author. It would have been preferable to construct the taxonomy on the basisof the judgements of a sizeable group of people (ideally, people without any theoreticalexperience of discourse analysis, given that the substitutability test is designed torecreate a task that forms a part of ordinary writing). However, the amount of dataneeded in order to build a taxonomy of any reasonable size from scratch makes suchan experiment quite infeasible, bearing in mind the huge number of relationships thatmust be documented. Instead, the decision was taken to build a taxonomy reectingthe author's own intuitions, which could then be used and tested more systematicallyin subsequent experiments on groups of naive readers and writers. Such experimentshave yet to be carried out; however, they would be very valuable as a follow-up to thepresent study.The amount of data required to build the taxonomy also dictated that most of theexamples used to motivate substitutability relationships were hand-crafted. It wouldhave been preferable to search for appropriate examples in a corpus, but again, thiswould have been prohibitively time-consuming. A corpus-based study would certainlyshed useful light on the taxonomy as currently constructed; but again remains to bepursued in follow-up work.4.6.2 An Extract from the TaxonomyA small portion of the taxonomy, dealing with some of the phrases which signal positionin a sequence, is given in Figure 4.11. Pre-theoretical titles have been assigned to some
































for a startFigure 4.11: A Portion of the Taxonomy of Cue Phrasesof the categories; but this is just to give some idea of what functions the phrases mighthave: the taxonomy still just represents substitutability information.Some examples of the substitutability relationships in Figure 4.11 are given below.Bob set about cleaning thehouse. 8>><>>: To start with,p To begin with,p First,# For one thing,# Furthermore,# And, 9>>=>>; he swept the oors; next hewashed them; and lastly, hetidied the cupboards. (4.28)Bob set about cleaning thehouse. To start with, heswept the oors and washedthem; 8>>><>>>: in addition,p after this,p following this,p (and)p also !# For one thing,# Furthermore, 9>>>=>>>; he tidied the cupboards. (4.29)Television is bad for us. Itkills creativity; 8>><>>: andp furthermore,p also,pmoreover# after this# for one thing 9>>=>>; it promotes an unhealthykind of `crowd mentality'. (4.30)
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 80Television is bad for us. 8>><>>: For one thing,p To begin with,p Firstly,# Moreover# And# First 9>>=>>; it kills creativity; inaddition it promotes anunhealthy kind of `crowdmentality'. (4.31)Jim jumped o the cli, soBill 8><>: also# and# in addition# furthermore# for one thing 9>=>; jumped o. (4.32)4.6.3 Some General Remarks about the TaxonomyTwo of the taxonomy's most signicant characteristics should be mentioned straightaway, as they have an important bearing on its organisation, and on the theoreticalinterpretation it will subsequently be given.For one thing, a degree of hierarchy is found throughout the taxonomy. Chains of 2or 3 hyponymic nodes are fairly common. The `most general' cue phrase is and, whichhas over 30 separate hyponyms. In other words, the degree of generality of cue phrasesin the taxonomy is an interesting variable to study.Another important nding is that the taxonomy does not divide neatly into largeexclusive subgroups of phrases. For any candidate grouping, many phrases can be foundwhich t into more than one group. (And and then, for instance, have many other usesaside from signalling position in a sequence.) In fact, most of the variation between cuephrases is represented at a relatively low level, in the microstructure of the taxonomy.This is interesting, because it already suggests that a classication scheme based onthe taxonomy is unlikely to identify any one dimension of variation amongst relationsas `dominant'|an assumption which is characteristic of many existing classicationsof relations.4.6.4 The Global Organisation of the TaxonomyThe task of representing all the substitutability relationships between all the phrasesin the corpus is an extremely complex one. One of the main diculties is the factjust alluded to, that the phrases in the corpus do not separate neatly into exclusivecategories. This lack of modularity makes it dicult to work with a subset of thephrases in isolation.To solve this problem, phrases are organised at a high level into a number of non-exclusive categories: sequence phrases, cause phrases, result phrases, re-statement phrases, temporal phrases, negative polarity phrases, addi-tional information phrases, hypothetical phrases, similarity phrases, anddigression phrases. These categories have no theoretical signicance at all, andshould just be thought of as providing an expedient way for spreading the taxonomyover several pages. Two types of cue phrase are then identied: exclusive phrases,
CHAPTER 4. A DATA-DRIVEN METHODOLOGY 81which belong just to one category; and multicategory phrases, which belong to twoor more categories. This distinction introduces a certain amount of modularity intothe taxonomy, and greatly reduces its complexity. To begin with, there is a diagramshowing the exclusive relationship between the `exclusive phrases' in every category.Then a substitutability diagram is given for each separate category, showing the rela-tionships between its exclusive phrases, and between its exclusive phrases and all themulticategory phrases. Finally, there is a substitutability diagram for all the multicat-egory phrases. In this way it is ensured that the relationship between each phrase andeach other phrase is represented.The reader is referred to Appendix B for a closer look at the taxonomy. It is notyet perfect, of course: there are still cue phrases in the corpus which have not beenincorporated; and it is still not very hard to nd counterexamples to some of therelationships it documents. But at least a reasonably clear method exists for queryingand improving it: questions about the placing of a given phrase will be decided on theevidence of concrete linguistic data.4.7 SummaryThis chapter has described the incremental construction of a taxonomy of cue phrases.Initially, a test for cue phrases was employed to gather a corpus of cue phrases fromnaturally occurring texts. Then this corpus was organised into a taxonomy, using a testfor substitutability. Using these two tests, it should be possible for several peopleto arrive at very similar taxonomies of cue phrases. And where there are discrepancies,the reliance in both tests on concrete linguistic examples should provide a convenientway for alternative analyses to be discussed.The next chapter shows how the taxonomy of cue phrases can be used to motivate anisomorphic taxonomy of coherence relations.
Chapter 5Preliminaries for Dening a Setof RelationsIn this chapter, a framework for using the taxonomy to create relation denitions isproposed. A fundamental theoretical assumption about the taxonomy is made|that itlends itself to a conception of relations as composite constructs, made up of a numberof independent features. This conception is argued for in Section 5.1: the argumentturns on the existence of hypernymic cue phrases in the taxonomy.In Section 5.2 some general principles governing the motivation of features are pro-posed. For one thing, the features chosen must be sucient not only to distinguishbetween the dierent cue phrases in the taxonomy, but also to determine all and onlythose contexts where a given cue phrase can be used. For another thing, the set offeatures eventually chosen must be productive; that is, the alternative values of eachfeature must make sense in combination with all the other possible values of all theother features.Section 5.3 presents the bare bones of the knowledge representation system to be usedfor expressing feature denitions. This system is able to represent the text itself,eventualities in the world, and the goals and beliefs of the reader and writer.5.1 Relations as Feature-Based ConstructsAs already noted in Section 4.6.3, the taxonomy is very much a hierarchical structure:hypernymity and hyponymity relationships amongst cue phrases are common. Somecue phrases are much more general in their application than others: a phrase likeand is substitutable for a wide range of more specic phrases, such as next, whereasand thereby. A question which immediately raises itself is, why do such `hypernymic'cue phrases exist? Our initial rationale for looking at cue phrases was to explore thelinguistic resources for making relations explicit. But if and is appropriate in such awide range of cases, it cannot serve to make any one relation explicit. Why, then, dowe nd hypernymic phrases like and in the taxonomy?82
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 835.1.1 Cue Phrases for Signalling Components of RelationsWe can begin by considering the case of the hypernymic cue phrase and. It shouldbe noted that even this most widely applicable of cue phrases is by no means anappropriate substitute for all other cue phrases. There are many phrases for whichand cannot be substituted, such as for example, before or because. Indeed, and is onlyan appropriate substitute for a fairly small subset of the overall corpus of cue phrases.It thus goes some of the way to making a relation explicit. Nevertheless, we are stillfaced with the question of why writers do not always choose to be as explicit as possiblewhen they select a cue phrase.One answer to this question can be given by appealing to Grice's `maxim of quantity'(Grice (1975)), which states that contributions to discourse should be as informative asrequired, but no more informative than required. If we think of relations as compositeconstructs, then it is possible to imagine a situation where some features of a relationare easily inferrable by a reader from context or background knowledge, while othersare not thus inferrable. Using the most specic cue phrase in such a situation wouldviolate the maxim of quantity, by providing some information twice. But if there werea cue phrase which specied just those features of a relation which were not inferrable,the maxim of quantity would not be violated.To give a concrete example, consider the text in 5.1:(5.1) It was time for punishment to be meted out. Bob decided on the cat o' ninetails, and Frank took his place at the gizzern.Here, because the reader does not know what a gizzern is, or who Bob and Frank are,the hypernymic cue phrase and is insucient to specify one particular relation, andthe text is ambiguous. For instance, the reader does not know whether Bob and Frankare both to be punished and have opted for dierent punishments, or whether Bob ischarge of deciding on a punishment for Frank. The two readings are much more clearlydistinguished if more specic cue phrases are used:(5.2) Bob decided on the cat o' nine tails, so Frank took his place at the gizzern.(5.3) Bob decided on the cat o' nine tails, whereas Frank took his place at thegizzern.On the other hand, if the relation is clear from context, a general cue phrase is accept-able:(5.4) The captain decided on the cat o' nine tails, and Frank wrapped his armsround the mast in readiness. . .If a much more specic cue phrase is used, then the same information is eectivelyprovided twice, violating the maxim of quantity, and resulting in a text which is (atleast) stylistically awkward:
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 84(5.5) The captain decided on the cat o' nine tails. As a result, Frank wrapped hisarms round the mast in readiness. . .The situation can be compared to that of referring expressions. Why do writers everuse pronouns? Why do pronouns exist at all? They are often ambiguous, and it issurely asking for trouble to introduce them. The answer, again, seems to be thatwriters try to avoid repeating information that can be easily inferred by the reader.Language contains the resources to create referring expressions with subtle variationsin explicitness. (Consider the following expressions: a big pot, a big one, the pot, such apot, it.) In a similar way, the hierarchical structures in the taxonomy permit relationsto be signalled more or less explicitly.15.1.2 Using Features to Explain Patterns in the TaxonomyThe taxonomy lends itself well to a conception of relations as feature-based constructs.We can think of cue phrases as signalling particular values for some features of arelation, and as being undened for other features (that is, it does not matter whichvalue they take). On this basis, the dierent substitutability relationships betweenphrases can each be given a plausible feature-theoretic interpretation: If two phrases are synonymous, then they are dened for exactly the same setof features, and take the same values for all of these features. This explains whythey can always be used in the same contexts. If two phrases are exclusive, then they are dened for at least one feature incommon, and signal dierent values of this feature. This inconsistency explainswhy they can never be used in the same contexts.2 If phrase X is a hypernym of phrase Y (and Y is a hyponym of X), then Y isdened for all of the features for which X is dened, and takes the same valuesfor all of these; in addition, Y is dened for at least one other feature, for whichX is not dened. Y , being more tightly dened, can only be used in a subset ofthe contexts in which X is appropriate. If X and Y are contingently substitutable, then they are both dened forsome set of features, and signal the same values for these features; in addition,Y is dened for some feature f1 for which X is not dened, and X is dened forsome feature f2 for which Y is not dened. Thus X can be used in some contextswhere Y cannot (those which take the wrong value of f1), Y can be used in somecontexts where X cannot (those which take the wrong value of f2), and in othercontexts (taking suitable values for both f1 and f2), X and Y can be substituted.1 Dale and Reiter (1992) have pointed out that when people generate referring expressions, they donot conform completely to Gricean maxims: they are often more explicit than they have to be. Thismay well be the case in the way people signal relations too. However, the maxim of quantity does atleast oer an explanation of why people are not always maximally explicit, and this is the importantpoint for present purposes.2 Note that feature values are not typed in the system I am proposing, and so dierent values do notunify. See Section 5.2.4 for a more detailed account of how this system diers from typed featurehierarchies in the tradition of ALE (Carpenter and Penn (1994)).




X and Y are both defined for a subset of features, and 
share the same values for these features. In addittion, 
X is defined for a feature for which Y is not defined, and
Y is defined for a feature for which X is not defined. 
X AND Y ARE CONTINGENTLY SUBSTITUTABLE
X AND Y ARE EXCLUSIVE
There is at least one feature for which X and Y are both
defined, and X and Y take different values of this feature.
X and Y are defined for the same set of features,
and take the same values for each feature.
X AND Y ARE SYNONYMOUSX
Y
Y is defined for all the features for which X is defined,
and takes the same values for all of these. In addition,
Y is defined for another feature, for which X is not defined. 
X IS A HYPERNYM OF Y (Y IS A HYPONYM OF X)
X Y
Figure 5.1: Feature-Theoretic Interpretations of Substitutability RelationshipsThe concept of inheritance can likewise be given a feature-theoretic interpretation. Thetaxonomy can be seen as an inheritance hierarchy for feature values:3 phrases ina daughter category inherit all of the feature values associated with its mother phrases,and in addition are dened for new features. We can also give an account of why itis that inherited contingent substitutability relationships can be overridden. ConsiderFigure 5.2. Phrase D inherits all the feature values of B (that is to say, f1+ and f2+);in addition, it is dened for a new feature, f3, for which it signals the value  . PhraseC also inherits f1+ from A, and is also dened in addition for f3, but it signals thealternative value +. B and C are contingently substitutable, since they are dened fordierent features, but D does not inherit contingent substitutability with C becausethey signal alternative values of the same feature.3 The notion of `feature inheritance' is also quite dierent from that used in typed feature hierarchies.gain, see Section 5.2.4 for an account of how the formalisms dier.













-Figure 5.2: A Feature-Theoretic Account of Phrases A, B, C and D5.1.3 Sanders et al's Study: Independent Evidence for a Feature-Theoretic ApproachTo sum up: the taxonomy seems to sanction a conception of relations as decomposinginto a number of orthogonal features. It is interesting to note that Sanders et al's(1992, 1993) studies come to the same conclusion|particularly so since these studiesare also based on a psychological conception of relations. Note, however, that Sanderset al's evidence for a set of independent features is of a quite dierent kind from thatbeing presented here. For Sanders et al, the decomposition is initially advanced asa psychologically plausible hypothesis. This hypothesis is subsequently supported byan analysis of the disagreements amongst writers about which cue phrases should beused in a given linguistic context (see Section 3.4.1); it was found that where there wasdisagreement, it tended to be over the value of just one feature. In the present work,the feature-theoretic account is not supported by an analysis of disagreements or bya priori psychological arguments; it simply emerges as a useful way of describing thetaxonomy of cue phrases. Nonetheless, both lines of evidence support the hypothesisthat readers and writers are able to treat cue phrases, and the representations whichunderlie them, as composite constructs.The question remains whether the same set of features will be motivated using thetwo methodologies. This question is currently being pursued in joint work (Knott andSanders (1996)), which involves the construction of a taxonomy of Dutch cue phrases.5.1.4 The Remaining TasksIn this section, we have seen how the linguistic data held in the taxonomy of cuephrases can be given a theoretical interpretation. The distribution of cue phrases isnow being used to come to decisions about the nature of the relations they signal:relations, unlike cue phrases, are theoretical constructs.Note that the distribution of features in the taxonomy is already to a large extentpredetermined by the substitutability relationships within it. It would now be possi-ble to go through the whole taxonomy, labelling the categories with a set of featuresf1 : : :fn; these features would be sucient to distinguish between the dierent setsof cue phrases. However, the questions of how these anonymous features should bedened, and how to avoid redundancy in the description they aord, are as yet unad-
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 87dressed. The following section outlines some guidelines to be followed in pursuing thistask.5.2 General Guidelines for Dening FeaturesThus far in the methodology, the operations have been fairly replicable. The testfor cue phrases and the test for substitutability can be systematically applied, andit is likely that dierent analysts will come up with very similar taxonomies for asingle given language. Likewise, a description of the taxonomy in terms of a set ofunknown features f1 : : : fn can be achieved automatically. However, the nal step ofcreating denitions for these features is less tightly constrained. When deciding how todistinguish between two exclusive cue phrases, for instance, several dierent featuresmay seem appropriate. In this section, a number of guiding principles concerning thisdecision are outlined.5.2.1 Some Substitutability Relationships to be Ignored`Swap-Substitutable' PhrasesConsider the extract in Figure 5.3. Since and so are rightly represented as exclusive:
since soFigure 5.3: Two `Swap-Substitutable' Phrasesclearly they can never be substituted for one another. In both of the following twoexamples, the transition from one phrase to another involves a clear change of meaning:Jim had a lot of money onhim that day, n so# since o he went shopping. (5.6)Jim went shopping, n since# so o he had a lot of money onhim that day. (5.7)However, as the examples show, the two phrases can be used in the same context: theyare only exclusive because since must be attached to one clause, and so to the other.When it comes to motivating a set of coherence relations, such dierences should beignored: they do not signal two distinct coherence relations, but merely two distinctways of marking a single relation.We can refer to such pairs of phrases as swap-substitutable. The original substi-tutability test specied that the candidate phrase had to be inserted into the sameclause as the original phrase. But if we relax the substitutability test a little more,
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 88and allow the candidate phrase to be inserted into either of the related clauses, thenphrases like since and so can be successfully substituted for one another.There are many other examples of this kind of substitutablility: for instance, on onehand and on the other hand are swap-substitutable; so are rstly, secondly and thirdly.It will not be necessary to give a feature-theoretic interpretation of the exclusivityrelationships between these phrases. Rather, we shall assume that the phrases signalexactly the same feature combinations.`Disjunctive' PhrasesUp to now, we have been thinking of hypernymic cue phrases as phrases which isolatecertain features of a relation. If a cue phrase is ambiguous, then it signals some ofthe features of relations associated with its hyponyms; and if it is general, then itisolates all of the features of some more abstract relation. However, there is one otherpossibility: some ambiguous cue phrases do not pick out a single subset of features, buta disjunction of sets of features. Consider the phrases in Figure 5.4: Since's hyponyms
since
ever since asFigure 5.4: A Disjunctive Cue Phrase and its Hyponymsare phrases with completely dierent characteristics: they seem to share nothing incommon. Ever since is used to situate some state of aairs with respect to a previousevent: I have mistrusted you  ever sincep since# because  we rst met. (5.8)Because, on the other hand, is used to explain the cause or justication for someeventuality: I accepted the gift,  becausep since# ever since  I knew that my host wouldlose face if I refused it. (5.9)Phrases like since are best thought of simply as having multiple possible meanings, justas `traditionally' homonymous words like bank (= edge of river or nancial institution)or pen (= writing instrument or animal cage). The alternative meanings of such wordsdo not have anything in common; therefore they are of no great interest in motivatinga set of relations.Since there is nothing interesting to be learned from disjunctive cue phrases, most ofthem have been assigned subscripts according to their dierent meanings, and eachmeaning appears separately in the taxonomy. Thus the taxonomy treats the phrasesas(1), as(2), and as(3) as completely dierent phrases.
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 89Of course, deciding whether or not a cue phrase is disjunctive is a tricky question. Increating the original taxonomy, a measure of circularity is likely to be present|thedecision calls for a theoretical assessment of the phrase, but the justication of thisassessment is supposed to make reference to the nished taxonomy. The tactic adoptedhere has been to identify phrases as disjunctive only when they have two very clearlydistinct and unrelated meanings, as is the case with phrases like bank and pen. Sinceseems to fall into this category; the other main examples are as (= because or while)and while (= as or whereas).5.2.2 Necessary and Sucient Conditions for the Use of a Cue PhraseThe extract in Figure 5.5 shows two exclusive phrases, while and afterwards.
afterwardswhileFigure 5.5: Exclusive PhrasesThere is no question of swap-substitutability here; so we need to nd a feature withrespect to which these phrases dier. One likely candidate would make reference tothe temporal relationship between the linked clauses: for while, the two clauses have todescribe temporally overlapping events, whereas for afterwards, the two clauses haveto describe events which happen in succession.These do indeed seem to be necessary requirements for the two phrases. However, theyare not sucient. For instance, the events described in Example 5.10 are temporallysimultaneous, but while is not appropriate:I don't know where Jill is.She was out n when# while o I called by. (5.10)If we are using cue phrases to motivate relation denitions, then each cue phrasemust be described using features which indicate both the necessary and the sucientconditions for its use.5.2.3 Constraints on the Range of Feature Values: Exclusivity andExhaustivityEach feature can take a number of alternative values. In this section, two importantconstraints on the range of values are outlined.Firstly, the dierent values must be genuine alternatives: they must express incon-sistent predicates. In other words, the dierent possible values of a feature must bemutually exclusive. If this were not the case, it would be possible to nd an object
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 90which could be described by two or more values of the same feature: such an objectcould not be properly represented by the feature formalism, in which each feature canonly take a single value.Secondly, the dierent possible values of a feature must be exhaustive: between them,they should be able to represent every object in the set to be described. For instance,a feature colour must have sucient alternative values to represent the colour of allthe objects in the set to be described. Of course, there are many types of object forwhich a given feature is undened: thus to represent the category `car', the featurecolour will not be assigned a value. However, a value for colour could be assignedfor any token car: it only violates the requirement of exhaustivity if there is some tokencar which cannot be described by one of its values.5.2.4 The Requirement of ProductivityThere is one nal, extremely important principle governing the choice of features inthe taxonomy. This time it is global, relating to the whole set of features eventuallymotivated. It is stipulated that the values of each feature must be dened so as tomake sense in conjunction with every other combination of feature values. In otherwords, there must be no contradictions possible between the value of one feature andthe value of any other feature: the only contradictions that are permitted are betweenalternative values of the same feature. This will be referred to as the requirement ofproductivity.The requirement of productivity is an important departure from the system of featurestructures found in ALE (Carpenter and Penn (1994)). Objects in ALE are classiedwithin a hierarchy of types, and there is a function specifying for each type the fea-tures which are appropriate for that type. (For instance, the feature `gender', takingalternative values `male' and `female', is appropriate for objects of type `person', butnot for objects of type `furniture'.) In the present model, there is no such appropri-ateness function. Or rather, it is specied that each feature must be appropriate forevery object in the set to be described.4The need for typed feature hierarchies in lexical semantics is not in doubt (see e.g.Boguraev and Pustejovsky (1990), Evans and Gazdar (1989), Briscoe et al (1990)).Clearly, to represent the huge range of concepts that words describe, such formalismsare necessary: it makes sense, for instance, to have dierent sets of features for describ-ing people and for describing furniture. So why should the requirement of productivitybe imposed in representing cue phrases? The reason stems from the fact that cuephrases are closed-class words. The set of cue phrases is very small in comparison tothe set of nouns or the set of verbs; moreover, while new nouns and verbs are con-tinually being invented, the set of cue phrases is relatively static, evolving at a much4 The idea of `an inheritance hierarchy for features' is thus used quite dierently in ALE than it is inthe current work. In ALE's type hierarchy, it is the appropriateness of a feature which is inheritedfrom a type to its subtypes. In the taxonomy of cue phrases, on the other hand, it is the values of thefeatures associated with a node that are inherited by its subordinate nodes. There is no notion ofdierent sets of features being appropriate for dierent nodes. (Indeed, all features are appropriatefor every node.) The resemblance between the taxonomy and an ALE-style type hierarchy is thusquite supercial.




































Figure 5.6: An Extract from Martin's Systemic Networks (Martin (1992) p.217)a system network. But it is also possible to represent a non-productive one; andMartin takes advantage of this extra facility. Consider the choice between diminishand augment in Figure 5.6. Martin describes this as being `to do with whether thereformulation is toned up or down'. The distinction is expressed in terms of the valueof a previously-decided feature, reformulation. It cannot be expressed for relationswhich are not reformulations (for instance, comparisons): in other words, it is nota productive distinction. The non-productivity is achieved by imposing an order on
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 92the decisions about feature values, and only asking about the value of a given featurein circumstances where the values of other relevant features are appropriate.There are problems with this system for classifying cue phrases. In particular, it doesnot allow each pair of phrases to be compared on the same terms. For example, thedistinction between at least and indeed is expressed in terms of a feature with alternativevalues diminish and augment; while the distinction between that is and for example isexpressed in terms of a feature with alternative values exhaust and exemplify. Howare we to know that there is not something in common between these two distinctions,which is not being factored out? It is impossible to compare them directly, as theyare specialised for dierent values of several other features. Using a productive set offeatures, each pair of phrases can be compared on the same terms: each feature makessense for all possible combinations of all other feature values, so each cue phrase canbe given a value for every feature in the set.The main problem with non-productive formalisms such as this one is that deciding onfeatures is almost too easy. Since a new specialised feature can be used to describe eachnew distinction, there is no necessity to ensure that the new feature does not overlapwith other features in the types of variation it captures. There is thus a possibilityfor redundancy in the nal set of features. Consider for instance, Martin's distinctionbetween exhaust and exemplify, used to represent the dierence between that isand for example. The choice between these two relations is presented as a renementof several other choices, namely reformulation, rework and abstraction. Andyet from the informal denitions Martin provides, it is hard to see exactly how theseearlier choices end up contributing to the nal concepts of exhaust and exemplify.The nal question `shall I use an example?' could simply have been asked at theoutset; it recapitulates all of the questions previously asked. So it is hard to see it asidentifying a dimension of variation separate from those identied by previous portionsof the network.It is considerations such as these that prompt a search for a more independent set ofparameters. Of course, it may turn out that no completely productive set of parameterscan be found for describing cue phrases, in which case something like a systemic networkwould have to be adopted. However, the requirement of productivity is useful at leastin forcing the theorist to begin by looking for as general an account as possible.A Note about the Uneven Distribution of Cue PhrasesAlthough productivity is demanded of the set of features used to describe cue phrases,this is not to say that there must be a cue phrase for each dierent combinationof features. In fact, as we shall see, this is far from being the case: there are manycombinations of features for which no cue phrase exists, and many leaf-level cue phraseswhich are undened for particular features.This is not a violation of the productivity requirement. Productivity is a requirementof the representation system for cue phrases, not of cue phrases themselves. It isperfectly possible to represent the uneven distribution of cue phrases at the leaves of thetaxonomy by showing, for instance, that some leaf-level phrases are undened for morefeatures than others. In fact, it is very useful to be able to represent those combinations
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 93of feature values for which no cue phrase exists, in order to frame questions about whyno cue phrase exists to signal these features, or whether cue phrases exist in otherlanguages for signalling them. If the representation system only captures the space ofactual phrases, these lines of questioning cannot be pursued.However, because some cue phrases are undened for some features, it may actuallymake sense to use a systemic network when it comes to deciding on a phrase to usein a given situation. To make this decision, we have to ask a number of questions, tox the values of the dierent relevant features. If the value of one feature determineswhether or not some other feature is relevant in deciding between alternative phrases,it makes sense to nd out the value of the former parameter rst, just on grounds ofeciency. But again, it should be emphasised that the additional power of the networkis only being used for choosing phrases, not for representing them.5.3 The Structure of Feature DenitionsThe nal preliminary to creating feature denitions is to note some general require-ments which they should meet, and to give an indication about the primitive conceptsin terms of which they will be expressed.5.3.1 Relations as Planning OperatorsAn important requirement for the feature denitions is that they form the basis for animplementable set of relations. In particular, we would like the relations we motivateto play a part in the process of text planning. Relations have already been usefullyadapted to this task, as described in Section 2.5; and one of the primary aims of thethesis is to develop a new set of relations which builds on those which have thus farbeen implemented.The notion of relations as planning operators is thus one which we will want toadopt from the outset. We need to describe relations in terms of the eects theyachieve on the reader, and in terms of the circumstances in which they can be used; inother words, in terms of their preconditions and postconditions. We will thus belooking for denitions broadly along the lines of those developed by Hovy et al (1988,1993) and Moore and Paris (1989, 1993).A conception of relations as planning operators is not only useful from the standpoint ofimplementation, however. Since the advent of speech act theory (Austin (1962), Searle(1969)), an active research programme has grown up around plan-based approaches topragmatics|see for instance Cohen and Perrault (1979), Cohen and Levesque (1990),Allen (1995). And if utterances are best thought of as actions intended to achieveparticular eects, then it makes sense to think of pairs of adjacent utterances in thesame way.











WRITER:Figure 5.7: Primitives for Feature Denitions: The Top Level of StructureThe notion of an innite regression of nested beliefs (`Writer believes [Reader believes[Writer believes. . . ]]') emerges easily from consideration of this diagram. A problemto beset many plan-based approaches to natural language processing (see e.g. Cohenand Perrault (1979)) is that such a regression seems an essential component of thepostconditions of linguistic actions. This problem will not be addressed directly here;for the purposes of the denitions developed in the next chapter, two levels of nestingshould prove sucient.5.4 SummaryThis chapter contains a general discussion of how the linguistic data in the taxonomy ofcue phrases should be exploited from a theoretical point of view. The most importantconclusion is that the taxonomy lends itself to description in terms of a set of indepen-dent features|in other words, that cue phrases (and the relations they signal) should
CHAPTER 5. PRELIMINARIES FOR DEFINING A SET OF RELATIONS 95be thought of as composite constructs. The task of dening the set of relations nowreduces to the task of dening the dierent features from which relations are composed.A number of requirements for the features to be motivated from the taxonomy havebeen set out in advance. Firstly, they must describe both the necessary and the su-cient conditions for the presence of a cue phrase. Secondly, they must be productive,by which is meant that the values of each feature should be dened for all combinationsof all other feature values. Finally, they should conform to a conception of relations asplanning operators, for reasons both implementational and philosophical.In the next chapter, the dierent features proposed to analyse the taxonomy are pre-sented one by one. To what degree they meet the requirements set out here will be animportant matter for discussion.
Chapter 6Using the Taxonomy to CreateRelation Denitions6.1 IntroductionIn this chapter, the linguistic data assembled in the taxonomy is nally given a theo-retical interpretation. Until now, the investigation has focused on surface structures intext; actual words and phrases, and how they can be manipulated by writers. However,as Scott and Paris (1995) note, at some point it is necessary to go `beyond the text', toproduce some description of it which is independent of its surface linguistic structures,in terms of which these structures can be dened. This is the concern of the presentchapter.A great deal has already been written about the semantics and pragmatics of cuephrases, and it should be no surprise that many of the ideas in this chapter draw onor expand on existing work. There are, however, two novel elements in the study,which provide some interesting new perspectives. Firstly is the fact that the set of cuephrases under investigation is much larger than usual. Often, theorists concentrate ona small set of cue phrases, or even on a single phrase|for instance but (Spooren (1989),von Klopp (1993)) or when (Moens and Steedman (1988)). The present study, as aresult of the requirement of productivity, is much broader in scope: we will be lookingfor parameters which are valid right across the space of cue phrases. The reasoningbehind this approach is that much can be learned about the semantics of a given cuephrase by comparing it to a number of other quite dierent phrases. To investigatethe semantics of because, for instance, it would be instructive to be able to point upthe similarities and dierences between it and phrases as diverse as when, then, evenif, or, to, on the other hand and but.A second dierence in the present work is that each theoretical construct introduced willbe motivated in exactly the same way; by examining a portion of the taxonomy of cuephrases, and noting a demand for features to represent the patterns of substitutabilityit contains.It should be stressed that the aim of this chapter is not to come up with a complete and96
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 97watertight set of relation denitions. Producing a complete feature-theoretic accountof the taxonomy is a huge task, and well beyond the scope of this thesis. The presentaim is rather twofold: to demonstrate the utility of the substitution methodology, by noting some ofthe interesting theoretical constructs which emerge when it is pursued; to motivate a core set of features needed to describe the taxonomy, to serve asthe basis for further investigations.In Section 6.2, the set of feature denitions is presented. Each feature is motivatedseparately, using appropriate extracts from the taxonomy. Section 6.3 provides a briefaccount of how the individual features interact with each other. Section 6.4 takesanother look at the mapping between the cue phrases for which denitions have beenformulated and the coherence relations which they signal. A summary and discussionis given in Section 6.5.6.2 Features Motivated by the Taxonomy6.2.1 Semantic and Pragmatic RelationsThe rst extract from the taxonomy to be considered is given in Figure 6.1.1 Motivatingexamples are given in Texts 6.1 and 6.2:
it follows that as a result
soFigure 6.1: Semantic and Pragmatic PhrasesThe footprints are deep andwell-dened.  It follows thatp So# As a result,  the thief was a heavy man. (6.1)I had a puncture on theM25 on my way back fromwork.  As a result,p So# It follows that  I missed most of the rsthalf. (6.2)As a result seems strange in the context of Example 6.1, because it suggests that thethief's heaviness is caused by the footprints being deep. Conversely, it follows that isodd in Example 6.2, because it suggests that the writer is deducing the fact that shemissed most of the rst half|while in fact she is reporting from her own experience.Note that so is acceptable in both cases.1 The extracts from the taxonomy given in this section will not be labelled with the features theyserve to motivate. A labelled version of the taxonomy is given in Section 6.3; the reader might ndit useful to refer forward to this section to see how feature values are assigned to cue phrases.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 98Both examples are commonly analysed as involving a causal/inferential relation ofsome kind, the dierence between them being to do with what this relation holdsbetween. Traditionally, the relation in examples like 6.2 is taken to be between theevents in the world described by the two clauses: the puncture causes the missed rsthalf. In examples like 6.1, the relation is taken to involve linguistic events themselves,not just the events they represent. For Martin (1992), Sanders et al (1992) and oth-ers, the writer's statement that the thief was heavy is caused by her belief that thefootprints are deep. Commentators have used a variety of terms to represent thesedistinctions. Martin (1992) and Halliday and Hasan (1976) use the labels externaland internal to refer to examples like 6.2 and 6.1 respectively; Redeker (1990) usesthe labels ideational and pragmatic; Van Dijk (1979) and Sanders et al (1992) talkof semantic and pragmatic relations.A useful modication of the notion of pragmatic relations is introduced by Sweetser(1990). For her, the relation in examples like 6.1 primarily describes the cause of thewriter's conclusion that the thief must have been heavy, and only indirectly describesthe cause of her statement to this eect. The important relation in the example isthe logical one, between two of the writer's beliefs. Sweetser calls relations involvingthe writer's beliefs epistemic, and denes a further category of speech act relationswhich make reference to actual writer utterances. Prototypical of speech act relationsare examples like the following:(6.3) What are you doing tonight, because there's a good movie on.Here it is certainly appropriate to analyse the relation as describing the cause of thewriter's utterance What are you doing tonight?.Sweetser's denition of epistemic relations is an improvement on the previous de-nitions. However, it still leaves something to be desired. Consider again Sweetser'sepistemic analysis of Example 6.1, as a statement about the writer's conclusions andhow they were reached. The text, according to the new analysis, is still fundamentallydescriptive; instead of describing the external world, it now contains a description ofthe writer's own thought processes. What is missing is an account of how an argumen-tative text like this one achieves a rhetorical eect on the reader|how it persuadesthe reader that the thief was heavy, where a simple statement like The thief was heavymight not have suced. Of course, in oering the reader a trace of the writer's reason-ing, the text suggests how the reader might come to the same conclusion. But while itis vital for the writer's purposes that the reader take this last step, it is not representedin Sweetser's analysis.Thinking about utterances in terms of their intended eects on the reader suggestsan alternative denition for epistemic relations. The new denition expresses theintended eect of a text containing two related utterances as a relation between theintended eect of each individual utterance. The suggestion is, for instance, that ina text containing an epistemic so, the writer's intended eect is not that the readerbelieve a statement about the causes of the writer's beliefs, but rather that a causalrelation actually does hold, in the real world, between the intended eects of the tworelated utterances|in other words, between two reader beliefs.Consider how this denition works in the case of Example 6.1. The text is presented
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 99again below, and the intended eects of its two clauses are shown in italics:(6.4) The footprints are deep. So the thief was a heavy man.R believes the footprints are deep. So R believes the thief was a heavy man.On this interpretation, the intended eect of the text is that the reader's belief that thefootprints are deep causes the reader to believe that the thief was a heavy man, whereotherwise the reader would not have been inclined to believe this latter statement. Itis because of this cause that the relation has persuasive force.Note that the proposed new denition of epistemic relations actually extends to somerelations Sweetser considers as speech act. For Sweetser, \if an utterance is im-perative (. . . ) in form, then it cannot reasonably be causally conjoined to anotherutterance except at the speech act level" (p78). Thus Sweetser would interpret anexample like 6.5 as speech act:(6.5) Hurry up, because we haven't much time!But here again, there are advantages in expressing the relation in terms of intendedeects. The writer's main intention in such a case is not to inform the reader aboutthe cause of her utterance; but rather that the realisation that they haven't much timeshould motivate the reader to hurry up. Using the new denition, this is just what isexpressed. The intended eect of the imperative Hurry up is that the reader hurry up;the intended eect of the statement we haven't much time is that the reader believethey haven't much time; and the intended eect of the whole utterance is that thisbelief causes the reader to hurry up.Because the new denition encompasses examples such as this one, we have decided torevert to the label pragmatic to refer to the relations it describes; and consequentlyto return to the label semantic for what Sweetser calls content relations. Thedenition for a feature with alternative values semantic and pragmatic can now begiven. After Sanders et al, we can call this feature source of coherence.2source of coherencesemantic: the intended eect of the text containing the relation is thatthe reader believes some relation holds between two propositions A andC. A and C are the propositional contents of the two related text spansSA and SC .pragmatic: the intended eect of the text containing the relation isthat some relation actually holds between two propositions A and C. Aand C are the intended eects of the two related text spans SA and SC .2 It should be noted at this point that, as new features are motivated, changes are sometimes requiredto the denitions of features already introduced. In consequence, the feature denitions presentedone by one in this chapter should not be regarded as nal, but only as sucient to account for thedata so far introduced.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 100Note that the new notion of pragmatic by no means covers all of Sweetser's speechact relations. (For example, Text 6.3 is still much better analysed as describing thecauses of the writer's speech act.) However, the class of speech act relations hasnot yet been motivated from the taxonomy, as it is hard to nd cue phrases which arespecic to this class.6.2.2 Positive and Negative Polarity RelationsA second portion of the taxonomy is given in Figure 6.2. Some motivating examplesare provided in Texts 6.6 and 6.7.
and
so butFigure 6.2: Positive and Negative Polarity PhrasesJim had just washed hiscar,  sop and# but  he wasn't keen on lending itto us. (6.6)It was odd. Bob shoutedvery loudly,  butp and# so  nobody heard him. (6.7)The fact that the phrases but and so can never be substituted for one another is clearfrom consideration of examples like these. But the examples also show that the phraseand is contingently substitutable both for but and (in other contexts, of course) for so.In feature-theoretic terms, we can conclude that but and so are dened for dierentvalues of some feature; and that and, being contingently substitutable for both, isundened for this feature. It remains now to decide what the feature is.3Many dierent suggestions have been made as to the similarities and dierences be-tween phrases like but and so. It is uncontroversial (as far as it goes) that A, so Csignals some kind of implication or cause, with A as the antecedent/cause and C as theconsequent/result. And it is likewise uncontroversial to say that A, but C signals (orat least can signal) a violation of the type of relation signalled by so. To illustrate withreference to the above examples: in Text 6.6, so signals that it follows from the factthat Jim had just washed his car that he was unwilling to lend it to us. In Text 6.7,but signals that it normally follows from the fact that Bob shouts loudly that people3 Note that in order to motivate a feature which distinguishes between so and but, we are not obligedto nd a common hypernym of the two phrases, as we did in the previous section. The fact thatand can sometimes be substituted for both but and so is sucient to show that it cannot be denedfor any feature which takes alternative values for these two phrases. If it were, there would have tobe an exclusive relationship between it and one or other of the phrases.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 101hear him, but in this case no-one does. Both phrases can thus be thought of as havinga consequential component: for so, the consequence relation is specied as succeeding;while for but, an expected consequence is not forthcoming. With and, it is simply notspecied whether or not the consequence relation succeeds|the information is left tobe inferred by the reader.The important question is how to express the above ideas more precisely. It hasbeen common to begin formalising the dierence between relations signalled by so andthose signalled by but by making reference to a `statement of implication' P ! Qwhich underlies both types of relation. The dierence between the two relations isthen expressed in terms of the relationship between P and Q and the propositions inthe related spans of text. For so, P relates to the proposition in the rst span andQ to that in the second span. For but, P relates to the proposition in the rst spanand Q to the negation of that in the second span. This story is roughly that given byLongacre (1983) in distinguishing between `consequence' and `frustrated consequence'relations. Sanders et al (1992) give a similar story to distinguish between positiveand negative polarity relations; I shall use these latter terms in what follows.Central to the distinction between so and but is the notion that causal or consequentialrules can be defeated. A number of recent accounts of concessive relations haveemployed the notion of defeasible rules; in particular Oversteegen (1995) and Grote,Lenke and Stede (1995). Defeasible rules provide a useful method for representingthe kind of common-sense generalisations which people rely on in order to make upfor their partial knowledge of the world. They are becoming increasingly popular incomputational linguistics, as a tool for modelling the inuence of the reader's worldknowledge on the resolution of ambiguities. For instance, Lascarides and Asher (1991),Lascarides, Asher and Oberlander (1992) use a system of defeasible rules to develop aframework for deciding which coherence relation is present at a particular point in a textwhen this is not signalled explicitly. Hobbs et al (1993) use defeasible rules to model arange of processes in text interpretation, including the resolution of anaphora, lexicalambiguities and compound nominals. The use of defeasible rules in the present contextis somewhat dierent, however. They are not being proposed as a way of deciding aboutthe interpretation of some part of a text, but as a part of the interpretation itself|thedefeasible rules used by a reader and writer to model the world are actually implicitin the semantics of phrases like but. As an initial model, then, we might propose thatthe phrases so and but are each associated with a defeasible rule, which in the case ofso succeeds and in the case of but is defeated.A number of questions still remain, however. Most importantly, what is the commu-nicative status of the defeasible rule? Is it something which the reader must alreadyknow as a precondition to understanding the text, or is it something which the readeris told in the text? Along with Oversteegen (1995), it is here proposed that the ex-istence of the defeasible rule should be seen as a precondition. It is problematic tosuggest that the rule itself is part of the information communicated to the reader bythe writer. For one thing, the reader is only given one instance of the rule|it wouldthen be necessary to abstract away from this to the rule itself; a process which is veryunderconstrained. Moreover, it is questionable whether causal or inferential rules con-stitute the kind of information that a reader will accept `on authority' from a writer inany circumstance. Consider again the statement in Text 6.6: Jim had just washed his
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 102car, so he wasn't keen on lending it to us. This may certainly provide new information,but it is implausible to suggest that the writer is informing the reader that `if a personwith temperament T has just washed his car, he normally doesn't like to lend it toothers'. It is more plausible to suggest that a rule along these lines is already knownby the reader, and what is being communicated is the fact that the rule succeeds inthis instance.Note that the information conveyed by such a statement might be more than the bareassertion that `there is nothing unusual about the situation being described'. Knowingthat the rule in question is triggered would allow the reader to infer that Jim is of typeT , for instance, if this was not already known. But it is much easier to imagine thereader adding such facts to his database than whole causal rules.To sum up: we can hypothesise a feature called polarity, with alternative valuesnegative and positive. It is assumed that each relation presupposes the presence ofa defeasible rule P ! Q.4 The relationship between P and Q and the propositions Aand C (dened in the source of coherence feature) is determined by the dierentvalues of the polarity feature, as follows:polaritypositive: A = P ; C = Q. The rule is specied to succeed.negative: A = P ; C is inconsistent with Q. The rule is specied tofail.Conditional Negative and Positive PolarityAnother portion of the taxonomy which can be used to motivate the polarity pa-rameter is given in Figure 6.3. Motivating examples are given in Texts 6.8 and 6.9:
provided that even if
ifFigure 6.3: Conditional Positive and Negative Polarity PhrasesYou can sit in the frontseat,  provided thatp if# even if  you put your seatbelt on. (6.8)I wouldn't vote for Major  even ifp if# provided that  you gave me a thousandpounds. (6.9)4 We will not at this point buy into any particular formalism for representing defeasible rules. However,some of the requirements for the formalism eventually to be adopted will emerge from the discussionin following sections.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 103The phrases in Figure 6.3 can be compared to those in Figure 6.2, a crucial dierencebeing the fact that the latter group of phrases relate hypothetical eventualities while theformer phrases relate actual ones. Motivation for a feature representing this dimensionof variation will be provided below, in Section 6.2.8; for now the important thing to noteis the variation in polarity exhibited by the phrases. For each phrase, an underlyingdefeasible rule P ! Q can be identied. For C, provided that A, A and C map ontoP and Q respectively and the rule is represented as succeeding. For C, even if A, Aand C map onto P and :Q respectively, and the rule is represented as failing. Thusin Example 6.8, the rule that putting a seatbelt on causes being allowed to sit in thefront seat is asserted to succeed, while in Example 6.9 the rule that giving people lotsof money causes them to vote against their will is asserted to fail in the case of thewriter.Semantic and Pragmatic Negative Polarity RelationsThe distinction between positive and negative polarity also cuts across the se-mantic/pragmatic distinction. Consider Figure 6.4, for which motivating examplesare given below:
but
admittedly.. butFigure 6.4: Semantic and Pragmatic Negative Polarity PhrasesUnited have some keyplayers injured; n admittedly. . . butp but o they're still bound to win. (6.10)Mary was behaving oddly.She ordered a pizza, n but# admittedly. . . but o she didn't eat any of it. (6.11)(The construction admittedly. . . but in these examples is to be read as distributed be-tween the two clauses in the relation. The rst example should thus read `Admittedly,United have some key players; but. . . ', and the second example should read `Admittedly,she ordered a pizza, but. . . '.)The point is that Admittedly. . . but signals the breaking of a defeasible rule just as butdoes; yet it has a specically argumentative avour. In Text 6.10, admittedly introducesa proposition which suggests one conclusion, and the negation of that conclusion isthen asserted. But on its own can also be used in the absence of any argument, as inText 6.11: here, the writer is simply informing the reader about an unusual state ofaairs, and admittedly is quite out of place.The semantic/pragmatic distinction is useful in capturing the dierence betweenthese negative polarity phrases. Admittedly. . . but can be dened as signallingthe value pragmatic, and but can be thought of as undened for the feature. The
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erence between semantic and pragmatic negative polarity relations can bethought of as follows. In the semantic case, the writer's aim is to inform the readerthat some general rule in the reader's model of the world is defeated in the situationbeing described. Thus in the above example, the defeated rule is that people who orderfood generally eat it. In the pragmatic case, the writer's aim is that some general rulein the world itself actually fails in the present instance. This rule holds between tworeader beliefs|the intended eects of the rst and second clauses taken individually.In the above example, the intended eect of the rst span is that the reader believethat United has some key players injured; that of the second span is that the readerbelieve that United will win. Normally, if the reader believes a team has several playersinjured, he will believe they will lose; but in this case, the writer's intention is thatthis conclusion is not drawn.6.2.3 Unilateral and Bilateral RelationsThe next portion of taxonomy to be considered, given in Figure 6.5, also involvesnegative polarity phrases. Motivating examples are given in Texts 6.12 and 6.13:
but
admittedly.. but despite thisFigure 6.5: Unilateral and Bilateral PhrasesBill lost the 400m last year.  Admittedly. . . butp Butp Despite this,  He should win it this year. (6.12)Bill should win the 400m.He lost last year;  Admittedly. . . butp but# despite this,  they're running at altitudethis time. (6.13)The relation in each of these examples can be signalled by admittedly. . . but, and canthus be considered as pragmatic negative polarity. However, the phrase despitethis is only acceptable as a substitute in Text 6.12. In Text 6.13 it appears odd; itsuggests that Bill's losing last year would normally lead to them not running at altitudethis time|an implausible assumption.The dierence between the two examples appears to be to do with the status of thesecond span in the relation (the one introduced by but). In each case, the rst spanpresents a premise P1 which suggests a conclusion C. In Text 6.12, the second spanpresents the negation of this conclusion, :C. In Text 6.13, the second span presentsanother premise P2, which is more telling than P1, and suggests an alternative con-clusion. This dimension of variation suggests another parameter, which we can callpattern of instantiation.To allow for multiple premises in the rule underlying the relation, we need to reviewthe denition of polarity presented in the previous section. The assumption must
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 105now be that each relation presupposes a rule of the form P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q. We needto map elements from this rule onto the variables A and C, dened in the featuresource of coherence. Let us assume that A is always on the left-hand side of therule.5 The polarity feature presented before assumed that C always mapped ontothe conclusion of the rule (Q); but we must now abstract away from this idea. Wemust dene a new variable|call it C0|whose relationship to C is determined by thevalue of the polarity feature. For symmetry, we will also introduce a variable A0,which always equates directly with A.6 The polarity feature can now be thought ofas specifying a function from A and C to A0 and C0. Its revised denition now lookslike this:polarity (2nd denition)positive: A0 = A; C0 = C. The rule is specied to succeed.negative: A0 = A; C0 is inconsistent with C. The rule is specied tofail.The mapping between A0 and C0 and the rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is now given by thenew feature:pattern of instantiationunilateral: C 0 is on the same side of the rule as A0 (but not the sameas A).bilateral: C0 is on the opposite side of the rule to A0.The phrase despite this can now be thought of as dened as bilateral, while both butand admittedly. . . but are undened for the feature. Thus in Example 6.12, for instance,A0 is the proposition `Bill lost the 400m last year' and C0 is the proposition `It is notthe case that Bill should win this year'. These two propositions can be thought of aspremise and conclusion of a defeasible rule. The relation can thus be thought of asbilateral, (and thus despite this is appropriate). Note that since the relation is alsonegative polarity, the point is that the rule is defeated.Several examples of phrases dened as unilateral will be given in the followingsections.6.2.4 Causal and Inductive RelationsConsider next the extract of the taxonomy in Figure 6.6, again featuring negativepolarity phrases. Motivating examples are given below:5 This assumption itself changes in Section 6.2.5, for reasons developed in that section.6 This is another assumption which will be re-examined as further portions of the taxonomy areconsidered; see Section 6.2.6 for details.
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despite this whereas
butFigure 6.6: Causal and Inductive PhrasesBill and Jill are like chalkand cheese. Bill lives for hisbooks;  whereasp but# despite this,  Jill is only interested in TaeKwan Do. (6.14)Bob was out of training;  despite thisp but# whereas  he completed the marathonin record time. (6.15)These phrases draw attention to another dimension of variation in the phrase but.Text 6.15 is of a kind we have already seen, where a causal or inferential rule isdefeated: the rule in this case is that people who are out of training do not normallybreak records. But no such rule appears to underlie Text 6.14: knowing that Bill livesfor his books gives no grounds for thinking that Jill is not just interested in Tae KwanDo.Whereas intuitively signals a contrast between two propositions. On a conventionalanalysis (see e.g. Spooren (1989)), we are able to say S1, whereas S2 if S1 and S2 allowthe inference of p(A) and :p(B) respectively, for some predicate p and two entitiesA and B.7 The question posed by the extract given in Figure 6.6 is: what doesthis have in common with the violated expectation analysis required for despite this?The feature-theoretic interpretation of the diagram requires us to nd some featureor features of whereas that are shared by despite this; but is dened for this commoncomponent, and undened for the feature(s) which distinguish the two phrases.A point to note about p(A) whereas :p(B) is that A and B are required to belong insome sense to the same category of entities. Constrasts are not made between objectswhich have nothing in common at all. Thus Bill and Jill might be brother and sister,or friends, or two candidates for some job that needs doing. Put another way: relationssignalled by whereas highlight an inability to generalise over the objects in a given classas regards some property p. This idea prompts the suggestion that a dierent type ofrule underlies such relations; namely inductive rules.An inductive rule is of the following general form: if property p is true of a certainnite number of elements from a particular class, then it follows that p is true ofall the elements in that class. Clearly, as rules of inference, such statements are notsound. But inductive rules are nonetheless a mainstay of human reasoning: in theend, all our generalisations about the world are arrived at by inducing from particularinstances. They can in fact be considered as another kind of defeasible rule, albeitquite dierent from those which we have so far been considering. Both kinds of rules7 In Text 6.14, for instance, we can infer from Bill lives for his books that Bill is not only interestedin Tae Kwan Do, which is an explicit negation of the predicate in the second span of the relation.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 107are to be relied on when no information to the contrary is found, but are overruled ifcontrary information is forthcoming.A proposition like p(A) can thus be thought of as forming part of the left hand sideof an inductive rule. If enough other objects in the same class as A have property p,then the inductive generalisation that 8X(X 2 C ! p(X)) will be triggered. Eventhe single instance of p(A), in the absence of any other information, is presumablyenough to trigger some very weak hypotheses about other similar objects. However,the inductive rule is defeated as soon as :p(B) is presented.In summary, what whereas and despite this seem to have in common is that they bothpresuppose a defeasible rule of some kind, and both signal its defeat. In one casethe defeasible rule is causal and in the other case, inductive; but can then be seen asundened with respect to the type of rule which is defeated. A new feature rule typeis now motivated:rule typecausal: the defeasible rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is a causal rule.inductive: the defeasible rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is an inductive rule.As might have been noticed, whereas and despite this dier not only as regards thefeature rule type, but also as regards the feature pattern of instantiation. De-spite this is dened as bilateral, as we have already seen in Section 6.2.3. Whereasmust be dened as unilateral: its two spans present two propositions from whichgeneralisations can be drawn, and the generalisation itself (or rather the lack of it)remains implicit. Consider Example 6.14 in more detail. A and C can be identied as`Bill lives for his books' and `Jill is only interested in Tae Kwan Do' respectively. Therelation is negative polarity, so while A0 is identical to A, C0 is inconsistent withC. Whereas is dened as unilateral; so A0 and C0 are both on the left-hand side ofsome defeasible rule. The relation is inductive, so each item on the left-hand side ofthe rule will be attributing the same predicate to a dierent member of a given class.In this case, then, C0 must be dened as `Jill lives for her books', or something to thateect. As this is inconsistent with the value of C, the inductive rule fails.Semantic and Pragmatic Inductive PhrasesThe distinction between causal and inductive relations cuts across that betweensemantic and pragmatic relations. Consider the extract in Figure 6.7, motivatedby the examples below:Bill and Jill are like chalkand cheese. Bill lives for hisbooks; 8><>: whereasp on the other hand,p but# then again,# despite this, 9>=>; Jill is only interested in TaeKwan Do. (6.16)
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but
whereas then again
on the other hand despite thisFigure 6.7: Semantic and Pragmatic Inductive PhrasesI don't know where weshould eat tonight. TheKalpna is great value formoney; 8><>: then again,p on the other hand,p but# whereas# despite this 9>=>; Sid isn't crazy about Indianfood. (6.17)Example 6.16 is the kind of contrast we have already considered, between objects in theworld with inconsistent predicates. Example 6.17 can also be analysed as a contrast ofsorts, but here the inconsistency is between the argumentative force of two propositions.The fact that the Kalpna is good value for money suggests that we should eat there.But the fact that Sid doesn't like Indian food suggests that we should not eat there.The interesting relationship in this diagram is between whereas, then again and on theother hand. Then again seems quite wrong in the rst example, and whereas is out ofplace in the second one. But note that on the other hand is acceptable in both cases. Itwill be suggested in the remainder of this section that all three phrases are signallers ofnegative polarity inductive relations; that the exclusivity between whereas andthen again is due to the semantic/pragmatic distinction; and that on the other handis undened for this latter feature and hence substitutable for both phrases.The contrast signalled by whereas relates to the propositional content of the relatedspans, and the writer's objective in presenting it is to make the reader aware of thegeneralisation which fails. It can thus be thought of as a semantic contrast. Butclearly, the contrast signalled by then again does not have to relate to the proposi-tional content of the spans. No inconsistent predicates are present in the contents ofthe two spans in Example 6.17, for instance. In such cases, dierent kinds of objectsare apparently being compared. A pragmatic analysis of these cases will be suggestedhere: in this analysis, the objects are reader beliefs (rather than objects in the world),the predicates about the objects concern the dierent conclusions supported by dier-ent beliefs, and the classes into which beliefs fall concern the conclusions to which theyare relevant.Consider what happens in the process of `reaching a conclusion by examining premises'.There must rst be an attempt to delineate those premises which will be relevant; anexhaustive search will not be feasible in any system with a reasonably sized set offacts and rules. Even the set of relevant propositions is likely to be too large to beexhaustively searched, and further heuristics will need to be used to consider theseselectively. It is reasonable to suppose that inductive principles play a part in theseheuristics: if we consider a certain number of relevant premises, and each one supports
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 109the same conclusion, there will come a point at which we decide that the conclusion istrue, and stop looking for additional premises. The notion of `reaching a conclusion'can be thought of as the moment when an inductive generalisation is made, and weassume that all premises relevant to the conclusion in fact support the conclusion.Now consider what happens with then again. Here two relevant premises are presentedwhich support opposite conclusions. This has the eect of blocking the generalisation,making the reader unable to reach a decision. In Lascarides and Asher's (1991) termi-nology, the reader has encountered a `Nixon Diamond', where two defeasible rules aretriggered, and neither takes precedence. Note that as this is a pragmatic relation,the eect is not simply that the reader realises that inconsistent premises have beenpresented, but that a Nixon Diamond actually happens in the reader's theorem provingsystem. However, we must also note that the system does not freeze up altogether asa result of this impasse: it is only as regards one particular conclusion that no decisioncan be reached. Inductive generalisations can still be made to reach other conclusions.Positive and Negative Polarity Inductive PhrasesFinally, consider the diagram in Figure 6.8, motivated by Texts 6.18 and 6.19.
then againfurthermoreFigure 6.8: Positive and Negative Pragmatic Inductive PhrasesUnited are bound to win.They have a great team; n furthermore,# then again, o they're playing at home. (6.18)I don't know whetherUnited will win. They havea great team; n then again,# furthermore, o they're playing away fromhome. (6.19)If then again signals the defeat of a pragmatic inductive rule, then furthermore canbe regarded as signalling the success of such a rule. In Example 6.18, a conclusion isreached: that United will win. Two relevant premises needed to be considered in orderfor the inductive rule to re in this instance.In other cases, more than two premises need to be advanced. Lists of premises signalledby phrases like furthermore can in principle be of any length. In the present model,these lists are analysed as nested applications of a binary relation, as in Figure 6.9 (i).(Premises are marked with a P; the conclusion with a C.) As regards the relationsbetween premises, the topmost relation links the rst premise with a complex spanconsisting of another relation between two further premises. It is easy to see how thispattern could be extended.
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(i) (ii)Figure 6.9: Alternative Structural Analyses of FurthermoreFigure 6.9 (ii) shows the structural analysis which rst would give for a text containinga sequence of premises. As already outlined in Section 2.4.3, the notion of multipleschema applications does service in such texts: the premises are not represented inrelation to each other, but in relation to the conclusion they support. The conclusionspan is thus related to several adjacent text spans. However, a disadvantage of thisapproach is that it can only be used if the conclusion is represented explicitly in thetext; and this is far from always the case. If a conclusion is implicit, rst would haveto analyse the premises using a much less informative relation, list. Maier and Hovy(1991) counter this problem by adding a separate level of `textual' relations to thediagram in Figure 6.9 (ii), which link the adjacent premises (see Section 2.5.3). But inthe present system, two levels of relations are not necessary: the relation dened bypositive pragmatic inductive features is suciently abstract to capture both therelationship between two premises and that between the premises and the conclusion.86.2.5 Cause and Result-Driven RelationsA further extract from the negative polarity portion of the taxonomy is given inFigure 6.10. Motivating examples appear below.
despite this unfortunately
butFigure 6.10: Cause-Driven and Result-Driven PhrasesBill took the lid o the pot.  Unfortunately,p But# Despite this,  there was nothing inside. (6.20)8 A question remains as to the nature of the relation which links the set of premises to the conclusion:it could either be pragmatic positive causal or pragmatic positive inductive. I favour theformer suggestion; note, for instance that it follows that can be used to introduce a conclusionsupported by several premises.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 111Sue had been up all night;  despite this,p but# unfortunately,  she was looking fresh as adaisy. (6.21)The text in Example 6.20 can be thought of as presenting an unsatised desire. Letus say Bill wants to eat something; one way of achieving this goal would be if the potcontained food and its lid were removed. He lifts the lid, but there is nothing inside.But is certainly appropriate to describe the circumstance which blocks fullment of thegoal; as is unfortunately (understood as `unfortunately for Bill'). But despite this isquite wrong|it suggests that lifting the lid is expected to cause or entail that the potis not empty. In Example 6.21, a text with a more conventional violated expectation ispresented. Here but and despite this are acceptable, but unfortunately is inadmissibleas a substitute.These two dierent uses of but have been noted by others;9 the following two examplesof the unsatised-desire type are respectively from Longacre (1983) and Spooren (1989):(6.22) I intended to go, but we had visitors that night.(6.23) I went to the church, but the vicar was not there.Both of these commentators attempt an explanation of such texts by proposing moreabstract ways in which expectations are violated. For Longacre,something is presupposed here like the Newtonian assumption (inertia) thata body in motion in a given direction will keep moving in that directionunless some force deects or stops it. . .For Spooren, the expectation arises as a result of implicatures that follow from thestatement of intention:part of our world knowledge is that going to church probably means thatthe vicar is in the church.Neither of these explanations is very convincing. It is far from the case that intentionsare normally achieved. It is certainly possible to set up contexts where an intentionhas no chance of being achieved and yet but is still appropriate. Imagine Jim is in aprison cell from which he cannot escape. We could still say that(6.24) Jim looked around for food, but there was none to be found.No amount of wanting or looking for food is going to satisfy Jim's intention, so the`inertia' explanation is ruled out. His looking for food does not probably mean thatthere is food to be found, so the introduction of implicatures is similarly inadmissible.Yet the phrase but does not seem out of place.9 However, no-one to my knowledge has suggested using unfortunately as a diagnostic for theunsatised-desire use.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 112A preferable explanation|and one that is motivated by the pattern of substitutabilityin Figure 6.11|is that but is undened for a further feature, for which despite this andunfortunately signal dierent values. The values of the feature relate to the manner inwhich the rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is used: are we predicting Q from our knowledge ofP1^: : :^Pn, or are we seeking to achieve Q, and thus investigating whether P1^: : :^Pnare true or themselves achieveable? We can call this feature anchor, to reect whetherthe `certainty' relates to the knowledge of the premises, or the desirability of theconclusion. In each case, the `certain' thing will be identied as A (for anchor). Thefeature can be dened as follows:anchorcause-driven: A 2 P1 : : :Pn; P1 ^ : : :^ Pn is true.result-driven: A corresponds to Q; and A is desired by the protago-nist.To take an example, consider again Text 6.22: I intended to go, but we had visitorsthat night. This is a result-driven relation: A, the rst clause, which presents thewriter's intention to go, corresponds to the right-hand side of the rule P1^: : :^Pn ! Q.C is the second clause, presenting the fact which prevents the intention being achieved.The relation is bilateral, since C relates to a fact on the left-hand side of the ruleP1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q. It is negative polarity, since the relevant fact in the rule (C0)is inconsistent with C.In one respect, the above denition of the anchor feature is slightly fudged. Considerthe original example of a result-driven relation: Bill took the lid o the pot; butthere was nothing inside. The rst clause must still be considered A, but note that itdoes not itself present the intention. Rather, it presents an action performed to achievethe intention. There will be more to say about such cases in Section 6.2.7, which dealswith presupposition. For the moment, note that the intention behind the action in thecurrent example can be expressed in a subordinate clause:(6.25) Bill took the lid o the pot to get some food; but there was nothing inside.10Note that the revised denitions of positive and negative polarity presented inSection 6.2.3 are still serviceable for both cause-driven and result-driven relations.In positive polarity relations, nothing is negated, and so no problems arise. And innegative polarity relations, it is always C which is negated. For a cause-drivennegative polarity relation, the anchor A is on the left-hand side of the rule, and C isthe negation of the expected conclusion. For a result-driven negative polarityrelation, the right-hand side of the rule is desired by the protagonist, and C is thenegation of one of the conditions necessary for this desire to be brought about.It should also be noted that the denition of pattern of instantiation in Sec-tion 6.2.3 does not need amendment. This denition determines whether C is on the10 Strictly speaking, to is not a cue phrase, as it does not pass the test for relational phrases. But, asnoted in Section 4.2, it is similar enough to a cue phrase to warrant attention.





fortunatelyFigure 6.11: Additional Cause-Driven and Result-Driven PhrasesBill took the lid o the pot. 8>><>>: Unfortunately,p Butp As it happened,# Fortunately,# Despite this,# As a result, 9>>=>>; there was nothing inside. (6.26)Bill took the lid o the pot. 8>><>>: Fortunately,p As it happened,# Unfortunately,# But# Despite this,# As a result, 9>>=>>; there was something inside.(6.27)Note that the exclusivity of fortunately and unfortunately depends crucially on the factthat the two phrases set up dierent implicatures about what Bill wants. Both of theabove texts presuppose that Bill's plan requires there to be something in the pot. Itmight also have been that the plan required the pot to be empty|in which case theappropriateness of fortunately and unfortunately would be reversed. The two phrasescannot be substituted for one another, as to do so requires a change in the assumptionsabout what Bill's plan involves.The most signicant fact about the diagram in Figure 6.11 is that as it happened issubstitutable for both fortunately and unfortunately, while these two latter phrasesare exclusive. All three phrases are exclusive with cause-driven phrases like as aresult and despite this, and it is plausible that they should all be labelled as result-driven. The variation within the phrases can then be traced to the polarity feature.Fortunately has positive polarity: the intention behind the rst clause is achievedif the second clause is true. Unfortunately has negative polarity: the intention
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 114behind the rst clause is achieved if the negation of the second clause is true. And asit happened is undened with respect to the polarity feature.Conditional Variants of Cause-Driven and Result-Driven PhrasesEvidence for the distinction between cause-driven and result-driven relations also showsup in the conditional phrases in the taxonomy. Consider the two examples below:(6.28) If you feel like cooking tonight, make something spicy.(6.29) If you feel like cooking, there's a kitchen on the rst oor.Both of these examples are of positive polarity pragmatic relations. In Exam-ple 6.28, the rule which the writer wants to succeed is that people who feel like cookingand who have a certain disposition make something spicy. (The writer's aim is thusthat the reader takes on this disposition.) But we cannot envisage a similar rule forExample 6.29. The kitchen is on the rst oor whether or not the reader feels likecooking. The point is rather that it is only relevant for the reader to know wherethe kitchen is if he feels like cooking. Treating the if in this text as result-driventhus provides a better analysis. We assume there is a goal underlying the rst clause;namely that the reader cooks. This will happen if the reader feels like cooking, andknows where the kitchen is.11A similar story can be told for negative polarity relations.(6.30) Even if you manage to break out of the prison, you'll never make it home.(6.31) You'll never make it home. Even if you manage to break out of the prison,the jungle round here is impenetrable.In Example 6.30, the presupposed rule is that if one breaks out of prison, one cannormally get home. The rule is defeated in the present case. In Example 6.31, however,there is no rule stating that breaking out of prison normally entails the jungle not beingimpenetrable. Rather, we must assume a goal behind the breaking out of prison, anda rule stating that the goal will be achieved if the outbreak occurs and the jungle isnot impenetrable.11 An alternative analysis for this kind of text is given by Sweetser (1990). She considers such a textto be an example of a speech act conditional, to be read as `if you feel like cooking, then (let usconsider that) I inform you that there's a kitchen on the rst oor'. According to this analysis, thespeech act of informing is only to be understood as having occurred if the information about thekitchen is considered relevant. However, it is odd to suggest that the speech act simply disappearsif its content is not relevant. The information about the kitchen is conveyed to the hearer under anycircumstances, even if it is not relevant; and it is hard to see what there is to an informative speechact beyond the deliberate conveying of information. The problem is exacerbated if the analysis isextended to cover examples such as Whenever you feel like cooking, there's a kitchen on the rstoor. If we interpret this as a speech act conditional, we must envisage a whole series of informativespeech acts, one for each time the hearer feels like cooking. At this point, we are clearly stretchingthe notion of a `speech act' beyond its normal use.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 115The distinction between cause-driven and result-driven conditional relations doesnot emerge systematically from the taxonomy. There are not always phrases whichdier only with regard to this feature (although see Section 6.2.8 for a discussion ofthe phrase in case). The only systematic evidence for the feature in hypotheticalrelations is thus that the phrases if and even if can take either of its values. However,indirect evidence can be obtained by converting `hypothetical' texts to `actual' ones,and observing which cue phrases are now appropriate. The following two texts are`actual' versions of Texts 6.31 and 6.29; the patterns of substitutability for the phrasesfortunately, unfortunately, despite this and so are what we would expect for cause-driven and result-driven relations.Bill managed to escapefrom prison.  Unfortunately,p but# despite this,  the jungle wasimpenetrable. (6.32)Bill felt like cooking. n Fortunately,# So o there was a kitchen on therst oor. (6.33)6.2.6 Anchor-Based and Counterpart-Based RelationsAnother portion of the taxonomy is given in Figure 6.12. The motivating examplesare as follows:
but otherwiseFigure 6.12: Anchor-Based and Counterpart-Based PhrasesBob put his hands up, n otherwise# but o Jill would have shot him. (6.34)Bob kept his hands by hissides, n but# otherwise o Jill didn't shoot him. (6.35)It seems that both of these texts involve a rule along the following lines:If Bob doesn't put his hands up, Jill will shoot him.For both texts, the anchor relates to the left-hand side of this rule, and the counterpartto the right-hand side. The texts are similar, in that the conclusion of the rule is avoidedin each case. However, the reason for this is dierent in the two cases. In Example 6.35,the premise of the rule is true, but the rule is defeated: some stronger conicting rulemust therefore be supposed to have taken precedence. In Example 6.34, the premise ofthe rule does not even occur: the protagonist takes action to avoid a conclusion whichis inconsistent with his goals.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 116In order to link the propositions related by the cue phrases onto the premise andconclusion of the relevant rule, another dimension of variation must be introduced.At present, in negative polarity relations, it is always the counterpart span whichneeds to be negated to map back onto the rule P1 ^ : : : ^ Pn ! Q. This is still thecase for Example 6.35; the counterpart is the second span, which is the negation of theexpected conclusion. But for Example 6.34, it is rather the anchor ( Bill put his handsup) which must be negated to map onto the rule, and the counterpart (Jill would haveshot him) which maps onto the rule without being negated.Examples such as this suggest the need for a new feature, which we can call focus ofpolarity, to specify whether the polarity transformation (if there is one) operateson the anchor or on the counterpart.The denition of focus of polarity will require another modication to the deni-tion of the polarity feature. In the current denition in Section 6.2.3, it is alwaysthe counterpart of the rule (C) which is a candidate for negation: the anchor A isnever negated. We now need to express the denition so as to allow the candidate fornegation to be determined by focus of polarity. To this end, we must introducesome new variables: the focus of polarity (F ), which is the candidate for negation,and the invariant (I), which is never negated. The variables F 0 and I 0 will be used torepresent F and I after the polarity transformation has taken place. The new denitionfor polarity now looks like this:polarity (3nd denition)positive: F = F 0; I = I 0;negative: F = :F 0; I = I 0.The focus of polarity feature now identies F and F 0 with A and A0 (and I andI 0 with C and C0) or F and F 0 with C and C0 (and I and I 0 with A and A0.focus of polarityanchor-based: F = A; F 0 = A0; I = C; I 0 = C0.counterpart-based: F = C; F 0 = C0; I = A; I 0 = A0.Consider how these new denitions work with the phrases but and otherwise. For Bobkept his hands by his sides, but Jill didn't shoot him, the rst clause is A and thesecond clause C. It is bilateral cause-driven, so A0 is part of the left-hand side ofP1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q, and C0 is Q. The relation is counterpart-based, so F is C andF 0 is C0. It is negative polarity, so F is :F 0; which means that C0 is :C. A is theinvariant, and hence maps straight onto A0. The eect is a violated expectation.For Bob put his hands up; otherwise Jill would have shot him, the rst clause is againA and the second clause C. The relation is bilateral cause-driven, so A0 is partof the left-hand side of P1 ^ : : : ^ Pn ! Q, and C0 is Q. This time the relation isanchor-based, so F is A and F 0 is A0. It is negative polarity, so F is :F 0; whichmeans that A0 is :A. This means that the rule does not trigger, and the right-hand
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 117side of the rule (C) does not occur.12Semantic and Pragmatic Anchor-Based PhrasesAs it is expressed in terms of A and C, the denition of focus of polarity servesequally well for semantic relations and for pragmatic ones. Consider the followingtwo cases:(6.36) Bob put his hands up, otherwise Jill would have shot him.(6.37) Put your hands up, otherwise I'll shoot you.Example 6.36 requires that the reader believe that a protagonist in the world beingdescribed (Bill) does not want some eventuality (being shot) to occur. It is thus asemantic relation, holding between the propositional contents of the related spans.However, for Example 6.37 it is a precondition that someone in the real world (namelythe reader) does not want to be shot. The intended eect of the relation is that thereader actually put his hands up in order to avoid this eventuality. (Note that it is notspecied whether the eventuality is in fact avoided; or even whether it is true that thewriter would have shot the reader if he had not obeyed her instruction.)Distinctions Amongst Anchor-Based RelationsOtherwise is only one of a number of anchor-based phrases. There are many othersthat seem to fall into this category: for example, or, unless, until, and before (seeSection 6.2.7 for a discussion about this latter phrase). There is not room to talkabout them all here, but the dimensions of variation between them look likely tocorrespond to those identied by other features. Deciding whether this is indeed thecase is a matter for further research.6.2.7 Presupposed and Non-Presupposed RelationsAnother informative extract from the taxonomy is given in Figure 6.13. Motivatingexamples are given in Texts 6.38 and 6.39:I haven't always been unt.I played a lot of rugby  whilep when# meanwhile  I was at college. (6.38)They set about preparingthe meal. Bill marinatedthe meat;  meanwhile,p while# when  Bob lit the barbecue. (6.39)All three of the phrases in the diagram convey information about temporal simultaneity,among other things. However, there is a syntactic dierence between when, which12 In fact, the story is likely to be more complicated than this. The reason why C does not occur isbecause it is not desired by Bob, and he takes action to avoid it. There thus seems likely to be aresult-driven component to the relation which has not so far been captured.
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while meanwhile whenFigure 6.13: Presupposed and Non-Presupposed Phrasesis a temporal subordinator, and meanwhile, which is a sentential adverb. While isappropriate as a substitute for either phrase, as the examples show.The clauses introduced by temporal subordinators are conventionally thought of aspresupposed (Karttunen (1973), Keenan (1971), Lascarides and Oberlander (1993)).They describe an eventuality with respect to which the material in the main clause istemporally situated: this eventuality must either be already known to the reader, ormust be accommodated prior to the addition of the temporal relation. The asym-metry of these sentences can be demonstrated by swapping the main and subordinateclauses. This typically results in incoherence, although the relation of `temporal over-lap' between the clauses is presumably unchanged:(6.40) I haven't always been unt. ?? I was at college when I played a lot of rugby.On the other hand, no harm is done by changing the clause introduced by meanwhile:(6.41) They set about preparing the meal. Bob lit the barbecue; meanwhile Billmarinated the meat.The question of when accommodation is possible is addressed by Lascarides and Ober-lander (1993). They propose two dierent mechanisms, which apply in dierent sit-uations. If the subordinate clause functions simply as a temporal adverbial, as inExample 6.38, then there is no need to nd a coherence relation between it and thepreceding context; the important relation (`background', in this case) is between themain clause and the preceding context. But in other cases, as in the following example,the subordinate clause has an important narrative function:(6.42) The backbenchers were in revolt. They were pacied after Major launched acharm oensive.Here, a coherence relation between the subordinate clause and the preceding contextmust be found to allow accommodation, and only after the subordinate clause has beenattached is the main clause considered. The explanation of the asymmetry introducedby the subordinator thus turns on the order of attachment of the two clauses.A similar explanation of temporal subordinators must be sought for the present theory.Here, however, it must emerge from the denitions of the relations marked by thesephrases, rather than from an account of the algorithm used to interpret them. We
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 119therefore need to think about how to express the preconditions for a relation betweentwo spans in terms of how these link to the immediately preceding context. We needa feature which takes one value for subordinating phrases like when, and another fornon-subordinating phrases.A feature with alternative values presupposed and non-presupposed is used here tocapture this dierence. The feature introduces another defeasible rule, X1^ : : :^Xn !Y , similar in structure to the one which the feature denitions have so far referred to.This rule makes a link between the span in the preceding context (which we will callPrecond) and the anchor A. We can dene the new feature as follows:presuppositionalitypresupposed: Precond is part of the left-hand side of the ruleX1 ^ : : : ^Xn ! Y , and A is Y .non-presupposed: Precond is A itself.We can now give an account of what happens in Example 6.42. The rst clause thebackbenchers were in revolt is Precond. The rule X1 ^ : : :^Xn ! Y has this clause aspart of its left-hand side, and anchor clause Major launched a charm oensive as itsright-hand side. When Precond occurs, the rule is thus triggered.A similar story can be told for other temporal subordinators. Consider the followingexample:(6.43) Bob heated the water. When it boiled, he stirred in the sugar.The rst clause Bob heated the water is Precond here. It can be seen as triggering acausal rule whose right-hand side is the water boiled, which is the anchor of the relationsignalled by when.We can now consider what happens in non-presupposed relations. An example ofsuch a relation appears in the text below.(6.44) Jill was curious, so she pulled the lever. Instantly, an alarm went o.In fact, there appear to be two overlapping relations in this example: one betweenthe rst and second clauses (signalled by so); the other between the second and thirdclauses (signalled by instantly). It seems quite plausible that the counterpart of therst relation actually identies with the anchor of the second relation. This is whatis captured in the denition of non-presupposed: an identity is specied to holdbetween A and Precond.Result-Driven Presupposed RelationsIt was noted above, in connection with Example 6.40, that swapping the main andsubordinate clauses in a presupposed relation leads to incoherence. However, it is
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 120interesting that where the subordinate clause has a narrative function (rather thanjust acting as a temporal adverbial), coherent texts can be created by swapping themain and subordinate clause, provided that the right subordinating phrase is chosen.Consider the following variation on Example 6.42:(6.45) The backbenchers were in revolt. Major launched a charm oensive to pacifythem.The anchor for the presuppositional relation is now `The backbenchers are pacied',and this is what must be attached rst to the preceding context. However, it is nolonger the pacication itself which is caused by the context. Rather it is the intentionthat the backbenchers be pacied. We have now set up a context whereMajor launcheda charm oensive can act as the anchor for a result-driven rule of the kind discussedin Section 6.2.5.Anchor-Based Presupposed PhrasesFinally, it is interesting to note that the rule X1 ^ : : :^Xn ! Y is defeasible, just likeP1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q. Consider this example:(6.46) Tidy your room, before I lose my temper.The relation signalled by the subordinator before is presupposed; in other words, thesubordinate clause `W loses her temper' is A, and the main clause `Reader tidies hisroom' is C. Since it is presupposed, there is a rule running from the preconditions ofthe text (i.e. the situation that is currently true) to A. In other words, A is predictedto happen as things stand. However, the relation is also result-driven, negativepolarity, and anchor-based. These parameters describe the relationship betweenA and C. They specify that there is a rule P1 ^ : : : ^ Pn ! Q, whose left hand sideincludes C, the action which the writer intends the reader to perform, and whose right-hand side is the negation of A. `Not A' is a desire of the reader's: he wants it not tobe the case that the writer loses her temper. We thus have two conicting rules: oneleading to A and one leading to :A. The left-hand side of the former rule is currentlytrue. The left-hand side of the latter rule contains what is currently true plus thedesired reader action. The latter rule is the one which is intended to re, and thus therule leading to A is defeated.The above account of counterfactual before still needs to be worked out in detail.However, it is interesting that the features being developed here seem well-suited forhandling such cases.6.2.8 Hypothetical and Actual RelationsA nal extract from the taxonomy is given in Figure 6.14. It is motivated by thefollowing examples:We had a strict upbringing. n IfpWhen o we were naughty, we weresent to bed with no supper. (6.47)
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if whenFigure 6.14: Actual and Hypothetical PhrasesYou can stay up n p if# when o you don't squabble. (6.48)n When# If o Mary gets home, ask her to call me. (6.49)In all of these examples, the suitability of the dierent cue phrases seems determinedby whether the subordinate span (A) is known or unknown. A feature called modalstatus can thus be proposed, with alternative values actual and hypothetical.The modal status feature interacts productively with a number of other features.We have already talked about `conditional' phrases in a number of other places; forinstance in connection with the polarity feature (if versus even if) and the anchorfeature (for which if is undened). The question is now how to dene it.A simple idea would be to identify the contexts where the anchor A is known asactual, and those where it is not known as hypothetical. However, there are anumber of problems with this approach. Consider the case of Text 6.49. It cannotbe that the writer actually knows that Mary gets home in this example, as it is anevent in the future. So what is it which makes if and when dierent in this case? It isplausible to suggest that when is sanctioned by the writer's ability to predict Mary'sreturn before it has happened. It would thus be preferable to dene the feature interms of knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the cause of A rather than of A itself.This being the case, we can thus make use of the variable Precond introduced by thepresuppositionality feature in Section 6.2.7, which for presupposed relations suchas the above, represents the cause of A. The denition of modal status would thenbe as follows:modal statusactual: Precond is known by the protagonist/writer.hypothetical: Precond is not known by the protagonist/writer.It should also be possible to talk about the hypothetical/actual distinction fornon-presupposed phrases. Consider the following examples:Bob piled up the boxesunderneath the bananas. n Then# In that case, o he was able to reach themeasily. (6.50)Bob might try piling up theboxes underneath thebananas. n Thenp In that case, o he'll be able to reach themeasily. (6.51)
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 122Both then and in that case are non-presupposed in the above contexts, so Precondis identied with the anchor clause, which is the rst clause in each case. Then seemsto be undened for modal status, being appropriate in both contexts; but in thatcase seems to require an anchor which is unknown.Result-Driven Hypothetical RelationsA possible instance of a hypothetical result-driven phrase is in case. Considerthe following text:Bill tidied the house, n in case# because o his parents came homeearly. (6.52)This text requires an inference about one of Bill's goals; namely that he does not wanthis parents to come home early and nd that the house is not tidy. It is not certainthat his parents will come home early|hence the relation is hypothetical|but itis suciently likely to make Bill tidy the house. We can therefore assume that the tworelated spans Bill tidied the house and his parents came home early are both part ofthe left-hand side of some rule whose right-hand side is a state of aairs desired byBill, such as `Bill's parents are not angry'. Note that the actual phrase because isinappropriate for signalling this relation.6.2.9 Semantic and Pragmatic Relations RevisitedThis nal section addresses a number of issues and problems that arise in connectionwith the semantic/pragmatic distinction. These will rst be outlined, and thensome suggestions for a solution will be put forward.A rst observation is that the present denitions of semantic and pragmatic bringtogether two quite dierent ideas: on the one hand, the issue of whether A and Crepresent the propositional content of the related clauses (semantic) or their intendedeects (pragmatic); and on the other, that of whether the intended eect of the wholerelation is that the reader believe a relation between two propositions (semantic) orthat a relation between two propositions is actually the case (pragmatic). The latterdistinction seems to dene whether the relation is part of a description or narrative,which the reader accepts without question, or whether it takes place in the real world,where the writer's goals are not just communicative. There seems no reason a prioriwhy these two dimensions should be related.Indeed, it is not hard to nd examples of prototypically pragmatic cue phrases inpurely narrative discourse. For instance, furthermore and then again can both featurein `free indirect speech', where an agent's thought processes are being described:(6.53) Sally couldn't decide who would win the match that evening. Spurs were athome; furthermore, they were on good form. Then again, they were playingthe league champions. . .But the intended eect of these relations is surely still descriptive rather than persua-sive.
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 123Conversely, going by the current denitions, it is hard to nd any phrases which arepurely semantic. A temporal phrase like after this is a plausible candidate, but suchphrases can be used to link imperative clauses, which currently count as pragmatic:(6.54) Sweep the oors. After this, tidy the cupboards.At the same time, furthermore and after this are exclusive phrases, as was noted in thevery rst extract to be presented from the taxonomy in Section 4.6.2. The motivatingexamples are reproduced below:Television is bad for us. Itkills creativity; n furthermore,# after this o it promotes an unhealthykind of `crowd mentality'. (6.55)Bob set about cleaning thehouse. He swept the oors; n after this,# furthermore, o he tidied the cupboards. (6.56)We need to nd a feature to account for this exclusivity. Clearly, the present denitionsof semantic and pragmatic are not able to.A suggestion for remedying the above problems comes from considering another of thedistinctions motivated from the taxonomy; that between cause-driven and result-driven phrases (see Section 6.2.5). The point is that some of the work being doneby the current semantic/pragmatic distinction appears to overlap with work beingdone by this feature. The denition of pragmatic talks about the `intended eects'of utterances SA and SC ; the denition of result-driven also talks about an agent'sintention, and an action or actions which are caused by this intention. It is interestingto speculate that the writer's utterances could be represented as goal-driven actions,just as are the actions of the agents which the writer talks about. To take just onepiece of evidence for this line of reasoning: the notion of result-driven negativepolarity relations seems to nd useful application in analysing the kind of but whichoccurs in dialogues, between two speakers. Consider the following exchange:(6.57) A: Go to bed.B: But I haven't done my homework yet. . .Just as with other result-driven relations, it is odd to analyse the second span as`violating an expectation' set up by the rst span, and preferable to think of it asdefeating a goal underlying the rst span. In this case, however, the goal is that ofthe rst speaker, rather than that of a protagonist being described in the text. Thisidea will not be pursued here, as the present work is not concerned with inter-speakerrelations. But it is an interesting thought that such relations might eventually benetted in by the theory.6.3 Summary of Features MotivatedNow that a number of features have been individually motivated, we can begin to putthem together to build up the complex denitions required for cue phrases and rela-tions. Until now, feature denitions have been presented individually. The complete
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 124Name of Feature Possible Valuessource of coherence semantic pragmaticanchor cause-driven result-drivenpattern of instantiation unilateral bilateralfocus of polarity anchor-based counterpart-basedpolarity negative positivepresuppositionality presupposed non-presupposedmodal status hypothetical actualrule type causal inductiveFigure 6.15: The Features So Far Motivated, and Their Alternative Valuesset of denitions for the features so far motivated can be found in Appendix C; here, theinteractions between the denitions can be more easily appreciated. For the moment,a summary of the eight features and their possible values is given in Figure 6.15.Figure 6.16 presents a larger extract from the taxonomy, which draws together a selec-tion of the phrases which have so far been discussed, labelled with the feature valueswhich have so far been established. The feature-theoretic interpretation of the taxon-omy is clearly illustrated here: exclusive phrases are dened for alternative values ofat least one feature; hyponyms inherit all of the feature values associated with theirhypernyms and are dened for other features in addition, and so on.The diagram in Figure 6.16 is complex: it documents many of the substitutabilityrelationships shown in the smaller diagrams in Section 6.2, as well as many relationshipsbetween phrases which appeared in dierent diagrams. The gure divides roughly intofour exclusive groups of phrases: positive polarity causal actual relations (dominated by the phrase so); negative polarity actual relations (dominated by the phrase but); hypothetical relations (involving if and even if); positive polarity inductive relations (the single phrase furthermore).Much of the complexity in the diagram is due to high-level phrases such as and andwhile, which cut across these divisions.13The features with which the phrases are labelled are unlikely yet to be sucient asdenitions, as many additional features have still to be motivated from the taxonomy.Even in this diagram|still just a small portion of the overall taxonomy|there remainrelationships which are not yet explained by the features provided. (For instance, thecontingent substitutability between while and whereas remains unexplained. So does13 The diagram in Figure 6.16 is already quite dicult to read|clearly, extending it to encompassall the phrases in the corpus would soon lead to problems. It is for this reason that the completetaxonomy in Appendix B is divided into a number of separate diagrams when it is presented; seeSection 4.6.4.
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CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 126the exclusivity between and and it follows that.) However, the current set of featuresalready give good approximate denitions in most cases, and at very least serve toindicate the avour of the denitions which will eventually be reached.A larger set of composite denitions is given in Appendix D, this time in tabular form.Again, the denitions are not always complete, but they already begin to provide areasonable account of the variations between the phrases.6.4 The Mapping between Cue Phrases and RelationsIt is useful to sum up what has happened so far in the theoretical interpretationof the taxonomy. In Chapter 5, it was noted that the taxonomy lends itself wellto a conception of relations as collections of independent features, and some generalprinciples governing the motivation of features were put forward. In the rst partof this chapter, a number of features were systematically motivated by consideringsmall excerpts from the taxonomy one by one. In this section, the nal step in themethodology is considered: how the features should be combined to give a set ofcoherence relation denitions.Until now, the assumption has been that there will be a one-to-one correspondencebetween relations and the cue phrases at the leaves of the taxonomy. Cue phraseshigher up in the taxonomy do not correspond to `more general' relations, but are usedto signal some components of a relation in circumstances where the reader is able toinfer the others from context and background knowledge. We begin, therefore, bylooking at the cue phrases at the leaves of the taxonomy.6.4.1 An Uneven Distribution at the Leaves of the TaxonomyIt should be clear by now that even the most specic `leaf-level' cue phrases in thetaxonomy may still be undened with regard to certain features. For instance, asnoted in Section 6.2.5, if is undened for the anchor feature; but there are no phrasesbelow if to distinguish between the alternative values of this feature (cause-drivenand result-driven.) In fact, it may be that when all the features necessary to describethe taxonomy are found, few if any leaf-level phrases will be dened for every one ofthem.It might also be that when the possible combinations of feature values are investigatedmore extensively, some combinations will be found which are not signalled by any cuephrase, even a general one which requires feature values to be inferred. Again, thisremains an open question.In short, the phrases at the leaves of the taxonomy are unevenly distributed overthe space of possible feature value combinations. Some phrases, being undened forvarious features, can be used for a wide range of possible combinations; there mayalso be possible combinations which are not signalled by any cue phrase. The mappingbetween leaf-level phrases and possible feature value combinations is thus many-to-one,and incomplete.




the instantFigure 6.17: Some `Problem' Extracts from the Taxonomyhyponym is the instant, which in the example we can take to be a leaf node. Accordingto the current hypothesis, the instant, being a leaf node, signals all the features of someparticular relation: after is used to signal this same relation if the extra informationcarried by the instant is easily inferrable from context. The odd thing is, that thereshould never be any need to use the instant to signal the relation in question. Aftercan only ever mark one possible relation; that is the relation marked by the instant. Sowhy does the phrase the instant exist at all? If after could signal two dierent relations,then the instant's existence would be understandable: it would be used whenever theinformation to distinguish between these two relations was not inferrable (in whichcase after would not identify the relation). But there is just one relation in the presentcase: we know this because the instant has no sister phrases, and the whole rationaleof the taxonomy is that a cue phrase will exist for each relation.So we have a problem in trying to explain this type of pattern in the taxonomy. Infact, we have exactly the same type of problem with the pattern in 6.17 (ii), wherethe leaf nodes later on and thereafter are contingently intersubstitutable, and have acommon hypernym afterwards. It might be thought that in this case there are twodierent relations, picked out uniquely by later on and thereafter respectively. In thiscase, afterwards is able to signal either relation, provided that the information neededto distinguish between them is inferrable from context. However, the phrases later onand thereafter could not be used to pick out their respective relations uniquely: theyare contingently intersubstitutable, which means that in some contexts, they can besubstituted for one another. In these contexts, there are no cue phrases for identifyingeither relation exclusively; again, this goes against the rationale of the whole taxonomy.An alternative suggestion is that later on and thereafter signal the same relation butidentify dierent subsets of its features, making them suitable for use in dierentcontexts, when dierent features will be inferrable. On this hypothesis, afterwards isto be used to signal this same relation, in contexts where all those features unspecied
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 128by either later on or thereafter are safely inferrable. However, this makes the situationidentical to that in 6.17 (i): if there is just a single relation, there is no need for thephrases later on and thereafter at all.Patterns such as those illustrated in Figure 6.17 are common in the taxonomy, andsome explanation is called for. One explanation is that the relations which cue phrasessignal are not all associated with the cue phrases at the leaves of the taxonomy: someare associated with cue phrases at higher levels. In other words, some relations aremore abstract than others. This idea permits an explanation of patterns like those inFigure 6.17: in each case, the hypernymic phrases signal relations at a higher levelof abstraction, subsuming those relations signalled by the hyponymic phrases. Ourgeneral assumption that `for every relation there exists a cue phrase which uniquelyidenties it' now actually requires such hypernymic phrases to exist.To give an example: in Figure 6.17 (i) we can posit two relations; one signalled bythe leaf node phrase the instant, and another (this one more abstract) signalled by thehyponymic phrase after. The instant uniquely identies one particular relation. After,at another level of abstraction, picks out another relation: there is no other cue phrasewhich can pick out all the occurrences of this relation.It might be thought that this scenario permits a dierent kind of ambiguity: if a writeruses the hypernym after, in a situation where the relation associated with the instantcan be inferred from context, how would the reader know whether the more abstractor the less abstract relation is intended? Both would appear to be possible. However,more careful consideration about what an `abstract relation' is will show that this kindof `ambiguity' presents no real problem for the reader.Levels of Abstraction in Text ProcessingIn Chapter 3, when the conception of relations as cognitive constructs was being out-lined, Rosch's notion of the basic level of categorisation|the level of abstractionat which the trade-o between usefulness and generality is optimised|was invoked.Rosch suggested that humans would operate at this level when performing certaintasks with a heavy information-processing load. I argued that tasks like reading andwriting are likely to be mediated by constructs at a similar level of abstraction; andproposed to think of coherence relations as modelling such constructs.The hypothesis now under consideration, that `relations exist at dierent levels of ab-straction', is quite consistent with this conception of relations. A writer's information-processing load can vary considerably, reecting factors such as time pressure or thediculty of the task at hand. It is likely that as the information processing load varies,so too does the optimal level of abstraction at which the writer should operate: thehigher the load, the greater the degree of abstraction. To take an example: if thewriter has to produce a text in a hurry, or if the elements of the text plan are hard tomanipulate, then maybe the writer's planning operators should be less tightly dened.Likewise, if the writer's time constraints are relaxed, then more features of a relationcan be taken into account.Many researchers have postulated relations at dierent levels of abstraction (eg Maier
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 129and Hovy (1991), Hovy et al (1992), Mann and Thompson (1988)). But no-one hasyet come up with a clear reason for doing this. However, if we accept the argumenton which the present project is founded|that for any relation that people actuallyuse, there will exist a cue phrase which uniquely marks it|then we have a genuinemotivation for postulating the existence of relations at dierent levels of abstraction.And by drawing on the psychological conception of relations developed in Chapter 3,we have a way to understand why dierent levels of abstraction should ever be used.Motivating Relations from High-Level Cue PhrasesThe question of when a high-level cue phrase motivates a `more abstract' relation isstill to some extent an open one. Given patterns like those in Figure 6.17, we havedenite evidence for dierent levels of abstraction. But consider a pattern such as thatin Figure 6.18, where two sister leaf nodes are exclusive. Here, two possibilities can
on the other hand
whereas then againFigure 6.18: Exclusive Sister Leaf Nodesbe discerned. The original story was that on the other hand can signal two dierentrelations, which are identied uniquely by whereas and then again. But, in the light ofthe current discussion, it might also be that on the other hand corresponds directly toa `more abstract' relation. The answer to this question is a matter for further research.For the moment, I will assume that abstract relations are only motivated where patternssuch as those in Figure 6.17 are found. In cases such as that in Figure 6.18, no abstractrelation will be postulated.6.5 SummaryThis chapter has presented the beginnings of a feature-theoretical description of thetaxonomy of cue phrases. Eight two-valued features have been proposed to accountfor various dimensions of variation amongst the phrases in the taxonomy. Denitionsof the features are summarised in Appendix C, and a preliminary table of relationdenitions, expressed in terms of these features, is given in Appendix D.There remains much work to be done, of course. The taxonomy contains a vast amountof substitutability data, and only a small portion has been looked at. The features so farmotivated only cover some portions of the taxonomy. Moreover, feature denitions havebeen expressed at a relatively informal level: more precise denitions would certainly bepreferable, both from a theoretical point of view and as a precursor to implementation.Finally, a great deal more eort is needed to investigate all the possible combinations
CHAPTER 6. CREATING RELATION DEFINITIONS 130of the features presented here. Again, this is an area where much further work isrequired.All the same, the preliminary conclusions reported here will be useful as the foundationfor a more complete account of the phrases in the taxonomy. At very least, they serveas a convincing demonstration of the utility of the methodology being proposed. Inparticular, they provide good support for the decision taken in Chapter 5, to look fora completely productive set of features. The directions in which further progress canbe made are thus quite clearly indicated by the ideas developed in this chapter.
Chapter 7An Evaluation of theSubstitution MethodologyThis chapter contains a discussion of some of the potential problems with the substi-tution methodology proposed in Chapters 3 to 6.A rst problem relates to the substitutability test itself: there are some cases where itseems unable to provide the kind of clearcut data necessary to motivate a feature-basedaccount of relations. This problem will be discussed in Section 7.1; as a solution, anempirical test is suggested which promises a clearer picture about these cases.Two other problems concern the set of relations eventually motivated by the substi-tutability test|there are many respects in which the set of relations seems unable toprovide a complete coverage of texts. For one thing, it is not hard to nd pairs ofsentences or clauses in a coherent text for which no cue phrase at all seems appropri-ate. Since our set of relations is based on the set of cue phrases, such contexts arebeyond the scope of the theory. This problem is considered in Section 7.2; a solutionis proposed by appealing to the concept of focus as better suited for an explanationof these contexts.Finally, in Section 7.3, the question of relations between large sections of text is raised.It might be thought that cue phrases are only suitable for signalling relations at alow level of hierarchy in a text. However, it is argued that the presence of anaphoricelements in many cue phrases allows them in practice to signal relations between verylarge sections of text. A discussion of such `high-level' cue phrases proves to be ofrelevance to the issue of the interaction of theories of relations and of focus.7.1 Limitations of the Substitutability Test: The Case ofPresentational SequencesSome relationships in the taxonomy of cue phrases seem more clearcut than others.No-one, for instance, would claim that the phrases nevertheless and on the groundsthat are anything other than exclusive. However, in other cases, our intuitions seem131
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 132to be less certain. This is particularly so for decisions about phrases signalling whatsome researchers have called `presentational sequence'|phrases such as moreover, foranother thing and furthermore. For instance, consider the following examples:The Tories have done a terrible job ingovernment over the last decade. Theirearly policies led to huge unemployment.Their increasing isolationism over Europewasted a precious opportunity to gaininternational inuence. n Furthermore,? Later, o they reducedBritain to alaughing stockwith their`back tobasics'campaign. (7.1)Let us review the sequence of governmentalblunders during the past decade. Theirearly policies led to huge unemployment.Their increasing isolationism over Europewasted a precious opportunity to gaininternational inuence. n Later,? Furthermore, o they reducedBritain to alaughing stockwith their`back tobasics'campaign. (7.2)The taxonomy represents furthermore and later as exclusive, based on examples such asthese. The claim is that in Example 7.1, replacing furthermore with later changes thetext from an argument to a temporal sequence; and that in Example 7.2, replacing laterwith furthermore changes the text from a temporal sequence into an argument. Indeed,there does seem to be some kind of dierence between the texts. But nevertheless, itis still possible to imagine a writer replacing one phrase by the other. Certainly, it iseasier to imagine this than to imagine replacing nevertheless with on the grounds that.Another problematic case is given in Example 7.3; here, it is unclear whether or notwhereas can be replaced by furthermore.It's crazy to keep Bill and Bob in theirpresent positions: we should swap them.Bill is a better player in attack; n whereas? furthermore, o Bob is abetter playerin defence. (7.3)The original phrase seems to imply that there is only one reason why Bill and Bobshould be swapped, namely that they are better suited to each other's positions. Fur-thermore, on the other hand, suggests that there are two independent reasons whyBill and Bob should be swapped. Again, the dierence seems to be one of emphasis|ultimately, the same information is derivable from both texts|but there is nonethelessa dierence. Should this dierence be treated as theoretically signicant or not?The problem is that in order to answer this question, the tester has to stop being anormal reader/writer, and start being a `discourse analyst'. Should the alternativeversions of the text be given the same analysis, or dierent ones? Such questionsrequire the kind of `post-theoretical' intuitions which were called into question at thebeginning of the thesis in Section 1.3.2|we cannot be sure if they are reliable, andthere seems to be no way of resolving any disagreements which might occur. Ideally,therefore, the test for substitutability should not be relied on in such cases.




contrastFigure 7.1: The Simultaneous Representation Hypothesis for Texts 7.1{7.3Such an analysis seems to be espoused by Halliday and Hasan (1976). The followingexample is referred to:(7.4) Next, previously to this he had already oered to resign.The apparent contradiction in this sentence is explained by noting that two dierentkinds of sequence are being signalled; one internal (argumentative) and one exter-nal (temporal). Martin (1992) also suggests that internal and external relationscan apply simultaneously. Maier (1993) perhaps comes closest to espousing the viewoutlined above, giving analyses very similar to that in Figure 7.1. For Maier, further-more signals a textual relation, and whereas and later signal ideational relations, andthese two types of relation can co-occur in a text.7.1.2 The Dominant Representation HypothesisThe alternative to the simultaneous representation hypothesis can be referred to asthe dominant representation hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, there isa signicant dierence between a text marked with furthermore and one marked withwhereas or later, which makes both these latter phrases exclusive with the former.





evidenceFigure 7.2: The Dominant Representation Hypothesis for Texts 7.1{7.3This is the view taken by Mann and Thompson (1988): their schemas do not permitthe type of diagram shown above. It is also the view taken in this thesis. It willbe argued here that although the above texts can be analysed using simultaneousrelations, thinking of relations as modelling psychological constructs makes this analysisimplausible. It seems likely that for a reader or a writer, one of the relations will alwaysbe more relevant than the other, and will dominate a representation of the text. Thisis not to say that when one reading dominates, the alternative reading is not availableat all to the reader. Clearly, both the argumentative information and the temporal(or contrastive) information can be inferred from the text if it is considered with anyserious attention. It is only suggested that this does not typically happen in what wemight call `normal' reading or writing.This hypothesis can be supported on grounds of cognitive economy. Consider the caseof a writer planning the text in Example 7.1. The writer's intention is to persuadethe reader that the Tories have done a terrible job over the past decade. Her tacticfor achieving this goal is to state a series of facts, each of which will individually pushthe reader towards this conclusion. The writer's task is then to determine which factsfall into this category: in other words, she needs to nd a collection of facts whichstand in the relationship of pragmatic additivity with each other. Once she hasfound such facts, there is no need for her to ascertain anything else in order to pursueher strategy. In particular, it is not important to ask about the temporal orderingof the facts: communicating this information will not contribute towards the overallpersuasive goal.Now consider Example 7.2. Here, the overall goal (as set out in the rst sentence) isto present to the reader a sequence of events. In order for the writer to achieve thisgoal, she clearly needs to verify the temporal order of the events. However, it will notbe necessary to consider whether or not the events act as premises for some commonconclusion: this question is just not relevant to the writer's goals.Given these facts, it is plausible to suggest that writers concentrate on either thetemporal relation or the argumentative relation when constructing text. The readerof a text can be expected to have a similar bias one way or the other, given that he isreally trying to make a coherent representation of the text, which ultimately includes
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 135a representation of the writer's intentions.It might be objected to this account that the writer may not have a single overridingintention behind producing a piece of text. It is conceivable that she has two separateintentions; one to persuade the reader of a particular fact, and one to tell the readerabout a sequence of events. It thus makes sense to have a strategy for killing the twobirds with one stone in a single piece of text: in order to analyse this text, it will benecessary to represent both argumentative and temporal relations between its spans.Of course, it is possible to have two separate intentions simultaneously. To take anunrelated example: I can have an intention to buy an ice cream, and at the same timeone to write a letter to my parents. However, there is no reason to expect these twointentions to co-occur with particular regularity; and therefore no reason to expectthat any special strategy will have evolved to deal with them both in the same action.Likewise, there is no reason to expect a regular co-occurrence between the intention toconvey a temporal sequence of events and the intention to argue for a given conclusion.So, if we are interested in modelling the specialised strategies a writer can make useof for conveying intentions in a text, we are unlikely to need to represent a specialmechanism whereby both these intentions can be achieved simultaneously.7.1.3 An Experimental Design for Testing the two HypothesesWhatever the arguments put forward for the alternative hypotheses, it is unlikely thateither will be conclusive by itself. However, other empirical means for deciding betweenthem may be more promising. In this section, an experiment is outlined which forcesthe two hypotheses to make dierent measurable predictions.The Form of the ExperimentWe will begin by considering the case of Texts 7.1 and 7.2. The dominant representationhypothesis suggests that readers and writers concentrate on the argumentative relationor on the temporal relation. The simultaneous representation hypothesis suggests thatreaders and writers should be able to concentrate on both relations at the same time.To decide between these alternatives, a experiment is proposed in which subjects reada text containing both temporal and argumentative information, and then answerquestions which relate specically to one type of information or the other. Dierentreading conditions can be created by varying the cue phrase used in the text: further-more emphasises the argumentative information, while later emphasises the temporalinformation; nally, an unmarked version of the text is neutral between the two.The text used in the earlier examples can be adapted for this purpose. A neutralintroductory sentence is used, so that both furthermore and later result in coherent
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 136texts: The sequence of governmental blundersduring the past decade makes for interestingreading. Their early policies led to hugeunemployment. Their increasingisolationism over Europe wasted a preciousopportunity to gain international inuence. n p Later,p Furthermore, o they reducedBritain to alaughing stockwith their`back tobasics'campaign. (7.5)When the readers have read the text, they are asked to verify a number of statements,including the following pair:S1 The Tories were isolationists over Europe before `back to basics' was launched.S2 The Tories can be criticised on several grounds.The subjects' reaction times will be monitored, to give an indication of how easy theynd it to decide about these statements. We can then make comparisons betweenthe subjects' performance after reading one of the alternative marked texts, and theirperformance after reading the unmarked text.Predictions of the Two HypothesesIt seems reasonable to predict that the text using later will facilitate the verication ofS1 compared to the unmarked text; given that it makes explicit the temporal relationbetween the two propositions in question. Likewise, it seems reasonable to predict thatthe text with furthermore will help readers verify S2 more than the unmarked text. Theinteresting question is how the later text inuences the decision about S2, and how thefurthermore text inuences the decision about S1. The simultaneous representationsmodel in these cases predicts the null hypothesis; namely that verifying S2 will be just as easy after reading the later text as after reading theunmarked text; verifying S1 will be just as easy after reading the furthermore text as after readingthe unmarked text.These predictions follow from the claim that both the temporal and the argumentativerelations in the original text should be represented: they are independent aspects ofits meaning. By marking just one aspect, we should in no way be inhibiting the other,which should be just as clear as in the unmarked case.Dierent predictions are made by the dominant relation hypothesis: according to this,the explicit signalling of the temporal information will inhibit the representation of theargumentative information, and vice versa. Thus verifying S2 will be harder after reading the later text than after reading theunmarked text;
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 137 verifying S1 will be harder after reading the furthermore text than after readingthe unmarked text.If these predictions were borne out, there would be a good case for arguing that tem-poral and argumentative relations are thought of by the reader as real alternatives toeach other, and that they are not expected to co-occur. If the reader nds an explicittemporal marker, it actually prejudices him against looking for an argumentative read-ing; while if he nds an argumentative marker, it prejudices him against looking fora temporal reading. For this reason, it seems legitimate to represent the two mark-ers as exclusive in the taxonomy: they really provide the reader with contradictoryinformation.Testing the Hypotheses for Furthermore and WhereasA similar experiment can be set up to test the predictions made by the two hypothesesabout Example 7.3. This text can be given in three conditions; with whereas, withfurthermore, and with the neutral null cue phrase:It's crazy to keep Bill and Bob in theirpresent positions: we should swap them.Bill is a better player in attack;  ? whereas? furthermore,?  Bob is abetter playerin defence. (7.6)The statements to be veried in the subsequent decision task are now as follows:S1 Bill and Bob are dierent.S2 There are two reasons why we should swap Bill and Bob.Again, the dominant representation hypothesis would predict that the text with whereaswould slow down the subjects' response to S2 as compared with the null marker, whilethe text with furthermore would slow down the response to S1. The simultaneousrepresentation hypothesis would not predict slowed down responses.A Control Condition: Contingently Substitutable PhrasesIn the case of two phrases which are `genuinely' contingently substitutable, we wouldnot expect to nd one phrase inhibiting the reading signalled by the other. We couldthus run a control condition, using clearly contingently substitutable phrases like onceand as soon as (see Figure 7.3).
once as soon as
afterFigure 7.3: Contingently Substitutable Phrases
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 138Both phrases signal a temporal succession between the two related spans, but oncesignals in addition that they are related as cause and eect, while as soon as signalsin addition that the temporal succession is very rapid. As the following two examplesshow, as soon as can be used in non-causal contexts, and once can also be used wherethe temporal succession is not immediate:We got the fright of ourlives last night coming backfrom Sue's party.  As soon as# Oncep After  we had stepped out of thehouse, we heard a huge clapof thunder. (7.7) Once# As soon asp After  the war ended, the country's economy gradually improved. (7.8)Note that the phrase after, being a common hyponym, can be used in both contexts:it signals nothing in addition to the temporal succession relationship.In a context describing an immediate causal succession, a writer could use any one ofthe three phrases:The thieves didn't havelong to search Jones'apartment.  Afterp As soon asp Once  he had fallen asleep, theyset to work as fast as theycould. (7.9)In such a case, there are no niggling suspicions that by substituting as soon as for once(or vice versa) we are somehow contradicting a presupposition set up in the originaltext. It seems legitimate to talk about `causality' and `immediacy' as independent fea-tures of the reader's model of the text, which can both be represented simultaneously.If this is indeed the case, we would not expect that once actively inhibits the infor-mation about immediacy, or that as soon as inhibits the information about causality.Again, we could create decision tasks for subjects to test this prediction; for exampleabout the following alternative statements:S1 The thieves had to wait for Jones to fall asleep before they could search hisapartment.S2 The thieves searched Jones' apartment immediately after he fell asleep.Here, our predictions conform to the null hypothesis|that verifying S2 will be noharder after reading the once text than after reading the neutral after text; and thatverifying S1 will be no harder after reading the as soon as text than after reading theneutral text.7.1.4 A Revised Role for The Substitutability TestThis section has presented an empirical means of examining the substitutability rela-tionship between two cue phrases. In some cases, this seems to provide a better meansof investigating the relationship than the test for substitutability; it will be interestingto see what results are produced in these cases.
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 139However, the test for substitutability cannot be dispensed with in favour of this newmethod. There are still many cases where the test for substitutability provides clearinformation. More importantly, the experiment only works where the alternative cuephrases both lead to coherent texts|most of the time, this is not the case. For instance,it would be impossible to nd a context neutral between the phrases because andalthough, where the relations marked by both phrases are inferrable from the samecontext.7.2 Issues of Descriptive Adequacy: The Problems ofElaboration and BackgroundTwo further problems with the substitution methodology concern the descriptive cov-erage of the set of relations it eventually produces. One will be discussed in this section,and the other in Section 7.3.The rst problem is simple|many coherent pairs of clauses or sentences can be foundfor which no cue phrase at all seems appropriate. Given that all the relations in thenew set have their basis in the phrases that can signal them, this indicates that thenew relations do not by themselves provide a descriptively adequate account of text.A few examples can be given of contexts where no cue phrase can be used. Considerthe following cases:Dow Associates is one ofBritain's largest companies. 8<: # Indeed,# Specically,# Furthermore,# Incidentally, 9=; its head oce is inKensington, where Dowhimself presides. (7.10)The University is playinghost to the 4th VMconference on geochemistryin August. 8<: # Indeed,# Specically,# Furthermore,# Incidentally, 9=; Geochemistry helps in thesearch for minerals bylooking at the origins andnatural associations ofchemical elements andcompounds. (7.11)In these texts, it seems impossible to nd an appropriate cue phrase to t betweenthe two sentences. In each case, the best approach is simply to present the sentencesone after the other with no explicit cue. No doubt it is texts such as these which ledMann and Thompson to their claim that `some types of rhetorical relations have nocorresponding conjunctive signals'.The lack of a prototypical cue phrase is characteristic of two rst relations in particu-lar: elaboration and background. Text 7.10 illustrates the elaboration relation.The second sentence provides additional details about Dow Associates, and thus elabo-rates on the rst. Text 7.11 illustrates background. In order properly to understandthe rst sentence in this case, it is necessary to know what geochemistry is, so thisadditional information is provided in the second sentence. While it is sometimes hardto distinguish between elaboration and background, it seems that neither of themis associated with any cue phrases at all.11 Note that rst's elaboration can be signalled by relative clauses (Scott and de Souza (1990)):
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 1407.2.1 Re-Assessing the Cue Phrase HypothesisThe nding that there are some coherent contexts where no cue phrase is appropriatehas important consequences for the working hypothesis in this thesis, that a connectioncan be made between the set of cue phrases and the set of coherence relations. We areforced to choose between the following two possibilities: If coherence relations are required to provide a full account of text coherence ontheir own, then the hypothesis that we can use the set of cue phrases as evidencefor the set of relations is false. If we wish to maintain the hypothesis, then we have to introduce some othertheoretical mechanism alongside relations in order to account for contexts whereno cue phrase is appropriate.The question we need to ask now, of course, is whether there are any principled reasonsfor proposing dierent mechanisms for explaining the coherence of texts such as thosegiven above. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that there are such reasons,re-iterating that relations were only intended to model some aspects of the phenomenonof coherence, and suggesting that the coherence of texts such as 7.10 and 7.11 is betterexplained in terms of the metaphor of focus. I will argue that the lack of descriptiveadequacy shown by the new set of relations may actually be an advantage: it makesfor a less redundant account of the interaction of coherence relations and focusingphenomena in text.7.2.2 The Concept of Focus RevisitedThe concept of focus is also of central importance to a theory of coherence. To recapfrom Section 2.3: the notion of focus (eg Sidner (1983), Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein(1983), Brennan et al (1987), McCoy and Cheng (1991)) is used to model those entitiesin a text's domain of reference which are uppermost in a reader's mind as the text isbeing read. At any particular moment, certain entities are said to be `in focus'; focustheories are concerned to chart the constraints on how the focused entities can changefrom one portion of text to another.The concept of a potential focus list (Sidner (1983)) is commonly invoked in suchtheories. Every portion of a text is associated with a potential focus list, which speciesall the items to which the focus can legally shift in the next portion. Consider thefollowing three texts:(7.12) Dow Associates today launched a surprise bid for the beleaguered Harrisgroup. It started buying shares as soon as the market opened, and continuedbuying all day.Dow Associates, whose head oce is in Kensington, is one of Britain's largest companies.However, relative clauses and cue phrases are two very dierent kinds of syntactic resource. Spanslinked by relative clauses are embedded one within another; those linked by cue phrases are presentedconsecutively. Furthermore, relative clauses can only operate at low levels of hierarchy within a text;whereas cue phrases such as this is because can link quite large text spans.
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 141(7.13) Dow Associates today launched a surprise bid for the beleaguered Harrisgroup. Harris reacted speedily, holding an upbeat press conference.(7.14) Dow Associates today launched a surprise bid for the beleaguered Harrisgroup. Beans, which contain lots of protein, are good for you.In Text 7.12, the focused item in the rst sentence is Dow Associates, and this focusis preserved in the second sentence. Text 7.13 shifts its focus from Dow Associatesto Harris; since Harris is in the potential focus list associated with the rst sentence,this text is also coherent. However, the potential focus list does not contain the itembeans|so Text 7.14 is incoherent.The concept of focus has proved useful primarily for modelling the pattern of anaphorain a text. For instance, it can explain how it is that the focused item in Text 7.12 canbe pronominalised, but those in Texts 7.13 and 7.14 cannot be|essentially, an itemcan only be pronominalised if it is already in focus. Focus theories have been usedsuccessfully for resolving anaphora (Sidner, 1983) and for generating it (Dale, 1988,1988).7.2.3 Relations and Focus: Two Overlapping MetaphorsIn the present context, the important point to note is that an account of focus seemsto touch on phenomena which a theory of coherence relations might also be called onto explain. For instance, a theory of focus might equally well be used to explain thecoherence of texts such as 7.10 and 7.11, which are presently explained respectively interms of the elaboration and background relations. Conversely, the elaborationrelation seems appropriate for analysing Texts 7.12 and 7.13, while no relation seemsappropriate for the incoherent Text 7.14.Much of the overlap between theories of relations and of focus can be traced to therelations of elaboration and background. The rst denitions for these relationsmake explicit reference to `objects' being elaborated, and `elements' for which furtherbackground is required; in this respect, they are unlike any other rst relations. It isthus clear how such relations might be re-described in terms of the focus metaphor.In fact, the overlap between the focus metaphor and the elaboration relation isonly partial. The denition for elaboration identies several sub-types of rela-tion, not all of which are elaborations of objects. The sub-relations whole-part,object-attribute and set-member seem clearly to involve a notion of an entitybeing elaborated on. However, the sub-relations abstract-instance, process-stepand generalisation-specific elaborate not on entities but on propositions. It shouldbe noted that for these latter species of elaboration, cue phrases can readily be found:abstract-instance can be signalled by for instance; process-step can be signalledby to do this or by; and generalisation-specific can be signalled by specically orto be precise.A clear dierence seems to be emerging between those relations which can be markedby cue phrases|which hold between propositions|and those which cannot be markedby cue phrases|which could just as well be thought of as focusing phenomena. The
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elaborationFigure 7.4: A Poorly Structured Textpoorly structured. The problem is with the last sentence, which returns to a topic whichhad apparently been closed. (It would be more appropriate to include the material fromthis sentence next to the material about Dow's trading company.) The sentence in itspresent position can nevertheless be described as an elaboration on the rst clause|it gives additional information about Dow, which is the only requirement specied bythe relation.It thus seems that the elaboration relation is overly permissive. Note, however, thatif we are only using relations to analyse texts, then leaving out elaboration resultsin a theory which is overly restrictive. For instance, how could we describe Text 7.15in relational terms, except by saying that the second sentence elaborates on the rst?(7.15) Dow Associates is one of Britain's largest companies. Its head oce is inKensington.
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 143Given that elaboration is the most commonly used relation in text analyses (cf.Mann (1984), p372), we must conclude that there are important aspects of text coher-ence which do not lend themselves well to description in terms of relations.Problems with a purely focus-based account.There are also problems with the focus metaphor when used by itself to model textcoherence. Consider Text 7.16:(7.16) Last year must have been hard for Dow. Oil prices fell by 20%.This text is clearly coherent, but it seems to contain a sharp focus shift: from Dow andlast year to oil prices. In order to account for shifts such as these, focus theorists areforced to abstract away from entities referred to explicitly in a text when creating thepotential focus list, and add references to properties or features associated with theseitems. For instance, Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein allow that entities which are `elementsof the situation' described by an utterance are members of the potential focus list.This would permit them to include the fall of oil prices in the list associated with therst sentence of Text 7.16.However, such abstractions seem to make the focus shifting mechanism itself too per-missive: clearly, it will not always be the case that a text's focus can move from last yearto oil prices. It seems more appropriate to explain coherence in a case like Text 7.16in relational terms, for instance by identifying the second sentence as a justificationfor the rst. Coherence in this text is due to the rhetorical force of the second sentence,not to any general tendency to shift from one topic to another.SummaryTo sum up thus far: there are some aspects of coherence that seem best described interms of rhetorical relations, and other aspects that seem best described in terms offocus. However, there is also a signicant overlap between the phenomena describedby the two metaphors. This leads to what we can term the redundancy problem:in a full account of coherence, it is likely that much information is expressed twice.The redundancy problem is symptomatic of a second, more fundamental problem withrelations and focus, which we can call the grounding problem. The problem withthe two metaphors is that they are too expressive: theorists are free to use them tomodel as much or as little as they want. What is needed, therefore, are empirically-grounded conceptions of relations and focus which allow us to specify in advance whatis to count as a relation or a focused entity.7.2.5 Recent Attempts to Link Relations and FocusMany discourse theorists have appreciated the need to integrate relational and focus-based approaches for a full account of coherence. Two strategies which have beensuggested are discussed in this section.
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 144Grosz and Sidner's (1986) theory presents one inuential hypothesis|that the rela-tional structure of a text has a role in determining shifts in focus. The dominancerelations in a text, which model the hierarchy of the writer's goals, are used duringits interpretation to determine pushes and pops of a focus stack. The concept of a`potential focus list' does not feature in this model; its work is done by the intentionalstructure of the text. Abrupt changes of focus such as that illustrated in Text 7.16therefore present no problems. However, as has already been noted in Section 2.4.3,the level of detail of this theory does present problems, in particular when it is usedas the basis for automatic text processing applications.Of the recent text planning systems to have incorporated both relational and focusingdevices, the most notable are those of McKeown (1985), Hovy and McCoy (1989),and Hovy et al (1992). These are all characterised by their use of relations and focusas multiple simultaneous constraints on coherence. As a text is built, each newelement is tted into an appropriate rhetorical structure, and is also checked withadjacent elements to ensure that a legal focusing move is made. While this strategycertainly guarantees text conforming to both relational and focusing constraints, it isnot guaranteed to be ecient: the large overlap between relations and focus meansthat, in all likelihood, many constraints are being checked twice.7.2.6 A New Proposal about the Interaction of Relations and FocusIn order to overcome the redundancy and grounding problems, we need to developindependent conceptions of relations and focus, which model clearly separable aspectsof discourse coherence, and which can be empirically motivated.The new set of relations is promising as the basis for such a model. We have already seenhow elaboration and background are responsible for much of the overlap betweenrelations and focus, and how elaboration is overly permissive in its own right. Thenew set of relations, in which the exclusion of elaboration and background aremotivated on independent grounds, seems a good starting point for a joint model ofrelations and focus.As was mentioned in Section 2.3, a theory of relations goes hand in hand with atheory of span structure, which species whereabouts in a coherent text relationsare expected to be found. The theory of span structure determines those points in atext where coherence is to be attributed to relations, and consequently, those partsof a text where coherence is to be accounted for by other devices. As was argued inSection 7.2.4, there are good reasons for adopting a theory of span structure whichdoes not force relations to do all the explanatory work.Based on the present conception of relations, a new suggestion about the interactionof relations and focus can be made. The principal claim is that text coherence whereno cue phrase can be used is better explained with the focus metaphor than with therelational metaphor. If one clause elaborates on another, the focus is likely to remainthe same, or to shift to some other item that has been explicitly mentioned in the text.A specic hypothesis can be advanced:H1 Where there is no coherence relation between two text units|i.e. where no cue
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 145phrase appears and none can be inserted|coherence is ensured by focusingconstraints.It should now be possible to give the term focusing constraints a much more concreteinterpretation; one that can be grounded in surface textual phenomena. (A simplistichypothesis could be, for instance, that when no cue phrase is appropriate between twospans, the entity in focus in the second span must appear as a lexical item in the rstspan. Of course this hypothesis is likely to need renement, for example to accountfor phenomena such as bridging references.) We can also propose a hypothesis abouthow coherence is preserved between text units which are linked by relations:H2 Focusing constraints are not needed to ensure coherence between text units linkedby relations.The main new idea in these hypotheses is that relations and focusing constraints ac-count not just for dierent aspects of a text, but dierent portions of it. To ensurea text is coherent, it is not necessary that there be a relation between every pair ofadjacent text units; but where there is no relation, separate constraints on focus mustbe met. Conversely, where there is a relation, focusing constraints are not needed toensure coherence. This idea diers from existing models of coherence, in which re-lational and focusing constraints apply simultaneously at every point in a text. Byusing relations and focus to model dierent portions of text, the new model presentsan appealing solution to the redundancy problem. Moreover, since it permits a moreconcrete conception of focusing constraints, it addresses the grounding problem as well.There thus seem to be good reasons for proposing an account where relations and focusinteract in the way proposed above. However, it should be borne in mind that theseare only suggestions, and that much further research is required to explore them indetail. Meanwhile, we should reiterate that the hypothesis proposed in this thesis,of a connection between cue phrases and coherence relations, is contingent on thesesuggestions proving fruitful.7.3 Relations at Dierent Levels of HierarchyA nal potential problem with the substitution methodology concerns the issue ofrelations between large sections of text. The idea that relations can apply betweentext units of any size was noted as one of their attractive features. In many theories ofrelations, structures as large as entire paragraphs are linked together by relations. Thehierarchical, recursive analyses which result from this conception of relations makeit attractive from a computational point of view, and also from the standpoint oftheoretical parsimony.It may seem that the decision to associate relations with cue phrases threatens to tiethem to text spans of a particular size. For instance, the cue phrase because is bestsuited for joining two clauses within a single sentence:(7.17) Mary was in a good mood, because she had passed her exam.
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 146While it is possible to use because in more complex sentences, it is often inappropriateto use the phrase to link units larger than clauses. Consider Text 7.18:(7.18) Mary was in a good mood. Because she had passed her exam.While some such texts may border on acceptability, because is not commonly used tolink whole sentences, and would probably lead to incoherence if used to link units ofseveral sentences.Other cue phrases such as nevertheless are better able to link whole sentences. However,the problem with such phrases is essentially the same: there is always a limit to thesize of spans which they are suitable for joining. For instance, we would not expectto nd the word nevertheless linking whole chapters of a book, or even sections of anarticle. How can the current theory of relations deal with relations between large unitsof this kind?An answer is suggested here which draws on the fact that cue phrases can containanaphoric elements.7.3.1 Cue Phrases and Propositional AnaphoraThe test for cue phrases as outlined in Section 4.2 permits phrases which containpropositional anaphora, such as this is because, or following this. This decision isjustied in two ways. Firstly, though the test for cue phrases calls for the replacement ofall anaphoric elements by their antecedents, in the case of these phrases the replacementrenders the outcome of the test a foregone conclusion|when the antecedent is used,the two clauses originally related are eectively re-expressed in a single clause, whichcan therefore stand on its own. For instance, consider what happens when the test isapplied to the following isolated clause:(7.19) Because of this, Mary was in a good mood.Replacing this by a non-anaphoric NP would result in something of the following form:(7.20) Because of the fact that she had passed her exam, Mary was in a good mood.Text 7.20, unlike Text 7.19, does not need additional context to be interpreted.The second reason for allowing anaphora in cue phrases is that many simple connectiveshave evolved from more complex expressions containing anaphora. As has been notedby Halliday and Hasan (1976), the etymology of words like therefore and thereby showsthat they derive from phrases containing anaphora.If simple propositional anaphora such as this and that are used, the resulting cuephrases are still inappropriate for signalling very large relations; readers tend not tolook for antecedents beyond the previous sentence. However, if more specic anaphoricexpressions are used, antecedents can be further away. Consider the following text:
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 147(7.21) Although the developers had scheduled construction to begin in January, animportant archaeological nd was made while the foundations were beingdug. A dig has quickly been organised to make the most of the nd; headingthe investigation is Professor W Percus, an authority on Roman Britain.Because of this discovery, the building has been delayed several months. Itis now unlikely to be nished on time. . .In this example, the cue phrase because of this discovery can be seen as signalling arelation between two whole paragraphs. It should be clear how such expressions couldbe used to link even larger sections of text.7.3.2 Dierent Relations at Dierent Levels?The substitutability test deliberately ignores the issue of span size when comparingtwo phrases. It is possible, for instance, that two phrases are classed as synonymouseven though they are suitable for linking spans of dierent sizes. So it remains an openquestion whether the set of relations used at low levels of hierarchy is the same as thatused for higher levels. For the most part, the examples in this thesis have been ofrelations between single sentences or single clauses; whether the same set of relationsemerges with larger texts is a matter for further investigation.Nevertheless, some observations can already be made. As was noted in Section 4.3.2,many cue phrases can be systematically modied to include anaphora|for instance,in contrast becomes in contrast to this; instead becomes instead of this; as a resultbecomes as a result of this.An interesting link can also be noted between the devices used to signal relations athigh levels and those which perform the same function within single clauses. Considerthe following texts:(7.22) Because of this problem, the experiment failed.(7.23) Because of a small leak in the hydraulic system, the experiment failed.In Text 7.22, this problem refers back to some previously described proposition, anda large relation appears to be signalled. However, in Text 7.23, the problem is beingdescribed for the rst time|in eect, a causal relation is being signalled inside a singleclause. Note that the only dierence between the two clauses is whether or not thenoun phrase is interpreted as anaphoric.7.3.3 Relations, Focus and NominalisationThe use of nominalisation to refer to previous propositions places texts such as 7.22within the scope of a theory of focus. Are we to interpret this clause as one span ofa high-level cause relation, or should we consider it simply as an additional state-ment about a topic introduced earlier? The fact that an anaphoric expression can beproduced, and correctly interpreted, might be taken as support for the focus-based
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY 148account. However, propositional anaphora are rather dierent from nominal or verbalanaphora. They introduce a meta-level of description: the propositions in which theyappear are not about objects in the domain of reference, but about propositions aboutthese objects.Nonetheless, it is implausible that all predications about propositions should be inter-preted as `indicators of text structure'. Predications do not have to provide the sortof information given by relations. Consider the following text:(7.24) Due to a leak in the hydraulic system, the experiment failed. The problemwas spotted by a junior lab assistant.We would not want to suggest that this is an instance of a relation called spotted-by.In many cases, therefore, it remains unclear how a joint theory of relations and focuswould handle texts containing nominalisations. Perhaps it would be best to leave adecision about such cases until a detailed theory of the interaction of relations andfocus has been established for more concrete texts. However, if this theory did notlead to a clear distinction between relational and focusing phenomena in these moreabstract cases, this would certainly tell against it.7.4 SummaryThis chapter has discussed in some detail three potential problems with the substitutionmethodology. Firstly, a limitation with the substitutability test was noted|in somecases it appears to draw on post-theoretical intuitions. For these cases, an alternativemethod for investigating substitutability relationships was suggested, based on an em-pirical study of subjects' response times. Secondly, contexts were presented where nocue phrase is appropriate, and hence in the current model no relation is present. It wassuggested that these contexts are better explained in terms of the focus metaphor, andthe outlines of a joint theory of relations and focus were sketched. Finally, the ques-tion of relations between large sections of text was raised. It was partially answered bynoting the existence of cue phrases containing propositional anaphora, which are ableto link quite large sections of text. The possibility of focusing mechanisms applying atthese high levels was also discussed.Clearly, all of these issues call for further investigation. However, none of the objectionsraised should yet be seen as fatal to the theory being proposed in this thesis. On thecontrary, they all suggest interesting new avenues of research.
Chapter 8Conclusions8.1 A Summary of the ThesisThis thesis addresses an important problem for theories of discourse coherence: thelack of a standard, well-motivated set of discourse relations. While the general ideaof coherence relations has proved extremely useful in many theories and many textprocessing applications, no solid conception has emerged about what it is that relationsactually represent, or how to go about dening them.The solution proposed in this thesis rests on a conception of relations as modellingpsychological constructs operative in writers and readers when they are processingtext. This conception is eshed out with reference to Rosch's notion of the basic levelof categorisation, and to the notion of action schemata as used in theories of skilledtask performance.It is argued that evidence for these constructs can be sought in a study of the connec-tive cue phrases found in a given language. If relations are actually communicatedbetween the writer of a text and its reader, then it makes sense for there to be resourcesin the language for signalling relations explicitly. While relations can sometimes beinferred by the reader from context and background knowledge, there is no reason tosuppose that any relation exists which will always be thus inferrable.Based on these arguments, a methodology is proposed for justifying a set of relations.The methodology centres around two simple linguistic tests. The rst is a test forcue phrases, which is used to gather a corpus of some 200 cue phrases from a sampleof naturally-occurring text. The second is a test for substitutability, which is usedto organise the corpus of cue phrases into a hierarchical taxonomy. This taxonomyis created without buying into any particular theory of discourse, but it provides anextremely rich source of information from which such a theory can be motivated.The taxonomy lends itself to a conception of relations as feature-based constructs.The substitutability relationships in the taxonomy each have a natural feature-theoreticinterpretation, which means that extracts from the taxonomy can be used separately tomotivate the individual features which are the components of relations. Some guidelinesfor creating feature denitions are laid down, and a number of specic denitions are149
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 150then motivated one by one. The features eventually motivated prove useful in analysinga wide range of cue phrases.The set of relation denitions is conceived as an overlay on the set of cue phrasedenitions. There remains some work to be done in deciding exactly how to mapone set onto the other; but in any case, most of the `hard work' will have been doneonce the cue phrase denitions are completed. At this point, all of the importantdimensions of variation for relations will have been established, and it will just be aquestion of deciding whether or not each cue phrase is in one-to-one correspondencewith a relation. Some guidelines for answering this nal question have been set out.8.2 The Contributions of the ThesisThe thesis delivers on two levels. Its most tangible contribution is the table of cuephrase denitions set out in Appendix D. These denitions can be taken to form thebasis for a new set of relations to be implemented in text processing applications, orused by discourse theorists as the basis for further research. The new denitions diersignicantly from existing sets, and contain some novel ideas. While several studiessuggest that relations are composite constructs, this is the rst to propose a set ofindependent features to analyse them, in which the order of the decisions about featurevalues is not constrained. Moreover, the feature denitions are expressed in relativelysimple terms|representing alternative feature values is often just a matter of choosingdierent bindings between variables|and they should eventually lend themselves wellto implementation. Some of the feature denitions are innovative extensions of existingwork; in particular the new semantic/pragmatic distinction and the new distinctionbetween positive and negative polarity. Finally, the use of defeasible causal andinductive rules in the denitions is promising as part of an account of how relationsare grounded in more general principles of cognitive economy. The new denitions arethus in tune with the suggestion in Hobbs' opening quote, that coherence relationsshould be thought of as `instantiations in discourse comprehension of more generalprinciples of coherence that we apply in attempting to make sense of the world we ndourselves in'.However, the main purpose of the thesis is not to put forward a completely worked-out set of relation denitions. It is rather to consider the question of how a set ofrelations should be justied in the rst place. The primary contribution of the thesisis the methodology proposed for motivating a set of relation denitions; the denitionsthemselves are intended rst and foremost as an implementation of this methodology.As such, they can certainly be contested. The corpus of cue phrases can likely beenlarged with new phrases. Exceptions might be found to some of the relationships inthe current taxonomy. The relationships in the taxonomy might be better modelledby altering the set of features. Such changes, made within the framework of the testsfor cue phrases and for substitutability, do not damage the substance of the thesis.Indeed, the tests provide a useful forum for discussion about the set of relations. If thesubstitution methodology is accepted, then disagreements about relation denitionsbecome disagreements about the interpretation of concrete linguistic examples, ratherthan about intangible rst principles.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 1518.3 The Substitution Methodology: A Balanced VerdictThe thesis therefore stands or falls on an assessment of the substitution methodology.Such an assessment can be made from several dierent standpoints, which will beconsidered below in turn.8.3.1 The Arguments for the MethodologyFirstly, the arguments on which the methodology rests can be evaluated. The mainargument is that the cue phrases in a language will tell us about the mechanismsused by readers and writers of that language. As noted in Section 3.6.1, it is unusualto propose an investigation of psychological mechanisms by any means other thanpsychoplogical experiments. However, experiments which investigate psychologicallyreal relations must make hypotheses about the behavioural indicators of relations, andthese hypotheses are themselves contentious. It is notoriously dicult to interpret thebehaviour of, say, a writer, in terms of a theory of writing. Faced with this diculty,it is surely permissible to look at the medium in which writing and reading occur|namely language|to nd out something about these tasks. Language is not adoptedarbitrarily by those who read and write; its evolution is inseparable from that of thetasks themselves. It would be surprising if it did not contain valuable informationabout how the tasks are performed.This is not to say that the substitution methodology obviates the need for empiricalexperiments on readers and writers. On the contrary, the two approaches complementeach other. The arguments used to support the substitution methodology also actto legitimise the use of cue phrases as an experimental window on relations. Andtheorising about the substitutability relationships in the taxonomy can be thought ofas a systematic way of generating experimental hypotheses to test.8.3.2 The Practicability of the MethodologyThe practicability of the substitution methodology should also be considered. Are thetests easy to use? Do dierent testers come to the same conclusions? The approach inthis thesis has been to assume that they will|in keeping with much work in linguistics,the examples of the operation of the tests are presented on the assumption that readerswill agree with them. However, it would be a good idea to put this assumption to thetest in an experiment comparing the decisions of several testers in particular cases. Inthe case of the substitutability test, a fairly high degree of consensus is predicted. Nev-ertheless, in cases where there is disagreement, we can resort to the kind of experimentdescribed in Section 7.1.3, which examines the inuence of alternative cue phrases onthe time taken to answer dierent questions about a text.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 1528.3.3 The Results of the MethodologyFinally, the substitution methodology can be assessed by looking at the set of relationswhich it serves to justify.A key result of the methodology is the motivation of a feature-theoretic approach torelation denitions. Most previous classications of relations have taken one particulardimension of variation to be dominant|the `top level' of classication varies fromtheory to theory, as was shown in Chapter 2, but successive classications do not seemto improve on one another.The taxonomy of cue phrases prompts a dierent categorisation of relations. Severaldimensions of variation are identied, but no single dimension is taken to be dominant.A conception of relations as unstructured collections of features falls quite naturallyout of the taxonomy of cue phrases, where nearly all of the variation between phrasesis found at the lowest levels. This feature-based classication promises to provide amuch better t for the data. What is more, the only other study starting from aconception of relations as cognitive constructs (that of Sanders et al) also suggeststheir decomposition into orthogonal features, and does so on independent grounds.The job of deciding on a set of features which make sense for all the various kinds ofphrase in the taxonomy is, of course, a very dicult one. Some interesting generalisa-tions have been noted in this thesis, but much work still remains to be done before asatisfactory set of features is produced. However, we have tried to avoid the temptationof concentrating on small subsets of phrases, and analysing these in isolation. Whileuseful results can be obtained in this way, it is hoped that the ndings in this thesistestify to the benets of seeking a theory with much broader coverage.The set of relations must also eventually be assessed in terms of its descriptive adequacyin describing coherent text. It is perhaps here that the main question mark about themethodology lies. As was noted in Section 7.2, the descriptive adequacy of the set ofrelations cannot be determined until an accompanying theory of focus is provided. Itwas argued that a theory of relations should not be saddled with all the explanatorywork in a theory of discourse coherence; a theory of focus should also be involved toaccount for pairs of text segments whose relationship cannot be made explicit by anycue phrase. It remains to be seen whether such a theory can be devised, and how wellthe theories of relations and focus would interact. Clearly, this is a matter for furtherresearch.8.4 Towards a Complete Account of Discourse CoherenceThe present theory of relations is thus only a partial theory of discourse coherence.However, it provides a solid foundation on which a complete account can be based.Specic hypotheses have been proposed about the segments of a discourse which will beexplained by relations|those which can be linked by cue phrases|and hence, aboutthe parts of a discourse which some other metaphor will have to explain.The emphasis has been on producing a compact theory whose constructs are system-
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 153atically justiable. Every relation is justied in precisely the same way: it is composedof a number of features, each of which is motivated in the same way from the sub-stitutability relationships in the taxonomy of cue phrases. These relationships are inturn based on the pre-theoretical judgements of ordinary readers and writers.The analysis of texts in terms of the theory is similarly grounded in pre-theoreticaldecisions. The decision about whether a relation applies between two spans of textis based on the decision about whether a particular cue phrase is appropriate to linkthem; it does not require the intuitions of a discourse analyst. Once the decisionhas been made, however, the complex denition of the relation provides a wealth oftheoretical information about the discourse at that point, representing the intentionswhich underlie it, and the states in the world and the reader's world model which arerequisite for their accomplishment.The theory of relations is based on an analysis of a well-delineated class of textualphenomena. By examining how these phenomena are used by ordinary readers andwriters, an extremely informative account of text is produced. It remains to be seenwhether a theory of focus can be developed to similar standards.
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Appendix AThe Corpus of Cue PhrasesThis appendix contains a list of the English cue phrases on which the classicationof relations is to be based. Each phrase in the corpus passes the test for cue phrasesset out in Section 4.2. The majority of the phrases were gathered systematically inthe analysis of `academic' discourse reported in Section 4.3; however, for the sake ofcompleteness, several phrases which were discovered after the analysis have also beenincluded (and identied as such).The cue phrases are listed in alphabetical order in the table below; there are around 350in all. The three columns in the table contain respectively a cue phrase, its syntacticcategory (though this is sometimes tricky to determine), and whether the phrase wasfound in the initial corpus analysis.Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisabove all Conj-adverb Yesaccordingly Conj-adverb Yesactually Conj-adverb Yesadmittedly Conj-adverb Yesafter Conj-adverb Yesafter Subordinator Yesafter all Conj-adverb Yesafter that Conj-adverb Yesafterwards Conj-adverb Yesagain Conj-adverb Yesall in all Conj-adverb Yesall the same Conj-adverb Yesalso Conj-adverb Yesalternatively Conj-adverb Yesalthough Subordinator Yesalways assuming that Subordinator Yesand Coordinator Yes161
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 162Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisand/or Coordinator Yesanother time Conj-adverb Noanyway Conj-adverb Yesapart from that Prep Phrase Noas Subordinator Yesas a consequence Conj-adverb Yesas a corollary Conj-adverb Yesas a result Conj-adverb Yesas it happened Conj-adverb Noas it is Conj-adverb Noas it turned out Conj-adverb Noas long as Subordinator Yesas luck would have it Conj-adverb Noas soon as Subordinator Yesas well Conj-adverb Yesat any rate Conj-adverb Yesat rst Conj-adverb Yesat rst blush Conj-adverb Yesat rst sight Conj-adverb Yesat rst view Conj-adverb Yesat last Conj-adverb Noat least Conj-adverb Noat once Conj-adverb Noat that Prep Phrase Noat the moment when Subordinator Yesat the outset Conj-adverb Yesat the same time Conj-adverb Yesat which point Prep Phrase Noback Adverb Nobecause Subordinator Yesbefore Conj-adverb Yesbefore Subordinator Yesbefore long Conj-adverb Nobefore then Prep Phrase Nobefore. . . ever Subordinator Nobesides Conj-adverb Nobut Coordinator Yesbut then Coordinator Noby all means Conj-adverb Noby and by Conj-adverb Noby comparison Conj-adverb Yesby contrast Conj-adverb Yesby the same token Conj-adverb Yes
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 163Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisby the time Subordinator Noby the way Conj-adverb Yesby then Prep Phrase Nocertainly Conj-adverb Yesclearly Conj-adverb Yescome to think of it Conj-adverb Noconsequently Conj-adverb Yesconsidering that Subordinator Noconversely Conj-adverb Yescorrespondingly Conj-adverb Yesdespite this Conj-adverb Yesdespite the fact that Subordinator Yeseach time Subordinator Noearlier Conj-adverb Yeseither Conj-adverb Yeselse Coordinator Yesequally Conj-adverb Yesespecially because Subordinator Noespecially if Subordinator Noespecially when Subordinator Noessentially, then Conj-adverb Yeseven Conj-adverb Yeseven after Subordinator Noeven before Subordinator Noeven if Subordinator Yeseven so Conj-adverb Yeseven then Conj-adverb Yeseven though Subordinator Yeseven when Subordinator Noeventually Conj-adverb Yesever since Conj-adverb Noevery time Subordinator Yeseverywhere Subordinator Noexcept Conj-adverb Yesexcept after Subordinator Noexcept before Subordinator Noexcept if Subordinator Noexcept insofar as Subordinator Yesexcept when Subordinator Nofailing that Conj-adverb Nonally Conj-adverb Yesrst Conj-adverb Yesrst of all Conj-adverb Yes
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 164Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisrstly Conj-adverb Yesfollowing this Conj-adverb Nofor Subordinator Yesfor a start Conj-adverb Yesfor another thing Conj-adverb Yesfor example Conj-adverb Yesfor fear that Subordinator Nofor instance Conj-adverb Yesfor one thing Conj-adverb Yesfor one, Conj-adverb Nofor that matter Conj-adverb Nofor the simple reason Subordinator Yesfor this reason Conj-adverb Yesfortunately Conj-adverb Nofrom then on Prep Phrase Nofurther Conj-adverb Yesfurthermore Conj-adverb Yesgiven that Subordinator Yeshaving said that Conj-adverb Nohence Conj-adverb Yeshowever Conj-adverb Yeshowever Subordinator NoI mean Phr.w/scomp Noif Subordinator Yesif ever Subordinator Yesif not Conj-adverb Yesif only Subordinator Yesif so Conj-adverb Yesin a dierent vein Conj-adverb Yesin actual fact Conj-adverb Yesin addition Conj-adverb Yesin any case Conj-adverb Yesin case Subordinator Yesin conclusion Conj-adverb Yesin contrast Conj-adverb Yesin doing this Prep Phrase Noin fact Conj-adverb Yesin other respects Prep Phrase Noin other words Conj-adverb Yesin particular Conj-adverb Yesin short Conj-adverb Yesin so doing Prep Phrase Noin spite of that Conj-adverb Yes
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 165Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisin sum Conj-adverb Yesin that Subordinator Noin that case Conj-adverb Yesin that respect Prep Phrase Noin the beginning Conj-adverb Yesin the case of X Conj-adverb Yesin the end Conj-adverb Yesin the event Conj-adverb Noin the rst place Conj-adverb Yesin the hope that Subordinator Noin the meantime Conj-adverb Yesin this way Conj-adverb Yesin truth Conj-adverb Noin turn Conj-adverb Yesin which case Prep Phrase Noinasmuch as Subordinator Yesincidentally Conj-adverb Yesindeed Conj-adverb Yesinitially Conj-adverb Yesinsofar as Subordinator Noinstantly Conj-adverb Noinstead Conj-adverb Yesit follows that Phr.w/scomp Yesit is because Phr.w/scomp Noit is only because Phr.w/scomp Noit might appear that Phr.w/scomp Yesit might seem that Phr.w/scomp Yesjust Conj-adverb Nojust as Subordinator Yesjust then Conj-adverb Nolargely because Subordinator Nolast Conj-adverb Yeslastly Conj-adverb Yeslater Conj-adverb Yeslest Subordinator Nolet us assume Phr.w/scomp Yeslikewise Conj-adverb Yesluckily Conj-adverb Nomainly because Subordinator Nomeanwhile Conj-adverb Yesmerely Conj-adverb Yesmerely because Subordinator Yesmind you Conj-adverb No
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 166Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysismore Xly Conj-adverb Yesmoreover Conj-adverb Yesmost Xly Conj-adverb Yesmuch as Subordinator Nomuch later Conj-adverb Yesmuch sooner Conj-adverb Yesnaturally Conj-adverb Yesneither is it the case Phr.w/scomp Yesnevertheless Conj-adverb Yesnext Conj-adverb Yesnext time Subordinator Nono doubt Conj-adverb Yesno sooner than Subordinator Nononetheless Conj-adverb Yesnot Conj-adverb Yesnot because Conj-adverb Yesnot only Conj-adverb Yesnot that Conj-adverb Yesnotably Conj-adverb Yesnotwithstanding that Subordinator Yesnotwithstanding that, Conj-adverb Yesnow Conj-adverb Nonow Subordinator Yesnow that Subordinator Yesobviously Conj-adverb Yesof course Conj-adverb Yeson balance Conj-adverb Noon condition that Subordinator Yeson one hand Conj-adverb Yeson one side Conj-adverb Yeson the assumption that Subordinator Yeson the contrary Conj-adverb Yeson the grounds that Subordinator Yeson the one hand Conj-adverb Yeson the one side Conj-adverb Yeson the other hand Conj-adverb Yeson the other side Conj-adverb Yeson top of this Conj-adverb Yesonce Subordinator Yesonce again Conj-adverb Yesonce more Conj-adverb Yesonly Conj-adverb Noonly after Subordinator No
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 167Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisonly because Subordinator Noonly before Subordinator Noonly if Subordinator Noonly when Subordinator Noor Coordinator Yesor again Coordinator Noor else Coordinator Yesoriginally Conj-adverb Nootherwise Conj-adverb Yesoverall Conj-adverb Yesparticularly because Subordinator Noparticularly if Subordinator Noparticularly when Subordinator Noplainly Conj-adverb Yespresently Conj-adverb Nopresumably because Subordinator Yespreviously Conj-adverb Yesprovided that Subordinator Yesproviding that Subordinator Yesput another way Conj-adverb Yesrather Conj-adverb Yesreciprocally Conj-adverb Yesregardless of that Conj-adverb Yesregardless of whether Subordinator Nosecond Conj-adverb Yessecondly Conj-adverb Yesseeing as Subordinator Nosimilarly Conj-adverb Yessimply because Subordinator Yessimultaneously Conj-adverb Yessince Subordinator Yesso Subordinator Yesso that Subordinator Yessoon Conj-adverb Nospecically Conj-adverb Yesstill Conj-adverb Yessubsequently Conj-adverb Yessuch that Subordinator Yessuddenly Conj-adverb Nosummarising Conj-adverb Yessumming up Conj-adverb Yessuppose Phr.w/scomp Yessuppose that Phr.w/scomp Yes
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 168Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysissupposing that Subordinator Yessure enough Conj-adverb Yessurely Conj-adverb Yesthat is Conj-adverb Yesthat is to say Conj-adverb Yesthat's all Sentence Nothat's how Phr.w/scomp Nothat's when Phr.w/scomp Nothat's why Phr.w/scomp Nothe fact is that Phr.w/scomp Yesthe rst time Subordinator Nothe moment Phr.w/scomp Nothe more often Subordinator Yesthe next time Subordinator Nothe one time Phr.w/scomp Nothe thing is Phr.w/scomp Nothen Coordinator Yesthen again Conj-adverb Yesthereafter Conj-adverb Yesthereby Conj-adverb Yestherefore Conj-adverb Yesthird Conj-adverb Yesthirdly Conj-adverb Yesthis means Phr.w/scomp Nothis time Conj-adverb Yesthough Subordinator Yesthough Conj-adverb Nothus Conj-adverb Yesto be precise Prep Phrase Noto be sure Conj-adverb Yesto begin with Conj-adverb Yesto conclude Conj-adverb Yesto make matters worse Conj-adverb Noto start with Conj-adverb Yesto sum up Conj-adverb Yesto summarise Conj-adverb Yesto take an example Conj-adverb Yesto the degree that Subordinator Yesto the extent that Subordinator Yestoo Conj-adverb Yestrue Conj-adverb Yesultimately Conj-adverb Yesundoubtedly Conj-adverb Yes
APPENDIX A. THE CORPUS OF CUE PHRASES 169Phrase Syntacticcategory In corpusanalysisunfortunately Conj-adverb Nounless Subordinator Yesuntil Subordinator Yesuntil then Prep Phrase Nowe might say Phr.w/scomp Yeswell Conj-adverb Nowhat is more Conj-adverb Yeswhen Subordinator Yeswhenever Subordinator Yeswhere Subordinator Yeswhereas Conj-adverb Yeswherein Subordinator Yeswhereupon Conj-adverb Nowherever Subordinator Yeswhether or not Subordinator Nowhich is why Phr.w/scomp Nowhich means Phr.w/scomp Nowhich reminds me Phr.w/scomp Nowhile Subordinator Yeswhilst Subordinator Nowith that Prep. Phrase Noyet Coordinator Yesyou know Phr.w/scomp No
Appendix BThe Taxonomy of Cue PhrasesThis appendix contains the taxonomy of cue phrases which forms the basis for thefeature denitions motivated in Chapter 6. It was created prior to the development ofthese denitions; the intention is that it should reect theory-neutral intuitions aboutthe substitution relationships between cue phrases, and that the feature denitionsshould then be based on these intuitions.1The taxonomy presented here is complex: around 150 phrases have so far been incor-porated. In order to achieve a complete taxonomy, the substitutability relationshipbetween each pair of phrases must be represented; in other words, for any two phrasesX and Y in the corpus, it must be specied whether X is synonymous with, hypony-mous to, hypernymous to, exclusive with, or contingently intersubstitutable with Y .For a taxonomy of 150 phrases, this means that (150149)=2 (= 11175!) relationshipsmust be documented. Using diagrams of the type described in Chapter 4, the greatmajority of the work can be done by inheritance; but there is still large amount ofinformation to be depicted. Some further principles of organisation have thus beenused; these were described briey in Section 4.6.4, and are described in more detailbelow.B.1 Exclusive Phrases and Multicategory PhrasesThe taxonomy is roughly organised into ten categories, as can be seen in the `toplevel' diagram in Figure B.1. The categories are as follows: sequences, causes,results, restatements, temporal relations, negative polarity relations,additional information relations, hypothetical relations, similarity re-lations, and digression relations. These categories only permit a rough divisionof phrases: some phrases (termed exclusive phrases) are unique to a single cate-gory, but others (termedmulticategory phrases) appear in more than one category.Because of multicategory phrases, the categories in Figure B.1 are all be depicted as1 In fact, a few of the phrases discussed in Chapter 6 have not yet been incorporated into the taxonomy.However, for these phrases, the relevant substitution relationships are given in Chapter 6 itself. Thedecision not to include them here too was made in an eort to keep `pre-theoretical' and `post-theoretical' intuitions separate. 170
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 171contingently substitutable with each other. Figure B.2 provides more detail, showingthe exclusivity between the exclusive phrases in each category.Relationships between the phrases within the individual categories are given in Fig-ures B.3 to B.12. Each of these gures isolates a single category, and shows how the exclusive phrases in the category relate to each other; how the exclusive phrases in the category relate to the multicategory phraseswhich belong to that category; how the exclusive phrases in the category relate to the multicategory phraseswhich do not belong in that category. (These are called non-shared multi-category phrases, and obviously none of them are substitutable for any of theexclusive phrases in the category.)Finally, in Figure B.13, the relationships between all the multicategory phrases aregiven. The gures thus provide a complete description of the relationships between allthe cue phrases, multicategory and exclusive.B.2 A Note about `Re-Entrancy' in the TaxonomyBecause of the way the taxonomy is organised, many of its phrases appear in more thanone diagram. Thus, all the multicategory phrases appear in Figures B.3 through B.12,and in Figure B.13. The higher-level categories in the taxonomy (such as sequencesand exclusive sequence phrases) are also depicted more than once: they appearin the top-level diagrams in Figures B.1 and B.2, as well as in the gure correspondingto their own category. Identical categories appearing in separate diagrams are tobe regarded as `one and the same object' in the taxonomy, and the sum of all therelationships of this object with other objects in the taxonomy is given by the unionof the relations depicted in all the dierent diagrams.This has an important consequence for the depiction of contingent substitutabilityrelationships in the taxonomy. These relationships, it will be recalled, are only inferredas a default, if none of the other relationships can be inferred. The distribution of thetaxonomy diagram over several pages means that each appearance of a item in thetaxonomy must be considered before a contingent substitutability relationship can beinferred. For instance, from Figure B.1 in isolation, we would conclude that the phrasesfrom the sequences category are all contingently substitutable with those from thecauses category. But other parts of the diagram present exceptions to this default:for example, in Figure B.2, the `exclusive' sequence phrases are depicted as exclusivewith the `exclusive' cause phrases.B.3 Additional Notation Used in the DiagramsFinally, there are two points to note about the notation used in Figures B.3 throughB.12. Firstly, in each diagram, the non-shared multicategory phrases are always
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 172grouped together in a single box. This is just to make the diagrams easier to un-derstand: the true relations between all the multicategory phrases are given in Fig-ure B.13. Secondly, in each diagram, the arcs linking the exclusive phrases to the boxentitled `exclusive phrases' have been left out, again to make the diagrams easier toread. Instead, exclusive phrases appear in bold type. Thus, for example, in Figure B.3,the phrases furthermore, lastly, etc are all assumed to be connected to the exclusivesequence phrases box.B.4 A Note about the Linguistic ExamplesFigures B.3 through B.2 each include a set of example texts; the kind of texts whichcan be used to motivate the substitutability diagrams. In each case, the examples havebeen picked to illustrate a selection of the substitutability relationships in the diagram.It is not possible to provide all the examples needed to motivate the diagrams. For onething, claims about synonymity, exclusivity, hyponymity or hypernymity all expressgeneral statements about all possible linguistic contexts: they cannot be veried bylinguistic data, only falsied. Only the relationship of contingent intersubstitutabilitycan be motivated by a nite number of examples: here, only three examples are needed;one providing a context in which two phrases X and Y are substitutable, one providinga context in which X is not substitutable for Y , and one providing a context in whichY is not substitutable for X . Even in this latter case, due to lack of space, motivatingexamples are not always given; but it is normally quite easy to think of them.
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Figure B.1: The Top Level of the Taxonomy































PHRASESFigure B.2: `Exclusive Phrases'
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 175It looks asthough Danwas preparingto sail. 8>><>>: For a start,p For one thing,p Firstly,p To start with,# First,# And 9>>=>>; he had taken o the sail covers andthreaded the sheets; furthermore, I saw himchecking the motor.Dan set aboutmaking theboat ready tosail. 8><>: First,p To begin with,p First of all,# For one thing,# Or 9>=>; he took o the sail covers and threaded thesheets; then he checked the motor.Dan set about making the boat ready. Hetook o the sail cover and threaded thesheets; 8>>>>><>>>>>: thenp andp afterwards,p later on,p after this,p in addition,p too !p as well !# furthermore,# besides, 9>>>>>=>>>>>; he checked themotor.It looks as though Dan was preparing tosail. He had taken o the sail cover andthreaded the sheets; 8>>><>>: what is more,p andp in addition,p too !p for another thing,# after this,# besides, 9>>>=>>; I saw himchecking themotor.We should swap Liz andKim. Liz is excellent indefence, 8>>><>>>>: whereasp andp whilep in addition,p furthermore,p on the other hand,# after this,# alternatively, 9>>>=>>>>; Kim is much better in goal.There are severalpossibilities. It could be inthe oce; 8>>>><>>>>: orp andp alternatively,p as well !p thenp next# after this,# besides, 9>>>>=>>>>; it could be at home; nally,it could be at Phil's place.I don't think that Bob canwin. Firstly, he's out oftraining; 8>>>><>>>: secondly,p next,p (and)p thenp on top of this# lastly,# besides,# after this, 9>>>>=>>>; he's running at altitude;and nally, he's up againstsome pretty toughopponents.Figure B.3: Sequence Phrases: Examples of Substitutability




































since, that is, that is to say,














Figure B.3: Sequence Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 177Sally left the enginerunning 8><>: in case# in that# now that# because# when 9>=>; she was in a hurry when shecame back.It's a good proposal,  except insofar asp except in that# except because  it makes no provision forbad debt.It's a fairly good piece ofwork, 8>>><>>: considering thatp given thatp seeing as# because# in that# to the extent that# when 9>>>=>>; you have been under a lotof pressure lately.The proposal is useful, 8>>><>>>>: becausep sincep asp in thatp insofar as# seeing as# to the extent that# considering that 9>>>=>>>>; it gives us a fallbackposition if the forthcomingnegotiations collapse.8>><>>: Seeing asp Given thatp Considering thatp Becausep Since# To the extent that 9>>=>>; we've got nothing but circumstantial evidence in this case,it's going to be dicult to get a conviction.Compulsive gamblers fallinto their addiction  because# on the grounds that# since  it provides an escape,however temporary, fromthe real world.I have had this violin  since# because# when  I was a boy.John stayed in bed thatday, 8><>: becausep asp sincep on the grounds that# in that 9>=>; he was sick.John must have been sickon Monday, 8>><>>: becausep sincep asp given that# on the grounds that# now that 9>>=>>; he stayed in bed all day.Figure B.4: Cause Phrases: Examples of Substitutability
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 178
now that
now













anyway, anyhow, until, finally, and,
that is, that is to say, to conclude, in








at last, while(1), on the other hand,
also, either(1)





forFigure B.4: Cause Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 179Jim summoned his nerveand made a break for thedoor; 8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>: at that,p instantly,p andp after this,p thenp as a result,p consequently,p so# in conclusion,# it follows that# to this end,# nally,# thereby,
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>; pandemonium broke out inthe bar.Sue left the country beforethe year was up; 8>>><>>>>: in so doing,p thereby !p immediately !p andp so# in short,# at that,# to this end, 9>>>=>>>>; she lost her right topermanent residence.We waited outside Mullen'sdoor for three hours: 8><>: at last,p nally,# instantly,# at that,# in doing this, 9>=>; he agreed to see us.The footprints are deep,and clearly dened. 8>>><>>>: It follows thatp Plainly,p That is to say,p Sop Therefore,# As a result,# Finally, 9>>>=>>>; the thief was a heavy man.The number is divisible byfour; 8>><>>: it follows thatp as a result,p hencep thus# instantly,# this way, 9>>=>>; it is divisible by two.One night, Van Diemennailed a pair of clogs toMortimer's door. 8><>: From then on,p Thereafter,p After this,p (and)# All in all, 9>=>; Mortimer stopped comingto the Dog and Duck.Mary held her breath, 8>><>>: untilp so thatp andp (nally)# from then on,# obviously 9>>=>>; she turned bright red.Figure B.5: Result Phrases: Examples of Substitutability
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 180
that is























since, when, or, or else, while(2),































Figure B.5: Result Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 181
She'll be here at threeo'clock this afternoon. 8>>>>><>>>>: At any rate,p At leastp Or rather,p That is,# In other words,# To recap,# In conclusion,# All in all,# Anyway, 9>>>>>=>>>>; she hoped to be here atthree: she might be a fewminutes late.It's high quality, good valuefor money, and easy to use: 8>>><>>: all in all,p to conclude,p in short,p summing up,# or rather,# on the other hand,# at least, 9>>>=>>; the RX-470 is an excellentpackage, and we highlyrecommend it.As we have already seen,the story he told to Foleywas completely dierent tothe story he has given us. 8>>><>>>>: In conclusion,p To conclude,p In other words,p In short,# All in all,# To summarise,# To recap,# Or rather, 9>>>=>>>>; he must be lying tosomeone.Foley doesn't like cowards;and if you don't agree tomeet him, he'll think you'rea coward. If you face up tohim, he'll respect you, andhe'll be more likely to makeconcessions. 8>>>><>>>>>: To sum up,p To recap,p Summing up:p In conclusion,p That is to say,p In other words,p All in all,# Or rather,# Anyway, 9>>>>=>>>>>; we do think you should goto the meeting, but wedon't think that you shouldagree to his demands.The latest reports indicatethat she doesn't want tovisit our country. 8>>>>><>>>>>: Or rather,p That is,p That is to say,# At any rate,# At least,# In conclusion,# All in all,# In other words,# To recap, 9>>>>>=>>>>>; she does want to visit, butnot in the present politicalclimate.Figure B.6: Restatement Phrases: Examples of Substitutability







RESTATEMENT RESTATEMENTS TOP LEVEL
since, when, until, afterwards,
or, or else, finally, while(2),
on the other hand, then(1),
that is















either(1),  also, and
Figure B.6: Restatement Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 183Jim felt the pain for therst time 8>>><>>: asp whenp while# Meanwhile# and# once# after 9>>>=>>; he was travelling to work.It was a lazy Sundayafternoon. Bill tinkeredwith his old Honda, 8>>>><>>>: whilep andpMeanwhile,p as# when# then# nally# previously 9>>>>=>>>; Bob mooched about on thedeck reading the papers.8>><>>: AspWhen# While# After# Until# Ever since 9>>=>>; the children rushed by, Bob noticed that some of them werecrying.8>><>>: The instantp As soon asp After# As# Once# While 9>>=>>; we had stepped out of the house, there was a huge clap ofthunder.8><>: Oncep As soon asp Afterp The moment# As 9>=>; we had left the house, Jim began to talk more freely.I have been frightened ofbees 8>><>>: ever sincep since# ; previously,# ; beforehand,# once# after 9>>=>>; I was a child.The service begins at nineo'clock; 8>>><>>>: afterwards,p from then on,p after this,p andp then# later on,# after 9>>>=>>>; it runs every half an hour.Jim had a tattoo donewhile he was on service inthe Philippines. 8><>: Later onp Laterp Afterwards# And# Following this 9>=>; he regretted it, because itmade it harder for him tond a job.Figure B.7: Temporal Phrases: Examples of Substitutability
















TEMPORAL TEMPORAL RELATIONS TOP LEVEL
that is, that is to say, to conclude,
in conclusion, either(1), or, or else,




















thereafterFigure B.7: Temporal Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 185Jim didn't go to school thatmorning;  instead,# rather,# but  he stayed in bed.It is not the governmentthat is to blame;  rather,# instead,# but  it is the civil service.She's part-time; 8>><>>: butp however,p even so,p in spite of this,# although# while 9>>=>>; she does more work thanthe rest of us put together.She does more work thanthe rest of us put together,  even though# but# while  she's part-time.That night, Bill and Bob were dressed verydierently. Bill was wearing a red suit; 8>>><>>>: whereasp andp on the other hand,# but# having said that,# though# all the same, 9>>>=>>>; Bob waswearing a blueone.Jim was starving;  butp however,# nevertheless,  there was no food in thehouse.We could go out for a walk. 8>>><>>>: Having said that,p Then again,p On the other hand,# Whereas# And# Though# Despite this, 9>>>=>>>; it's raining: we may bebetter o indoors.Give me your money; 8<: otherwise,p or# alternatively,# and 9=; I'll punch you. Even thoughpWhile# Whereas  I am normally a timid man, on this occasion I was roused toanger.Bill and Bob could not bemore dierent.  WhereaspWhile# Though  Bill excels in all kinds ofsports, Bob lives for hisschoolbooks.8<: Eitherp (Unless)p (Until)# On one hand 9=; you settle the matter amicably, or you will never be friendsagain.Figure B.8: Negative Polarity Phrases: Examples of Substitutability




















since, when, anyway, afterwards,
after this, eventually, at last,
either(2)
on one hand






















in spite of this
finally, then(1), either(1), too, also,
that is, that is to say, to conclude,
in conclusion
while(2)
Figure B.8: Negative Polarity Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 187I don't despise him at all: 8>><>>: on the contrary,p even !p indeedp as a matter of fact,p in fact# in point of fact, 9>>=>>; I have a lot of respect forhim.I liked Perkins a great deal: 8>>><>>>: indeedp actually,p in fact,# even# on the contrary,# in point of fact,# in truth, 9>>>=>>>; the whole squadron likedhim.We all liked Perkins. 8><>: Even# Indeed,# On the contrary,# In fact,# Actually, 9>=>; the sergeant-major likedhim.Fred treated us very wellwhile we were staying withhim: he was verythoughtful. He 8><>: even# indeed# on the contrary# in fact# actually 9>=>; drove us to the airportwhen we left.Grandpa's always going onabout his experiencesduring the war. 8>>>><>>>: In truth,p In point of fact,p In fact,p Actually,p As a matter of fact,# Indeed,# Even,# On the contrary, 9>>>>=>>>; he was only in the cateringcorps; but he still seems tohave had a pretty hairytime.Figure B.9: Additional Information Phrases: Examples of Substitutability
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 188
MULTICATEGORY PHRASES
TOP LEVEL in fact
in actual fact
actually
as a matter of facteven
on the contrary
in truth











Figure B.9: Additional Information Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 1898>><>>: If onlyp Ifp (Supposing that)# If ever# As long as# On condition that 9>>=>>; I had spoken up in yesterday's meeting, they would havebeen eating out of my hand by now! If everp If# If only  I strike it rich, I promise that I'll give you a fty percentshare in the business.8>><>>: If everp Ifp (Supposing)# If only# As long as# On condition that 9>>=>>; she decided to leave me, I would be heartbroken.8><>: As long as# If# On condition that# If ever# If only 9>=>; the Tories are in power, we have no chance of electoralreform.You can stay up with us 8><>: on condition thatp as long asp if# if ever# if only 9>=>; you promise to be quiet.8>><>>: Assuming thatp Supposing thatp Ifp As long as# If ever# On condition that 9>>=>>; I really am one of the lucky winners, then that holiday inTonga may be on the cards after all!8><>: Assuming thatp Supposing thatp (Suppose that)p If# If ever 9>=>; they are travelling at about sixty miles an hour, they willarrive in about twenty minutes.Suppose that Liz hadgenuinely forgotten ourappointment:  in that case,p if so,p (then)  she wouldn't have soundedso apologetic on the phonethis evening.If you behave well tonight,  then# if so,# in that case  you'll have extra pocketmoney on Friday.Figure B.10: Hypothetical Phrases: Examples of Substitutability



















on the assumption that
assuming that
if
Figure B.10: Hypothetical Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 191Jim jumped o the cli, soBill 8>><>>: alsop as well !p too !# in addition# either# just as 9>>=>>; jumped o.I don't like Jim. He has nosense of humour; 8>><>>: In addition,p either !p also# as well# too# as 9>>=>>; he has no brains.Jip swam 8>><>>: just asp asp the way# and# also# either 9>>=>>; all dogs swim: head up,with an expression of panic.Figure B.11: Similarity Phrases: Examples of Substitutability
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 192
following this, or, or else, finally,
while(2), on the other hand
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Figure B.11: Similarity Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 193We were talking aboutFrank, and about how tidyhis at is these days. It'squite amazing, consideringhow it used to look. 8>>>><>>>>: Incidentally,p By the way,# And# Anyway,# Actually,# Besides,# Then# However, 9>>>>=>>>>; did you know that Frankhas given up his job? He'snow writing full time.Maybe that's why he'sturned over a new leaf. . .Figure B.12: Digression Phrases: Examples of Substitutability













Figure B.12: Digression Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
APPENDIX B. THE TAXONOMY OF CUE PHRASES 195We were all shocked 8<: when# since# in other words# and 9=; we heard that Kennedy hadbeen assasinated.Forensic has drawn a blank, door-to-doorquestioning is getting nowhere, and we can'teven begin to think of a motive. 8>><>>: In short,# When# Ever since# And# Anyway,# On the other hand, 9>>=>>; the case is acompleteshambles.John walked all afternoon 8>>>><>>>>: , untilp , andp , thenp ; nallyp ; eventually# , or# ; on the other hand,# ; either 9>>>>=>>>>; he reached a huge forest.I'm not sure whether sheshould get the job. She ispretty smart; 8>><>>: on the other hand,# whereas,# nally,# after this,# or esle# until 9>>=>>; she didn't show muchenthusiasm in the interview.It could be in the kitchen; 8>>>>><>>>>>: orp alternativelyp on the other hand,p also !p as well !# either# whereas# until# anyway, 9>>>>>=>>>>>; it could be in the livingroom.I'm more or less acommitted socialist, 8<: whereas# also# either# too 9=; she's far to the right ofGenghis Khan.It's good idea to keep themin their present jobs.Mullen has a air forresearch; 8>><>>: andp also,p whereas# as soon as# thereafter,# either 9>>=>>; Clarke is well suited toeldwork.Figure B.13: Multicategory Phrases: Examples of Substitutability











































Figure B.13: Multicategory Phrases: Substitutability Diagram
Appendix CThe Core Set of FeaturesMotivated from the TaxonomyThis appendix gives denitions for the eight features motivated in Chapter 6, along withsome explanation of the variables in terms of which they are dened. The denitionsgiven here are slightly dierent from those given in Chapter 6, as in this chapter theywere introduced one by one, and reference could not be made to constructs yet to beintroduced.A relation is specied as holding between two adjacent text spans, SA and SC . Theorder of these spans is not initially specied.Variables used in one denition have scope across all other denitions: thus, for in-stance, the value of A or C in one denition is expected to unify with the values of Aand C in other denitions.source of coherencesemantic: the intended eect of the text containing the relation is thatthe reader believes some relation holds between two propositions A andC. A and C are the propositional contents of the two related text spansSA and SC .pragmatic: the intended eect of the text containing the relation isthat some relation actually holds between two propositions A and C. Aand C are the intended eects of the two related text spans SA and SC .anchorcause-driven: A 2 P1 : : :Pn; P1 ^ : : :^ Pn is true.result-driven: A corresponds to Q; and A is desired by the protago-nist. 197
APPENDIX C. THE CORE SET OF FEATURES 198pattern of instantiationunilateral: C 0 is on the same side of the rule as A0 (but not the sameas A).bilateral: C0 is on the opposite side of the rule to A0.focus of polarityanchor-based: F = A; F 0 = A0; I = C; I 0 = C0.counterpart-based: F = C; F 0 = C0; I = A; I 0 = A0.polaritypositive: F = F 0; I = I 0;negative: F = :F 0; I = I 0.presuppositionalitypresupposed: Precond is part of the left-hand side of the ruleX1 ^ : : : ^Xn ! Y , and A is Y .non-presupposed: Precond is A itself.modal statusactual: Precond is known by the protagonist/writer.hypothetical: Precond is not known by the protagonist/writer.rule typecausal: the defeasible rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is a causal rule.inductive: the defeasible rule P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q is an inductive rule.There follows a brief description of each of the variables used in these denitions. SA: the text span associated with the anchor of the relation. SC : the text span associated with the counterpart of the relation. P1 ^ : : :^ Pn ! Q: the rule linking A0 and C0. A: the anchor of the relation.
APPENDIX C. THE CORE SET OF FEATURES 199 C: the counterpart of the relation. A0: the anchor after the polarity transformation has taken place. C0: the counterpart after the polarity transformation has taken place. F : the focus of polarity. Represents either the anchor or the counterpartbefore the polarity transformation. I : the invariant. Represents either the anchor or the counterpart before thepolarity transformation. F 0: represents either the anchor or the counterpart after the polarity transfor-mation. I 0: represents either the anchor or the counterpart after the polarity transforma-tion. X1 ^ : : :^Xn ! Y : the rule for linking A to Precond. Precond: the proposition associated with the context preceding (or overlappingwith) spans SA and SC .
Appendix DA Preliminary Set of RelationDenitionsThis appendix contains a table giving the set of relation denitions as it has so far beenworked out. In fact, it is better thought of as containing denitions of cue phrases thandenitions of relations. As argued in Section 6.4.2, the set of relation denitions shouldprobably be regarded as an overlay on the set of cue phrase denitions. The issue ofwhether `high-level' phrases should ever be thought of as markers of `more abstract'relations was left unresolved; therefore it might be that the denitions of some ofthe higher-level cue phrases in the table should be left out of the nal set of relationdenitions. But in any case, it should not be necessary to devise any denitions inaddition to those presented in the table.A number of other caveats should be mentioned before the table is presented. Firstly, Ihave just selected a subset of cue phrases to look at at this stage. I have aimed to choosea wide range of dierent phrases, rather than to consider them in any particular order.In fact, the table is best seen as bringing together a collection of additional hypothesesto investigate in the style of Chapter 6. As has already been stressed, it was notpossible to consider each phrase or each combination of feature values in detail in thischapter.Secondly, the set of features used to frame the denitions is still not complete. Again, asemphasised in Chapter 6, there are many patterns of substitutability in the taxonomywhich the current set of features does not yet seem able to explain; further featureshave still to be motivated.Finally, there are many places where I am not sure of the value of a particular feature.These places are left blank, and should be distinguished from boxes containing a dash(|), which denote that a feature is undened.200
APPENDIX D. A PRELIMINARY SET OF RELATION DEFINITIONS 201D.1 A Table of Cue Phrase DenitionsCue Phrase ANCHOR POLARITY RULE TYPEMODAL STATUSPATTERN OF INSTANTIATIONSOURCE OF COHERENCE PRESUPPOSITION- ALITYFOCUS OF POLARITYif SA, SC | | | count | pres hyp causSA; despite this, SC prag caus bilat count neg non act causeven if SA, SC | | count neg pres hyp causeven when SA, SC | count neg pres act causSA; otherwise SC res bilat anch neg non act causunless SA, SC prag caus bilat anch neg pres hyp causuntil SA, SC sem caus bilat anch neg pres act causbecause SA, SC prag bilat count pos pres act causSA, in order that SC prag res bilat pos pres causto SA, SC prag res pos pres causby SA, SC prag res bilat pos pres act causSA; instead SC unil count neg non act causSA; rather SC unil count neg non act causSA or SC | | | anch neg non hyp causSA; besides, SC prag unil count neg non causSC , before SA sem pres act causSA; instantly SC sem non act causSA; before long SC sem non act causSA; suddenly SC sem non act causSA; not that SC prag nonSA; even then SC neg | causSA; then SC | pos |SA; next SC | pos non actSA; nally SC | pos non actonly if SA, SC | neg pres hyp causonly when SA, SC sem neg pres act causSA; in that case, SC pos non hyp causSA, so SC | | bilat pos causSA; it follows that SC prag bilat pos non act causSA; as a result SC sem caus bilat count pos non act causSA; but SC | | | count neg non act |SA; as it happened, SC res unil | non act causSA; fortunately, SC sem res unil pos non act causSA; unfortunately, SC sem res unil neg non act causSA; on the other hand SC | unil neg non act indSA, whereas SC sem unil neg pres act indSA; then again, SC prag unil neg non act indadmittedly, SA; but SC prag | neg non actprovided that SA, SC bilat count | pres hyp causwhen SA, SC sem | | count pres actSA; meanwhile SC sem unil non act causwhile SA, SC | | | pres act |?SA and SC | | | non |?SA; furthermore, SC prag unil pos non act ind?
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